Aquinas on Powers --- One Interpretation (3)

In the last post, I tried to buttress Aquinas's (alleged) argument that the soul and its powers cannot be one and the same because I always have a soul, whereas I do not always exercise my soul's powers (there are times when I sleep, for instance, when I do not think). I further pointed out in the last post that each of the soul's powers require different circumstances for their actualization, and that provides another reason to say that the soul's powers must be distinct from each other (and, consequently, from the soul itself).

Now, suppose that we grant this. Still we might wonder: what sorts of things are the soul’s powers? According to Aquinas, they are qualities of the soul, perhaps similar to the way that a pale skin color is a quality of Socrates.

Of course, to compare the soul’s powers to the color of Socrates’ skin might suggest that the soul’s powers can be gained and lost, just like the color of Socrates’ skin. After all, Socrates’ skin color can change --- as would happen, say, if he went to the beach and got a tan. So surely the soul’s powers can change too.

But Aquinas rejects this, insisting instead that although the soul’s powers are qualities of the soul, they cannot be gained and lost in the way that Socrates’ skin color can. On the contrary, the soul’s powers are not the sorts of features that can ‘come and go’. Rather, they are permanently attached, so to speak, to the soul itself (so long as the soul exists).

I should note that Aquinas does not, so far as I know, ever offer an argument for the claim that the soul’s powers are qualities. But he did make this claim more than once throughout the course of his career, so I think we can safely assume that Aquinas is firmly committed to the idea that every human soul is accompanied by a set of distinct powers (qualities) that are permanently attached to it (so long as that soul exists).

One could easily take these ideas from Aquinas and generalize them. That is, one could easily insist that any power must be distinct from its basis when the thing that has the power in question also has its basis for any period of time when that power is not exercised. So, that is one interpretation of Aquinas's theory of powers.

Aquinas on Powers - One Interpretation (2)

In the last post, I mentioned that part of me thinks Aquinas's arguments about powers really boil down to a simple argument from identity: if A and B are identical, then anything true of the one must be true of the other, but since this is not the case with my soul and its powers (I always have soul, for instance, but I am not always thinking), it follows that my powers that are based on my soul must be different from my soul itself.

But one could buttress this argument even further. For we might point out that one of the characteristics of powers is that they can only be exercised in particular circumstances. For instance, wine glasses can be broken when they are dropped on a hard floor (in a world consisting only of soft cushiony floors, wine glasses would not break when dropped). Wine glasses might also be broken when they are struck with a swinging baseball bat. And so on.

We might then point out that each power of my soul is no different. Each power of my soul requires a different set of circumstances for its exercise too. For example, compare my power of sight with my power to remember things I have already seen. According to Aquinas, both of these are powers of my soul. However, it would seem that the former power can only be exercised in one set of circumstances (I must have my eyes open, there must be sufficient light, and so forth), whereas the latter power requires an entirely different set of circumstances (e.g., that what I saw before was adequately stored in my memory banks, and so forth).

Consequently, we might make the following inference: since each power of my soul requires a different set of circumstances for its exercise, it follows that each power of my soul must be distinct from every other power of my soul, and from my soul itself. Otherwise, I could not exercise one of my soul’s powers without exercising all of them at the same time. So, one might say, surely it follows that my soul and each of its powers must be distinct from each other.

Aquinas on Powers - One interpretation (1)

Throughout his career, Aquinas maintained that a human soul cannot be identical to its powers. I have translated a number of his arguments for this view (see the previous three posts), but I'm not sure I understand any of those arguments.

Part of me thinks that much of Aquinas's reasoning here boils down to the following simple argument: although I always have a soul as long as I exist, my soul’s powers are exercised only some of the time. For instance, so long as I am alive, I have a soul, but there are times in my life when I do not think, when I do not love, and so on. Consequently, my soul cannot be identical to any of my powers to perform these operations.

This is, of course, a simple argument from identity. That is, if any A and B are identical, then anything true of the one must be true of the other. But since this is not the case with my soul and its powers (for I always have a soul as long as I exist, but I do not always exercise my soul’s powers), Aquinas concludes that they must not be identical. Whatever my soul is then, it must be distinct from my power to think, my power to love, and so on.

I thought I could do otherwise, but I was mistaken

Let's assume that an action is free if it could have been otherwise: 

(T1*)  For any person x who performs an action A,
x performs A freely = iff
x could have done other than A,
given the same history. 

Now imagine the following scenario. Suppose you live in a big mansion. You're sitting in your study, reading an excellent philosophy book. I sneak up outside the door and lock you in, but I do this so stealthily that you don't even notice that I've done it. Soon it hits your bedtime (which is probably 9 o'clock), but after looking at your watch, you decide to stay and read a bit longer.

Was that a free choice? You couldn't have left, even though you don't know it. Some people might say that it is a free choice, even though you couldn't have done otherwise. If so, then this would be a counter-example to the idea that an action is free if it could have been otherwise.

We could go even further here and introduce moral responsibility. Let's assume that a person is morally responsible for what she does if and only if she could have done otherwise:


(T3)  For any person x who performs an action A,
x can be held morally responsible for A = iff
x could have done other than A,
given the same history.

Now suppose that we are back in the days of the cold war, and you decide to kill President Reagen. I find out about your scheme, and being a KGB spy, I want to ensure that you go ahead with it. While you're sleeping, I implant a little device in your head that will make you kill Reagen when activated. You know, in case you loose your nerve, I can activate the device, and you'll kill Reagen. But again, you don't know this. In the end, I don't need to activate the device, because you go ahead and kill Reagen anyway.

Would you be morally responsible for this? This is very nearly parallel to the last example. You couldn't have done otherwise, but you don't know it. Some people might think that you would be morally responsible, even though you couldn't have done otherwise. If so, then this is a counter-example to the idea that moral responsibility requires that you could have done otherwise.

(Notice a difference between these two examples: in both cases you do not know that you could not have done otherwise, but in the one case the question is whether you're free, and in the other case the question is whether you're morally responsible.)

Moral responsibility and free will

In my last post, I mentioned that some people say that a person can be held morally responsible for their actions if and only if they perform those actions freely, by which we mean they could have done otherwise than they did:

(T3)  For any person x who performs an action A,
x can be held morally responsible for A = iff
x could have done other than A,
given the same history.

This might be too strong. I'm not sure, but maybe. I'm thinking about cases where we have a very strong impulse to do something bad --- e.g., if someone held a gun to my head and made me smash your favorite porcelain plates, or if I stole your favorite porcelain plates so I could sell them and feed my crack addiction.

In these cases, someone could say:

'Look, you're still free there, because you could have done otherwise. You could have opted to be shot instead of smashing those plates, and you could have opted to suffer withdrawal instead of stealing those plates'.

Okay, sure. I'll grant that. After all, I'm assuming for the moment that an agent acts freely if they could have done otherwise. So these would be cases of 'free acts' in that sense. 

Still, would I be morally responsible for these actions? Probably not in the first case. (Unless I said something to you like this: 'I did it at gunpoint, man! You can't hold me responsible for destroying those plates that I hate so much'.)


I guess I'm saying that there might be cases where the accused had the choice to do otherwise than they did (and so were 'free' in that sense), but yet are not morally responsible for doing what they did. So I'm not sure I'd buy T3, which says that 'moral responsibility' and 'free action' extend to exactly the same cases.  

Moral responsibility and could-have-done-otherwise

Sometimes people say that moral responsibility requires free will, i.e., that we can act freely.

(T2)  For any person x who performs an action A,
x can be held morally responsible for A = iff
x performs A freely. 

But we can go further. We might assume that moral responsibility requires the sort of free will where we could have done otherwise. After all, when we say 'you should not have done what you did do', or 'you should have done what you did not do', we seem to be implying that you could have done otherwise. So if we assume that free will is this:

(T1*)  For any person x who performs an action A,
x performs A freely = iff
x could have done other than A,
given the same history.

Then one could say:

(T3)  For any person x who performs an action A,
x can be held morally responsible for A = iff
x could have done other than A,
given the same history.

Free will, could-have-done otherwise, and causal determinism

One common notion of free will is the idea of choice: you have a number of options in front of you, and you pick one. Or, perhaps a better way to talk about this is like so: you have free will if you could have done otherwise than you did. A provisional definition could be this:

(T1)  For any person x who performs an action A,
x performs A freely = iff
x could have done other than A. 

But that's not really good enough, because a determinist who believes that our actions are causally determined by our prior histories could agree with it. Such a determinist might say: 'of course you could have done otherwise, if you had a different history.'

Well, sure, I could have done otherwise if I had a different history. But that's still deterministic: one history determines me to do certain things, and another history determines me to do other things. And that's not really what I mean when I say that I could have done otherwise. What I really mean is that I could have done otherwise, even with the same history. So we could revise T1 something like this:

(T1*)  For any person x who performs an action A,
x performs A freely = iff
x could have done other than A,
given the same history.

That seems a little better.

More on Ockham against Henry's Solution to the Creation Problem

The interesting thing about Ockham’s argumentation here is that it highlights the precise point of comparison that Henry draws between the divine essence and matter. For Henry, the divine essence is like matter because it is not produced in the Son. But that’s the only reason that Henry really has to say that the divine essence is like matter at all.

Ockham points out that it is at least logically possible that the form is unproduced. God could take an already existing form, and create new matter under it.

I don’t know, let’s construct an example. Suppose an ancient king has his servants build a giant gold statue of himself. God doesn’t like the king’s arrogance, so he destroys the gold, and replaces it with rusty iron, but he keeps the statue’s shape throughout the whole process.

Then the king becomes the laughing stock of his people. They’re all standing around, pointing, pushing each other over in the bushes and laughing.

Maybe something like that.

There we would have a case where the matter is produced but the form is not! So as Ockham sees it, it’s at least logically possible that the form is the constituent that is unproduced, not the matter.

Consequently, thinks Ockham, Henry has no reason to say that the divine essence is like a lump of matter. It could just as well be like a form.

So Ockham rejects Henry’s view just like Scotus. But Ockham takes a different approach. He rejects the whole idea of drawing an analogy between the divine essence and matter. That’s just too slippery a slope for Ockham.

But again, what’s amazing here is that Ockham doesn’t label Henry as a heretic, neither does Scotus. I mean, in their day, Scotus and Ockham are the minority. They’re the dissentors. Henry’s view was fairly popular, and Scotus and Ockham were the ones sitting there telling their classmates, “you guys got it all wrong.”

Ockham against Henry on the Creation Problem

Now, let’s turn to Ockham. Ockham essentially agrees with Scotus’s conclusions. He agrees that the divine essence is not material, and he agrees that it is a pre-existing ingredient in the Son, and therefore the Son is not created from nothing.

But Ockham attacks Henry’s view in a different way than Scotus. Ockham points out, “Okay Henry, so you say the divine essence is a lump of matter. Either you mean that literally, or figuratively.”

Well, obviously the divine essence is not literally a lump of matter. Everybody agrees that the divine essence cannot possibly be material in any literal way. So Henry must mean that the divine essence is like a lump of matter.

But, says Ockham, if you want to say that two things are alike, they must have something in common, and that commonality is what you base your comparison on.

So, for instance, let’s suppose that Socrates had the embarassing social habit of chewing his cud. Well, then we could say that Socrates is like Beulah the cow, because both chew cuds.

So also in the divine case. If Henry wants to say that the divine essence is like a lump of matter, then Henry is going to have to identify some feature that the divine essence has in common with matter.

However, says Ockham, sometimes two things share their commonalities with other things too. For instance, it’s not just Socrates and Beulah that chew their cuds. Camels, llamas, giraffes, and other such things chew their cuds too.

So if the only basis of comparison that we have for Socrates and Beulah is that they chew their cuds, well then we could just as easily say Socrates is like Elsie the Giraffe, or Hank the Llama.

Likewise in the divine case, says Ockham. Everything imitates God in some way, so we could say that the divine essence is like all sorts of things. We could say the divine essence is like a stane, or a warrior, or a guardian angel, or whatever.

If we want to say that the divine essence is like a lump of matter rather than something else, we’ve got to identify something that the divine essence has in common only with a lump of matter.

So Ockham says: “Fine. Let’s suppose that we can identify something that the divine essence has in common only with a lump of matter.”

But then, what if the divine essence has something in common only with something else too? For instance, the divine essence has certain things in common only with forms. Forms make things certain kinds of things. A human form makes something human, a bovine form makes something a cow, and so on. Similarly, the divine essence makes the divine persons divine, so it’s like a form in that very sense. And that’s something the divine essence has in common only with forms.

So even if we can say identify something that the divine essence has in common with matter, we can also identify something that the divine essence has in common with forms. So why should we say that the divine essence is like a lump of matter? We have just as much reason to say it is like a form!

As Ockham sees it, Henry is really on a slippery slope. Ockham’s a very literal kind of guy. He doesn’t like this analogy stuff. It doesn’t really do much philosophical work. So Ockham not only rejects the idea that the divine essence is literally a lump of matter, he also rejects the analogy.

Scotus on the Creation Problem

As I explained in the last post, Scotus argues against Henry of Ghent: the divine essence is not like 'materials' that the Son is made from. It's more like a shared form. Still, that leaves the question that Henry was grappling with: what about the Creation problem? Wouldn't the Son be created if he were not produced without any 'pre-existing materials'?

To that, Scotus says that the Son is not created. In order for something to be created, Scotus says it must be produced with at least one pre-existing ingredient. But that doesn’t have to be some kind of material. It could be a form, or any other sort of constituent. What matters is simply that it is a pre-existing ingredient, so to speak.

So as Scotus sees it, we don’t need to say that the Son is produced with materials in order to avoid the Creation Problem. All we need to say is that the Son is produced with some sort of pre-existing ingredient. And of course, the divine essence is a pre-existing ingredient in the Son, because it already exists in the Father.

But it’s not like a lump of matter or any other sort of material. We don’t need to appeal to materials to solve the Creation Problem.

What’s interesting here is that Scotus accuses Henry of being incoherent. Scotus doesn’t say to Henry, “you’re a heretic,” or anything like that. There’s nothing religious about this. This is purely philosophical. Scotus rejects Henry’s view simply on philosophical grounds.

This is amazing to me. You would think that one of the first things people would say to Henry is that he is heretical. God is not material in any way. But that wasn’t the case. Henry garnered a healthy group of followers. So these scholastic Christians didn’t see Henry as a heretic or a nutjob. Henry’s view seemed to many as perfectly sane.

So this tells me that we need to be very careful about our pre-conceived ideas of medieval philosophy. We need to be careful about thinking of medieval philosophy as an era of superstition, or the Dark Ages, or everybody just bowing to the Pope. There was some really imaginative philosophical thinking going on here.

But again, this is all stuff that we’re just learning about. There’s a lot of really interesting stuff here in the medieval period, and we’re only just starting to learn about it.

Duns Scotus against Henry on the Creation Problem

Even though Henry of Ghent garnered a healthy group of followers (see the last post for details), there were some dissentors. Scotus was one of the students that grew up under Henry. In fact, Scotus may have even sat in Henry’s classroom. But unlike many of his classmates, Scotus was not happy with Henry’s theory. Scotus was against it.

Scotus’s real problem with Henry’s view is this: it makes the divine essence the subject of incompatible properties. I mean, fatherhood and sonship are incompatible. In logic, we would call them irreflexive relations. Someone can be the father of someone else, and someone can be the son of someone else. But nobody can be the father and son of himself, right? So if the divine essence were like a lump of matter that exemplified both fatherhood and sonship, then the divine essence would be both the father and son of itself! And that’s just flat out impossible.

Indeed, that’s like saying that a lump of clay is shaped like both a statue and a vase at the same time. But that’s crazy. A lump of clay has got to be one or the other, it can’t be both.

So Scotus thinks we cannot say that the divine essence is like a lump of matter or subject of fatherhood and sonship. On the contrary, says Scotus, the divine essence has got to be more like a form that the persons share.

Henry of Ghent on How the Son is Produced 'From Materials'

As I explained in the last post, Henry of Ghent argues that the Son must be produced from materials in some sense, for otherwise the Son would quite literally be created 'from nothing'. Still, Henry recognizes that he needs to explain how that is possible.

To do that, Henry points out that according to Aristotle, you produce things by taking a lump of matter and giving it a form. As an analogy, a sculptor makes a clay statue by taking a lump of clay, and giving it a statue shape. Similarly, says Aristotle, anything that gets produced is made by taking a lump of matter and giving it a form.

Henry likes this model. He points out, “look, the matter is not produced, but the form is”. A sculptor doesn’t produce the clay. She simply gives it a shape. Something similar happens in the Godhead.

According to Henry, and indeed all his scholastic contemporaries, each divine person includes two ingredients: first, there’s a shared divine essence. This is a single item that all three share. So it’s not like sharing a piece of cake where you cut it up into pieces and dish it out. The divine essence is one, undivided thing that exists in all three persons.

Second, each person has a unique ingredient that belongs only to them. These are called ‘personal properties’. So to take the Father and Son, the Father’s unique ingredient is called fatherhood, and the son’s is called sonship. So the Father and Son each share one divine essence, but they also each have their own unique ingredient, fatherhood or sonship.

Henry then says, “look, the divine essence is shared by the Father and Son. So the Father doesn’t produce it in the Son. He just shares it. Sonship, on the other hand, does get produced with the Son. It is unique to the Son, so it only exists when the Son does. So the divine essence is not produced in the Son, but his sonship is.”

And that’s just like a clay statue. The clay does not get produced, but its shape does. So Henry concludes that the divine essence is like a lump of matter, and the personal properties are like forms.

If you can imagine three gold statues all made from the same lump of gold at the same time, that’s very close to what Henry has in mind.

Now, if you think about the medieval context here, this might seem like a really wild idea. This is the age of high scholasticism and perfect being theology, so surely Henry would get condemned as a heretic, and denounced as a crazy man.

But amazingly, that’s not the case. Henry actually ended up with a number of loyal supporters on this issue. Among his students, and even among the next generation of students after that, a number of them thought Henry had hit the nail on the head.

Solving the Creation and Subordination Problems

In the last two posts, I described what I call the 'Creation' and 'Subordination' problems. Here, I want to say something about different ways to solve these Problems. Christian scholastics are dealing with two sets of claims. On the one hand, they have a set from Aristotle and Avicenna (from Aristotle: things can only be produced with materials, from Avicenna: things produced without materials are created and inferior to their producers). On the other hand, they have their own Christian set of claims about divine production (namely, T1, T2, and T3 from the last two posts). As I explained in the last two posts, putting these two sets of claims together results in the Creation and Subordination Problems.

To avoid these two Problems, a scholastic thinker like Scotus or Ockham must reject something from either set of claims. As for the Christian claims (T1-T3), scholastics like Scotus and Ockham feel that T1 and T3 are required by Christian doctrine, for T1 is required by the Nicene Creed, and T3 is required to avoid subordinationism. Consequently, they are not going to reject T1 or T3. However, authors like Scotus or Ockham do not think that T2 is required for orthodoxy in the way that T1 and T3 are. Rather, they see T2 as just a very plausible claim.

In principle then, a scholastic thinker could reject T2, and that could be one way to avoid the Creation and Subordination Problems. For instance, if one were to say that the Son is, in fact, produced from some sort of pre-existing material, then the Son would not be created from nothing, and by consequence, the Son would not necessarily be less perfect than his producer (the Father).

But of course, T2 is extremely plausible, so anyone who wants to reject it would have to explain how a divine person --- who is entirely spiritual and therefore without any material components at all --- could be produced from 'pre-existing materials'. And that is certainly no easy task.

Alternatively, someone Scotus or Ockham could reject one of the claims from Aristotle or Avicenna. That too could be a way to avoid the Creation and Subordination Problems. However, Aristotle’s and Avicenna’s theories are designed to explain production, so if one were to reject a part of these theories, they would have to provide an alternative account, and that too is no easy task.

Divine production and the 'Subordination Problem'

In the Christian tradition, 'subordinationism' is the idea that one divine person is less perfect than another. This is considered a heresy; the divine persons are all supposed to be equal. Thus, one might think that when one divine person produces another, the product must be just as perfect as its producer(s):

(T3) For any divine persons x and y, if x produces y, x and y are equal in perfection.

However, T3 conflicts with Avicenna’s theory of production. Avicenna maintains that whenever a product is produced without any pre-existing materials, it must be different in kind from its producer. Further, many medieval Aristotelians held the even more general claim that whenever a producer and its product are different in kind, the product must be less perfect than its producer.

But supposing all of that is right, then if a divine person were produced without any pre-existing materials (as T2 from the last post says), that person would then be different in kind, and therefore less perfect than its producer.

(1**) For any x and y, if x produces y without any material m, x and y are different in kind.
[From Avicenna.]

(2) The Father cannot produce the Son with any material m.
[From T2.]

(3**) Therefore, if the Father produces the Son, the Father and Son are different in kind.
[From (1**) and (2).]

(4**) For any x and y, if (i) x produces y, and (ii) x and y are different in kind, then y is less perfect than x.
[From any standard medieval Aristotelianism.]

(5) Therefore, if the Father produces the Son, the Son is less perfect than the Father.
[From (2), (3**), and (4**).]

But of course, that amounts to subordinationism, and it contradicts the Christian scholastic claim that

(6) the Father and Son are equal in perfection.
[From T3.]

Thus, scholastic thinkers like Scotus and Ockham cannot hold all these ideas together, on pain of contradiction. Again then, Avicenna’s theory leaves the Christian schoolmen with a problem, for Avicenna’s theory entails that if the Son and Spirit are produced, they are lesser deities. And that is not acceptable to a Christian scholastic Hence what I call the Subordination Problem: how can the Son and Spirit be produced, but not be lesser deities?

Divine production and the 'Creation Problem'

The Nicene Creed states that when the Father begets the Son, the Father does not create the Son out of nothing. For a Christian scholastic like Scotus or Ockham, this suggests that no divine person is created:

(T1) For any divine persons x and y, if x produces y, x does not create y from nothing.

Now, if the Son and Spirit cannot be produced from nothing, then it might be tempting to think that they must be produced from something. But what could that 'something' be? Surely it cannot be any pre-existing materials. After all, the Son and Spirit are spiritual beings, so how could they be 'made' from anything material? It seems very plausible to think that the Son and Spirit cannot be produced from materials at all. Thus:

(T2) For any divine persons x and y, if x produces y, x cannot produce y with any material M.

However, (T1) and (T2) lead to problems. Consider the following.

Aristotle maintains that nothing can be produced unless it is produced from pre-existing materials. According to (T2) though, a divine person (e.g., the Son) cannot be produced from pre-existing materials. Thus, a divine person (like the Son) cannot be produced at all:

(1) For any x and y, if x produces y, x cannot produce y without any material m.
[From Aristotle.]

(2) The Father cannot produce the Son with any material m.
[From T2.]

(3) Therefore, the Father cannot produce the Son.
[From (1) and (2).]

Of course, scholastics like Scotus and Ockham want to affirm that

(4) the Father produces the Son,

but that contradicts(3), so one cannot hold all these claims at the same time, on pain of contradiction.

In order to avoid this, one might be tempted to give up Aristotle’s claim in (1), just as Avicenna did. After all, Avicenna was a good Muslim, so he believed in creation: some things can be produced without pre-existing materials.

However, Avicenna also holds that if a product is produced without any pre-existing materials, then it must be created from nothing. And that would entail that if a divine person is produced without pre-existing materials (as T2 says), then that person would be created from nothing.

(1*) For any x and y, if x produces y without any material m, x creates y from nothing.
[From Avicenna.]

(2) The Father cannot produce the Son with any material m.
[From T2.]

(3*) Therefore, if the Father produces the Son, the Father creates the Son from nothing.
[From (1*) and (2).]

But according to the Nicene Creed, no divine person is created from nothing, so:

(4*) if the Father produces the Son, the Father does not create the Son from nothing.
[From T1.]

But that contradicts (3*), so again we get a contradiction.

On the face of it then, both Aristotle’s and Avicenna’s theories of production present scholastic authors like Scotus and Ockham with a problem. For Aristotle’s and Avicenna’s theories entail that either the Son and Spirit cannot be produced at all, or they must be created from nothing, and neither consequence is acceptable for the Christian schoolmen. Hence, what I call the Creation Problem: how can the Son and Spirit be produced, but not created?

Scotus on the 'indetermination' of active and passive powers

Scotus on the different ways that active and passive powers can be indifferent (or 'indeterminate') to the different activities they empower.

Lect., 1.3.3.2-3, n. 415 (Vat. 16: 390.22-391.6): 'dicendum quod indeterminatio duplex est: una est indeterminatio quae convenit causae materiali, et alia est indeterminatio quae convenit causae agenti universali et quodammodo illimitatae. Exemplum primi est de indeterminatione ligni respectu caloris vel alterius formae; exemplum secundi est de indeterminatione solis ad producendum hoc generabile vel illud; unde haec indeterminatio virtutis activae est ad agendum et non ad aliquam formam ab aliquo recipiendam. Quando igitur dicitur quod illud quod est indeterminatum requirit aliquam formam determinantem qua determinetur, verum est de potentia passiva’.

'It should be said to this that indetermination is twofold: one is the indetermination that belongs to material causes, and the other is the indetermination that belongs to a universal agent cause which, in a sense, is unlimited. An example of the first is the indetermination of a log with respect to heat or some other form. An example of the second is the indetermination of the sun with respect to producing this or that generable thing. Whence, the indetermination of active power is for acting, not for receiving some form from something. Thus, when it is said that something indeterminate requires some determining form to determine it, this is [only] true of passive power’.

Lect., 1.3.3.2-3, n. 415 (Vat. 16: 391.6-22): 'Si autem loquimur de indeterminatione causae effectivae, hoc contingit dupliciter: aliquando enim causa efficiens est indeterminata ad producendum aliquem effectum quem tamen immediate producere potest, et aliquando est determinata ad effectum producendum quem tamen sine causa proxima producere non potest. Loquendo autem de causa effectiva primo modo, ad hoc quod determinetur ad agendum sufficit praesentia passi, sicut sol habet virtutem qua immediate potest dissolvere et constringere: ad hoc quod dissolvat sufficit praesentia dissolubilis, ut glaciei, et ad hoc quod constringat sufficit etiam praesentia passi, ut luti; unde causa effectiva non determinatur per hoc quod aliquam formam recipit. Sed ad hoc quod causa effectiva secundo modo determinetur, sufficit praesentia passi cum praesentia causarum particularium concurrentium, sicut est de sole ad producendum animalia perfecta, ut asinum, bovem; requirit enim, ad hoc quod determinetur ad productionem bovis, causam particularem univocam, ut bovem et passum praesens’.

'But if we are talking about the indetermination of an effecting cause, it applies in [one of] two ways, for sometimes the effecting cause is indeterminate with respect to producing some effect that it can produce directly, and sometimes it is determined to produce some effect that it cannot produce without [the help of] a proximate cause. Speaking of an effecting cause in the first way, the presence of the recipient is enough to determine it to activity. For example, the sun has the power to melt or dry [something] directly, so the presence of something meltable (like ice) is sufficient for the sun to melt it, and the presence of some recipient (like mud) is sufficient for the sun to dry it. Whence, the effecting cause is not determined through the fact that it receives some form. But in order for an effective cause to be determined in the second way, the presence of the recipient along with the presence of [any] concurring particular causes is sufficient. An example is the sun’s ability to produce complete animals like donkeys or cows, for in order to produce a cow, the sun must [act along with] a particular univocal cause such as a cow, and a recipient must be present’.

Ibid., n. 416 (Vat. 16: 391.23-392.3): 'Dico igitur quod intellectus est indeterminatus ad eliciendum actum intelligendi, non indeterminatione causae materialis et passi sed indeterminatione causae activae, quae requirit causam aliam particularem, ad hoc quod causet intellectionem, --- et illa est obiectum, vel species in qua obiectum relucet; et ideo determinatur per obiectum et speciem. Sed non determinatur ipsa tamquam intellectum perficiat, ad hoc quod intelligat, sed determinatur sicut causa universalis et quodammodo illimitata, per causam particularem’.

'I say, then, that the intellect is indeterminate with respect to eliciting acts of understanding not by the indetermination of a material or recipient cause, but rather by the indetermination of an active cause which requires some other particular cause to bring about understanding. And that is the object or species in which the object ``shines through’’. For this reason, it is determined by the object and the species. But it is not determined such that it perfects the intellect enough to understand, but it is determined --- as a universal cause which is, in a certain sense, unlimited --- through a particular cause’.

Lect., 1.7.un., n. 26 (Vat. 16: 481.16-22): 'Sed contra hanc opinionem arguo sic: duplex est potentiae indeterminatio, sicut supra dictum est. Una enim est indeterminatio ``potentiae passivae’’, et haec est ad contradictoria, quae ad hoc quod determinetur, oportet quod recipiat (sicut lignum est in potentia ad calefaciendum et privatur calore aliquando, et ideo non vadit in actum nisi recipiat calorem); et haec est potentia passiva, quae est ``materiae’’’.

'But against this opinion [of Henry’s], I argue as follows. The indetermination of a power is twofold, as I said above. One is the indetermination of a ``passive power’’, and this is [indeterminate with respect] to contradictory [states of affairs]. In order for this [indeterminate power] to be determined [to one or the other state of affairs], it must receive [something]. For instance, a log has the potential to be heated, but sometimes it is deprived of heat, so it only becomes actually [hot] when it receives heat. This is the [indeterminacy of the] passive power of ``matter’’’.

Lect., 1.7.un., n. 26 (Vat. 16: 481.22-482.5): 'Alia est ``potentiae activae’’ indeterminatio, quae indeterminatio consequitur illimitationem suae causalitatis et suae virtutis, et haec potentia in naturalibus -- licet non in voluntate --- non est ad contradictoria; et ista potentia indeterminata, ad hoc quod determinetur, non recipit aliquam formam, sed sufficit praesentia passi si requirat passum (sicut sol est indeterminatus ad multos effectus indeterminatione et illimitatione quadam suae virtutis activae; et ideo ad hoc quod determinetur, non requiritur quod aliqua forma sibi imprimatur)’.

'The other [kind of] indetermination is that of ``active power’’, which is an indetermination that follows from the unlimitedness of its causality and power. And this power [that exists] in natural things -- though not in the will -- is not [an indetermination with respect] to contradictory [states of affairs]. In order for such an indeterminate power to be determined, it does not need to receive some form. Rather, it only requires the presence of a recipient (if it requires a recipient [at all]). For instance, the sun is indeterminate with respect to many effects by an indetermination and a certain unlimitedness that belongs to its active power. For this reason, in order for it to be determined [to some effect], it does not need to have some form imprinted in it’.

Lect., 1.7.un., n. 27 (Vat. 16: 482.6-17): 'Ex his arguitur sic: principium indeterminatum ``indeterminatione activa’’, quod est totale principium naturale et non ``voluntarium indifferens ad contradictoria’’, est de se determinatum ad producendum. Ista propositio iam manifesta est in exemplo praedicto [viz., solis], et iterum probatur ratione: quia si talis causa limitaretur ad unum effectum tantum, determinaretur sufficienter ad illum; sed per hoc quod talis causa ponitur illimitata respectu aliorum effectuum, non aufertur determinatio ad istum effectum nec tollitur comparatio eius ad istum effectum, unde nihil eius perfectionis tollitur per comparationem ad istum effectum; igitur potentia naturalis quae est indeterminata illimitatione suae naturae, determinatur ex se’.

'From these points, I argue as follows. The basis [for a power] that is indeterminate by ``the indetermination of active [power]’’ -- which is the total natural basis and not [a power that is] ``indifferent to contradictory things that can be chosen’’ -- is determined to produce [the effect or effects in question] from within itself. Now, this claim is obvious in the aforesaid example [of the sun], but it can further by proved by argument. For if such a cause were limited to one effect only, it would sufficiently be determined to that [one effect from within itself]. But given that, if such a cause were then supposed to be unlimited with respect to other effects, it would not lose that determination to the first effect nor would that take away its relationship to that effect. Whence, nothing of its perfection would be lost through its relationship to this [other] effect. Therefore, a natural power that is indeterminate by the unlimitedness of its nature is determined from within itself’.

Lect., 1.7.un., n. 27 (Vat. 16: 482.17-22): 'Cum igitur essentia divina sit indeterminata non indeterminatione passiva, sed indeterminatione quae est virtutis activae illimitatae, ipsa non requiret aliquam formam ipsam determinantem; si igitur essentia divina sit principium generationis aut spirationis, ipsa non determinatur ad producendum per aliquam proprietatem respectivam’.

'Thus, since the divine essence is indeterminate not by the indetermination of passive [power] but rather by the indetermination of the unlimitedness of its active power, it does not require some form to determine it. If, then, the divine essence were the basis for generation or spiration, it would not be determined to produce through some relative property’.

Ord., 1.7.1, n. 20 (Vat. 4: 114.1-11): 'Indeterminatio, quaedam est ``potentiae passivae’’ et quaedam ``potentiae activae’’ illimitatae ad plures effectus (exemplum: sicut sol est indeterminatus ad producendum multa generabilia, non quod aliquam formam recipiat ut agat, sed quia habet virtutem productivam illimitatam). Quod est indeterminatum ``indeterminatione materiae’’ oportet quod recipiat formam ad hoc quod agat, quia non est in actu sufficiente ad agendum, sed quod est indeterminatum ``indeterminatione potentiae activae’’ est ex se sufficienter determinatum ad producendum quemcumque illorum effectuum: et hoc si passum-dispositum sit approximatum, ubi requiritur passum, vel ex se ipso ubi passum non requiritur’.

'One kind of indetermination belongs to ``passive power’’ and another to ``active power’’ that is unlimited with respect to many effects. For example, the sun is indeterminate with respect to producing many generable things, not because it needs to receive some form in order to act, but rather because it has unlimited productive power. That which is indeterminate by ``the indetermination of matter’’ must receive a form in order to act, because it is not sufficiently actual itself to act. But that which is indeterminate by ``the indetermination of active power’’ is sufficiently determined from within itself to produce any of those effects (and in cases where a recipient is required, this will happen if a disposed recipient comes near enough, but in cases where no recipient is required, this will just happen from within itself)’.

Ord., 1.7.1, n. 20 (Vat. 4: 114.11-115.2): 'probatio: si tale activum esset de se determinatum ad unum effectum, posset de se sufficienter producere illum, --- sed si est indeterminatum ad hoc et ad aliud, ex tali illimitatione non tollitur perfectio causalitatis eius respectu talis effectus, sed tantum additur causalitas respectu alterius; ita ergo potest istud producere, sicut si tantum esset istius, et ita non requiritur aliquod determinans’.

'Proof: if such an active thing were determined within itself to [produce only] one effect, it could produce that effect sufficeintly from within itself. But if it were indeterminate with respect to this effect and another effect, such unlimitedness would not entail that it would lose the perfection of its causality with respect to the [first] effect. Rather, this would only add causality with respect to the other effect. Thus, it could produce this other effect, just as if it were limited to [produce only] this other effect, and it would not need something to determine it’.

Ord., 1.7.1, n. 21 (Vat. 4: 115.3-7): 'Ad propositum. Essentia divina non est principium indeterminatum ``indeterminatione materiae’’: ergo si est indeterminatum indeterminatione alterius quasi principii activi, erit simpliciter determinatum determinatione quae requiritur ad agendum, et ita non requiritur aliquid aliud’.

'As for the case at hand, the divine essence is not the basis for indeterminate [power] by the ``indetermination of matter’’. Therefore, if it is indeterminate by the indetermination of the other [sort], as the basis for active power, so to speak, then it will simply by determinate by the determination which is required for acting, and it will not need anything else’.

Ord., 1.7.1, n. 21 (Vat. 4: 115.7-12): 'Confirmatur, quia talis indeterminatio activi licet sit ad disparata, non tamen est ad contradictoria, sed determinate ad alteram partem contradictionis respectu cuiuslibet illorum disparatorum; nulla autem indeterminatio prohibet ex se determinate agere, nisi quae aliquo modo esset ad contradictoria, ut ad agere et non-agere; ergo etc.’

'This is confirmed in the following way. Although the indetermination of active [power] is [indeterminate with respect] to different kinds [of activities], it is not [indeterminate with respect] to contractory [states of affairs, viz, acting or not-acting]. Rather, it is determinate only to one of the contradictory [states of affairs, i.e., it is determinate to acting rather than to not-acting], and so [it is only indeterminate] with respect to the different kinds of [activities] for which it is [the basis]. However, no indetermination prohibits something within itself from acting except the kind [of indetermination that is indeterminate with respect] to contradictory [states of affairs] such as acting and non-acting. Therefore, etc.’

Another argument of Scotus against Henry of Ghent (translation)

From the Lectura

‘If the [divine] essence is that from which the Son is produced, then this can only be in virtue of some being that belongs to that essence, for that from which the Son is generated must have some being if a form is imprinted on it’.

[Scotus, Lect., 1.5.2.un., n. 83 (Vat. 16: 441.22-25): ‘si essentia sit illud de quo producitur Filius, oportet quod hoc sit secundum aliquod esse ipsius essentiae, quia illud de quo generatur Filius oportet habere aliquod esse prout sibi imprimitur forma eius’.]

‘Therefore, I ask what is this “being” that the essence has, in virtue of which the Son is produced from it? It is either the being which the essence has in itself, or it is the being it has unshareably in some person’.

[Scotus, Lect., 1.5.2.un., n. 84 (Vat. 16: 442.1-3): ‘Quaero igitur quid est illud esse quod habet essentia, secundum quod de ea producitur Filius: vel est esse quod est essentia de se, aut est esse incommunicabile in alia persona?’]

‘If in the first way, then the Son would truly be generated from the essence of the Son just as [he is generated] from the essence of the Father [for the essence is shared by the Father and the Son]. But they [viz., Henry and his followers] concede that this cannot be admitted, for they say that the Son is [produced] from the [divine] substance as it is in the Father and not from the substance as it is in the three persons’.

[Scotus, Lect., 1.5.2.un., n. 84 (Vat. 16: 442.4-7): ‘Si primo modo, igitur ita vere Filius erit genitus de essentia Filii sicut de substantia et essentia Patris; unde et ipsi concedunt quod hoc non potest dici, dicentes quod Filius sit de substantia ut est Patris et non de substantia ut est trium personarum’.] [The reference is to Henry of Ghent, SQO, 54.3 (Bad. II f. 84rF): ‘Dico autem [Filius generat] de substantia generantis cum reduplicatione, in quantum scilicet generans est: licet enim eadem sit in tribus, non tamen habet rationem potentiae ut de ea generatur aliquis, nisi secundum quod habet esse in Patre’.]
‘But if it is said that the Son is [produced] from the essence of the Father insofar as the being [of the essence is unshareably] in another person (e.g., in the first existent [viz., the Father]), then I argue like this: the being [of that] from which something is [produced] by imprinting [a form in it] cannot be understood without the being [of that] in which that [same] something is [produced by imprinting a form in it], nor can the being [of that] in which that [same] something is [produced by imprinting a form in it] be understood without the former [viz., that from which that same something is produced by imprinting a form in it]. If, then, there is something from which the Son is [produced] by imprinting [a form in it], e.g., the substance insofar as it is in the Father, then that substance insofar as it is in the Father will necessarily be that in which the Son is [produced]. For if a surface is that from which whiteness [is produced] by imprinting [the whiteness in it], then that surface [will be that] in which the whiteness [is produced], and so by consequence, just as that surface will have whiteness, so also the essence as it is in the first person will have filiation’.

[Scotus, Lect., 1.5.2.un., n. 84 (Vat. 16: 442.8-18): ‘Sed si hoc dicatur, quod Filius est de essentia Patris secundum esse in alia persona, ut in prima exsistens, tunc arguo sic: esse de quo est aliquid per impressionem, non potest intelligi sine esse in quo est aliquid, nec esse in quo est aliquid potest intelligi sine hoc quin sit illud. Si igitur est aliquid de quo per impressionem est Filius, ut substantia secundum quod est in Patre, tunc substantia secundum quod est in Patre necessario erit illud in quo est Filius; sicut si superficies sit illud de quo per impressionem est albedo, superficies est illud in quo est aledo, — et per consequens sicut superficies est habens albedinem, ita essentia ut est in prima persona erit habens filiationem’.]


From the Ordinatio

‘It is necessary to assign some being to the [divine] essence insofar as it is that from which the Son is generated, for to be the principle — whatever kind of “principle” — of some real being only belongs to a real being. Therefore, I ask: what “being” belongs to the essence as it is that from which the Son is generated by an impression? If it is precisely its absolute being, which belongs to the essence qua essence, then the Son will be [produced] from the essence qua essence, and in this way the Son will be of three persons. Alternatively, if the “being” [I’m asking about] belongs to the [divine] essence insofar as it exists in some subsistent [person], then I ask: in which person? If it’s the ingenerate person [viz., the Father], then the concept of “the being from which something is produced” includes the notion of “the being in which the form is induced”, and so in that concept the “being in which” includes “that which is in it”, and by consequence the being that comes along with it formally. Therefore, if the [divine] essence as it is in the Father is tha from which the Son is generated (and by an impression, according to them), then it follows that the essence itself as it is in the Father will be that in which begotten knowledge [viz., the Son] is imprinted, and so the essence as it is in the Father will formally by the Word or “that which knows begotten knowledge”, which is inappropriate’.

[Scotus, Ord. 1.5.2.un., nn. 72-73 (Vat. 4: 50.15-52.4): ‘essentiae ut de ea generatur Filius necesse est assignare aliquod esse, quia principiare aliquod verum ens — in quocumque genere principii — non convenit alicui nisi realiter enti. Quaero igitur, quod esse convenit essentiae ut ipsa est de quo per impressionem generatur Filius: aut praecise esse ad se, quod est essentiae ut essentiae, — et tunc Filius est de essentia ut essentia, et hoc modo est trium personarum; aut convenit sibi esse in aliqua subsistentia. Et tunc quaero, in qua: aut ingenita, — et si hoc, cum in intellectu eius quod est “esse de quo aliquid producitur” includatur hoc quod est “esse illud in quo forma inducitur”, et in intellectu eius quod est esse in quo includatur habere illud quod est in eo, et per consequens esse formaliter per ipsum, — ergo si essentia ut est in Patre sit de quo Filius generatur (et per impressionem, secundum eos), sequitur quod ipsa ut in Patre erit illud in quo notitia genita [viz., Verbum vel Filius] imprimitur, et ita essentia ut in Patre erit formaliter Verbum [viz., Filius] sive noscens notitia genita, quod est inconveniens’.]


From the Reportatio

‘Every real principle of a real entity has real being in virtue of which it is a principle, for otherwise it would be the principle of a non-being. The [divine] essence is a real principle of a real entity, namely insofar as it is a quasi material principle of a real being, namely the Son. Therefore, it gives some real being to him. But it either gives him absolute being or relative being. It does not give him absolute being, because then the Son would be from the substance of the Father insofar as [the Father’s substance] has absolute being, and then the Son would be from the substance of the three persons, for the absolute being of that substance does not belong to one person more than to another. Therefore, it is clear that the essence is not the principle from which the Son is produced insofar as it has absolute being. However, if the essence, as a quasi material principle, were to give relative being [to the Son], then this will be in the first person . . . . But it does not give relative being in the first person, because that which is the material principle of generation and that which receives the form are the same according to this “relative being”. Therefore, the being of this quasi material principle in the first person would receive the property of the Son, and then filiation would be received in the Father, so that in this way the Son [would be the Son] of [the Father’s] substance’.

[Scotus, Rep. 1.5.2.un., nn. 68-69 (Wolter, 276-278): ‘omne principium reale entis realis habet esse reale secundum quod principiat, alioquin illud quod principiat esset non-ens; essentia est principium reale et entis realis, scilicet in quantum est principium quasi materiale, et entis realis, scilicet Filii; ergo dat sibi aliquod reale esse. Ergo vel dat sibi esse ad se vel esse ad; sed non dat sibi esse ad se, quia tunc Filius esset de substantia Patris secundum esse ad se; ergo de substantia trium, eo quod substantia ad se non est plus unius personae quam alterius. Sic ergo patet quod essentia secundum esse ad se non est principium de quo principiatur Filius. Si autem essentia ut est principium quasi materiale det esse ad, ergo hoc erit vel in prima persona . . . . Nec dat “esse ad” in prima persona, quia secundum idem “esse ad” istius aliquid est principium materiale generationis et recipit formam; ergo secundum esse istius principii quai materialis in prima persona recipitur proprietas Filii, et sic filiatio recipitur in Patre et sic Filius substantiae’.]

One argument of Scotus against Henry of Ghent (translation)

From the Lectura

‘According to the Philosopher in Physics 5, a change belongs to the same species as its end-point, just as [the act of] whitewashing [a log] belongs to the species of whiteness, not the species of “white-log”, which is only one “thing” incidentally’.

[Scotus, Lect. 1.5.2.un., n. 72 (Vat. 16: 437.2-4): ‘quia secundum Philosophum V Physicorum [224b6-8] mutatio est eadem specie cum termino, ut dealbatio cum albedine, et non cum ligno albo, quod est unum per acccidens’.]

From the Ordinatio

‘A production is placed in a genus or a species from its formal end-point, as is clear from the Philosopher in Physics V [224a26-30]. For instance, a change in quality is placed in the genus of quality, for here there is a [qualitative] form which is the formal end-point of the change in quality. Therefore, if the formal end-point of some such production were a relation, that production would be placed in the genus of relation, and it would not be a generation’.

[Scotus, Ord. 1.5.2.un., n. 69 (Vat. 4: 49.8-13): ‘productio ponitur in genere vel specie ex suo termino formali, sicut patet per Philosophum V Physicorum, — sicut alteratio ponitur in genere qualitatis, qua ibi est forma quae est formalis terminus alterationis; ergo si formalis terminus huiusmodi productionis esset relatio, ista productio poneretur in genere relationis et non esset generatio’.]


From the Reportatio

‘Change and every per se production is placed per se in the genus of the end-point to which [the change or production is directed], and [it is placed] precisely in the genus of the formal end-point, according to Physics V, where examples are given from each [kind of] per se motion or change, namely generation, alteration [i.e., change in quality], and growth [i.e., change in size]. If, then, the formal end-point of the Son’s production were a relation [i.e., the Son’s unique property of sonship] rather than the [divine] essence, then the Son’s production would not be a generation, but more a change in relationship’.

[Scotus, Rep. 1.5.2.un., n. 63 (Wolter, 275): ‘mutatio et omnis per se productio ponitur per se in genere termini ad quem et praecipue in genere termini formalis, V Physicorum, ubi exemplificatur de omnibus per se motu et mutatione, scilicet generatione et alteratione et augmentatione. Si igitur formalis terminus productionis Filii non est essentia sed relatio, tunc productio Filii non esset generatio, sed magis adaliquatio erit’.]

Scotus on generation without matter

From the Reportatio

‘Insofor as it implies production, generation as such does not require matter or quasi-matter, and where it happens without matter, generation is said to be perfect and without any imperfection. Therefore, this is how it has to be ascribed to God, for in no way can generation be conceived without imperfection if it is understood to presuppose matter’.

[Scotus, Rep. 1.5.2.un., n. 74 (Wolter, 279): ‘generatio ut importat productionem, quae ut sic non requirit materiam nec quasi materiam et ut sic dicit perfectionem sine imperfectione; ergo ut sic habet attribui Deo. Sed nullo modo concipitur sine imperfectione ut intelligitur praesupponere materiam’.]


From the Ordinatio

‘The reason that a “generated creature” is not [produced] from nothing is that something in it (such as matter) pre-exists. Therefore, . . . if the form of something were to pre-exist and the matter were newly added to it so that it were informed by the pre-existent form, that very product would not be [produced] from nothing, for something in it pre-existed [the production] . . . . Therefore, if someone [like Henry] were to say that the Son is not [produced] from nothing “because his essence existed in the Father prior in the order of origin”, and if [they said that] the essence is the matter, so to speak, in the Son’s generation, then how much more would it be the case that the Son is not [produced] from nothing if the [divine] essence that “exists in the Father prior in origin” is a quasi-form shared with the Son?’

[Scotus, Ord. 1.5.2.un., n. 103 (Vat. 4: 64.3-13): ‘quia “creatura genita” non est de nihilo, quia aliquid eius praeexsistit, ut materia. Ergo . . . si forma alicuius praeexsisteret et materia de novo adveniret et informaretur illa forma iam praeexsistente, ipsum productum non esset de nihilo, quia aliquid eius praeexstitisset . . . . Ergo si Filius non diceretur esse de nihilo “quia essentia eius secundum ordinem originis praefuit in Patre”, et hoc si illa essentia esset quasi-materia generationis Fili, multo magis nec Filius erit de nihilo si illa essentia “prius origine exsistens in Patre” sit quasi-forma communicata Filio’.]


From the Reportatio

‘It is impossible for the numerically same [lump of] matter to remain under the form of the generator and the generated [at the same time], whatever sort of thing the generator or the generated is, for the same [lump of] matter cannot be simultaneously perfected by two ultimate forms which give complete being to the matter. Nevertheless, the same form can give being to many [lumps of] matter simultaneously, or to one [lump of] matter to which it did not give being before. This is clear in growth, for where the form of food has corrupted into flesh, the [already existing] form of the flesh newly perfects the matter of the food, because the [body’s] flesh converts the food into flesh and perfects the matter of the food insofar as it is flesh pre-existing in the food’.

[Scotus, Rep. 1.5.2.un., n. 80 (Wolter, 282): ‘impossibile est eandem materiam numero manere sub forma generantis et geniti, quodcumque sit generans vel genitum, quia non potest eadem materia simul perfici duabus formis ultimis quae dant esse completum materiae; potest tamen eadem forma dare esse pluribus materiis simul, sive uni materiae cui non dabat prius. Patet in augmentatione ubi, corrupta forma alimenti in carnem, forma carnis de novo perficit materiam alimenti, quia caro convertit alimentum in carnem et perficit materiam alimenti ut carnem praeexsistentem in alimento’.]


From the Lectura

‘This can also be shown with an example. If something were to grow in itself without anything being added to it (as it happens in rarefaction), here the form of the growable thing would be changed and it would receive some new perfection. But suppose that there is some growth that occurs by something more being added to it, and that the soul (which havs the capacity and power to perfect the whole organic body) only perfects one part (like the heart) [first], and afterwards when other parts of the body are added to it, the soul — without any change to itself — perfects those other organic parts without being perfected in some other way. Similarly, the divine essence is supremely perfect in the first instant of nature, and afterwards the relations spring forth and come onto it, as it were, and then the essence makes itself intimate to them, giving them every perfection that they have and making them God by deity. For this reason, in no way does the essence have a passive capacity to be perfected by them’.

[Scotus, Lect. 1.5.2.un., n. 105 (Vat. 16: 451.10-21): ‘Hoc etiam declaratur in exemplo: si alquid augmentetur in se sine alio adveniente, ut est in rarefactione, ibi forma rei augmentabilis mutatur et recipit novam perfectionem. Sed ponamus quod augmentatio fiat aliquo extra adveniente, isto modo, quod anima habens potentiam et virtutem perficiendi totum corpus organicum tantum perficiat unam partem, ut cor, et quod postea aliae partes corporis addantur, tunc anima — sine ulla mutatione sui — absque hoc quod aliunde perficitur perficit alias partes organicas. — Sic essentia divina, in primo signo naturae est perfectissima; postea, quasi superveniant relationes pullulantes, essentia intimat se eis, dans eis quidquid perfectionis habent et quod sint Deus deitate, — et ideo nullo modo habet potentiam passivam ut perficiatur eis’.]


From the Ordinatio

‘An example of this can be taken from creatures, by postulating a certain counterpossible situation. [We know that] growth happens when food [that’s been eaten] comes to be corrupted in the body, and its matter receives the form of flesh, and [thereby being new flesh added to the body], in this way it becomes informed by the soul. Here we are supposing that the same matter which remains throughout is apt to receive another part of the [soul’s] form (just as it is thought to happen in rarefaction), so the matter remains one, though it was first informed [by the form of food], but is now informed by a new form. This is formally a real change, because the matter goes from being deprived of to having a form. Now let’s look at this from the side of the soul. Suppose that the same soul perfects first one part of the body (such as the heart), and then later, when another part of the organic body which is perfectible by the soul is added to it [such as some food that is converted into flesh], the soul perfects that newly added part. In this case, the soul is not changed by this because it is not first deprived of and then comes to have a form. Deprivation is a lack in something that is naturally apt to receive, but [in our example here], the soul is first not-informing [the acquired part] and afterwards it is informing [it], and the soul is not apt to receive something, but rather to give’.

[Scotus, Ord. 1.5.2.un., n. 133 (Vat. 4: 76.1-15): ‘Exemplum istius potest accipi in creaturis, ponendo ibi quaedam “per impossibile”. Augmentatio modo fit per hoc quod alimentum adveniens corpori corrumpitur, et materia eius recipit formam carnis, et sic informatur ab anima. Ponatur quod eadem materia manens nata sit recipere aliam partem formae (sicut ponitur in rarefactione), materia manet una, quae prius fuit formata et nunc nova forma formatur, — ipsa tamen formaliter est vere mutata, quia de privatione transit ad formam. — Ponamus, ex alia parte, quod anima eadem perficeret primo unam partem corporis (ut cor), postea adveniret alia pars corporis organici, perfectibilis ab anima, anima perficeret illam partem advenientem de novo, — et ipsa tamen non mutaretur, quia non esset in ea primo privatio et postmodum forma. Privatio enim est carentia, in apto nato recipere; anima autem primo non-informans et postea informans non est nata aliquid recipere sed dare’.]

‘In each of these cases, there is a real production of some product, but in the first case, there is a change, and in the second case, there is not’.

[Scotus, Ord. 1.5.2.un., n. 134 (Vat. 4: 76.16-17): ‘In utroqe extremorum istorum vere esset productio alicuius producti, sed in primo mutatio, in secundo non’.]
‘A more apt example can be seen if we suppose that the matter of the animated heart could remain the same and be shared with diverse forms — say, that of a hand and a foot — so that by the [hypothetical] active power of the animated heart, it would produce those composites [namely, the hand and the foot] from its matter that it shares with them and their forms. Here there would be a true production of the composite wholes, and they would have the same matter, though this would happen through a change in the matter. Now let’s look at this from the side of the soul. Let’s suppose that the soul [which first exists in and so animates the heart] is unlimited with respect to its actuality as a form, such that it could be shared with many things, so that by the power of that soul in the heart, it could share itself with a hand and a foot which the animated heart produces. If that happened, there would here be a true production of many things that are consubstantial in their form, without any change in that form’.

[Scotus, Ord. 1.5.2.un., n. 135 (Vat. 4: 76.18-77.4): ‘Aptius videtur exemplum, si ponamus materiam cordis animati posse eandem communicari diversis formis — puta manus et pedis — et hoc virtute activa cordis animati, producentis composita ista ex materia sua communicata et ex formis istis, hic vere esset productio totorum habentium eandem materiam, et esset cum mutatione illius materiae; sed si, ex alia parte, ponamus animam — propter sui illimitationem in ratione actus et formae — posse communicari multis et virtute animae in corde ipsam communicari manui et pedi, productis a corde animato, hic vere esset productio multorum consbustantialium in forma, absque mutatione illius formae’.]

‘In each example, it is proposed that some being is produced which is subsistent by itself (rather than proposing that some parts are produced that belong to the same thing, because to be a part is an imperfection). These cases being posed, the second case in each example (which is about a form being shared with the product) perfectly represents production in God, while the first case in each example (which is about matter being shared) does not. Let’s modify this example even further, namely by supposing that although the soul is in the heart and the hand and the foot, it is not an informing form (for being a component of a composite is an imperfection), but is rather a whole form which is those subsistent things [viz., the heart, the hand, and the foot] and which animates them. Similarly, deity is understood to be shared with the relational subsistences (assuming that the persons are relative subsistences) not like quasi matter, but rather as a form, and not by informing them but rather as that by which each relation or the relative subsistent is God’.

[Scotus, Ord. 1.5.2.un., n. 136 (Vat. 4: 77.5-16): ‘In utroque exemplo ponantur producta esse per se subsistentia, non partes eisdem, quia esse partem est imperfectionis. Hoc posito, secundus modus in utroque exemplo, qui est de communicatione formae ipsi producto, perfecte repraesentat productionem in Deo, non primus, qui est de communicatione materiae, — et hoc, adhuc addendo in positione, quod anima in corde et manu et pede non sit forma informans, quia componibilitas includit imperfectionem, sed sit forma totalis qua illa subsistentia sint et animata sint: ita quod intelligitur deitas non communicari quasi-materia, sed relationibus subsistentibus — si personae ponantur relativae — communicatur deitas per modum formae, non informantis sed qua relatio vel relativum subsistens est Deus’.] [See also, Rep. 1.5.2.un., nn. 77-79 (Wolter, 280-281).]

Scotus on change vs. production (translation)

From the Lectura

‘Generation in creatures includes both change and production. For a [creaturely] generator has imperfect power, so it requires not only another cause in the same genus, but also a cause in another genus, and for this reason, it does not produce the whole composite [from nothing]. Rather, it presupposes [a lump of] matter, and then it produces the form by transforming that matter.

Thus, change and production have different end-points, for the end-point of change is the form introduced in the matter, but the proper end-point of production is the whole composite (hence the Philosopher speaks of the end-point of generation in various ways, for in Physics II [193b12-18] he postulates that the form is the end-point of generation, and in [Metaphysics] VII [1033b16-18] he says that the composite is primarily generated).

From this, it is clear that the nature of production is separable from the nature of change — by removing the imperfection of the agent — without contradiction, for production is that by which a thing acquires being. Now, it is incidental to a thing which is produced [by a creature] — and so which acquires its being through that production — that it is changed [in this process]. This is evident in creation, where the whole is truly produced without any preceding change. Whence, where there is perfect active power, a thing can acquire all of its being without a change.

Therefore, production is separable from change, for there are distinct formal end-points in generation: the proper start- and end-points of change are being deprived of a form and having a form, but the end-point of a production is the whole composite itself. For an agent with perfect power can act, and there will then be a production, but not a change. Whence in creation, because something is produced by a perfect production, there is a production but not a generation’.

[Scotus, Lect. 1.5.2.un., n. 91 (Vat. 16: 444.23-445.18): ‘generatio in creaturis includit mutationem et productionem. Quia generans est imperfectae virtutis, ideo non solum requirit aliam causam eiusdem generis, sed causam alterius generis causae, et ideo non producit totum compositum, sed praesupponit materiam, et tunc producit formam transmutando materiam. Et ideo alios terminos habet formaliter mutatio et productio, nam terminus mutationis est ipsa forma inducta in materia, sed terminus proprius productionis est totum compositum (et secundum hoc, Philosophus variis modis loquitur de termino generationis, nam in II Physicorum [193b12-18] ponit quod forma est terminus generationis, — et in VII [Metaphysicae, 1033b16-18], quod compositum primo generetur): ex quo patet quod ratio productionis separabilis est a ratione mutationis — amota imperfectione agentis — sine contradictione, nam productio est qua res capit esse. Nunc autem accidit rei quae producitur — et quae esse capit per productionem — quod mutetur, sicut patet in creatione, ubi vere producitur totum sine mutatione praecedente; unde ubi est perfecta virtus activa, ibi potest res capere totum esse sine mutatione. Productio igitur separabilis est a mutatione, tum quia habent terminos formaliter distinctos in generatione, nam termini proprie mutationis sunt privatio et forma, sed terminus productionis est ipsum totum compositum, — tum quia agens perfectae virtutis potest agere, et ibi erit tunc productio, sed non mutatio; unde in creatione, quia producitur aliquid a perfecto producente, est productio et non generatio’.]


‘Therefore, by laying aside the imperfections in generation (namely, the presupposition of matter, which is required on account of the agent’s imperfection), generation is transfered to the divine case. For this reason, generation that’s transfered to the divine case only includes production, but not change, and so in no way in divinity is there a subject or matter or quasi-matter, since there is no change nor quasi-change in God’.

[Scotus, Lect. 1.5.2.un., n. 92 (Vat. 16: 445.19-25): ‘Auferendo igitur illud quod est imperfectionis in generatione (scilicet praesuppositio materiae, quae requiritur propter imperfectionem agentis), transfertur generatio ad divina. Et ideo generatio tantum transfertur ad divina prout includit productionem, et non mutationem, — et ideo nullo modo in divinis est subiectum aut materia nec quasi-materia, cum ibi non sit mutatio nec quasi-mutatio’.]



From the Ordinatio

‘There are two things said to be in generation in creatures: change and production. And of these, there formal natures are different, and they are separable from each other without contradiction’.

[Scotus, Ord. 1.5.2.un., n. 94 (Vat. 4: 60.16-18): ‘Generatio in creatura duo dicit, mutationem et productionem, et istorum formales rationes aliae sunt et sine contradictione separabiles ad invicem’.]

‘For production formally belongs to its product, and it is incidental to it that it comes about by changing some part of the composite, as is clear in creation [where the production occurs without presupposing a part such as matter to change]. Change is formally the act which the “changeable” thing comes to have after being deprived of it, but change occurs along with production in creatures because of the imperfection of [creaturely] productive power, for it is not [powerful enough] to give the end-point of production all of its being. Rather, some part of it is presupposed, and then changed to another part of it, and in this way the producer produces a composite. Therefore, change and production can be separated without contradiction, and they really are separated in cases where there is perfect productive power’.

[Scotus, Ord. 1.5.2.un., n. 95 (Vat. 4: 60.19-61.7): ‘Production enim est formaliter ipsius producti, et accidit sibi quod fiat cum mutatione alicuius partis compositi, ut patet in creatione; mutatio formaliter est actus “mutabilis” qui de privatione transit. Concomitatur autem mutatio productionem in creaturis propter imperfectionem potentiae productivae, quae non potest dare totale esse termino productionis, sed aliquid eius praesuppositum transmutatur ad aliam partem ipsius et sic producit compositum. Ergo sine contradictione possunt separari, et realiter separantur comparando ad potentiam productivam perfectem’.]

‘This is apparent in creation, where because of the perfection of the productive power [of the creator], something is first placed in all of its being, and this is the true nature of production, in which the end-point of the production acquires its being through the production. But there is not here [viz., in the case of creation ex nihilo] a change, insofar as change is said to be some substratum that ‘exists now in a way that it did not before’, from Physics VI [234b5-7, 10-13]. For in creation, there is not some substratum’.

[Scotus, Ord. 1.5.2.un., n. 96 (Vat. 4: 61.8-13): ‘Hoc etiam apparet in creatione, ubi propter perfectionem potentiae productivae ponentis primo in esse totum, vere est ratio productionis, in quantum per eam terminus productus accipit esse, — sed non est ibi ratio mutationis, in quantum mutatio dicit aliquid substratum “aliter nunc se habere quam prius”, ex VI Physicorum [234b5-7, 10-13]. In creatione enim non est aliquid substratum’.]

‘To the case at hand. Since no imperfection should be postulated in God, but rather only total perfection, and since change is said to be imperfect in its very nature, for it pertains to potentiality, in virtue of which something is changeable — and accordingly the active power in the changer is also said to be imperfect, for an imperfect changer necessarily requires a concurrent cause in order to produce something (for there [in God] htere is no imperfection, nor any sort of passive power, nor even any imperfect active power, but only the highest perfection) — in no way is generation in God postulated with the character of change or quasi-change. Rather, generation is postulated in God only insofar as it is production, that is, insofar as something acquires being from it. Thus, generation occurs without matter in God — and for this reason, matter nor quasi-matter is attributed to generation in God, but only the end-point, and this is either the total or primary (i.e., the adequate) end-point, namely that which is primarily produced in being, or it is the formal end-point, according to which the primary end-point formally acquires being’.

[Scotus, Ord. 1.5.2.un., n. 97 (Vat. 4: 61.14-62.10): ‘Ad propositum. Cum in divinis nihil ponendum sit imperfectionis, sed totum perfectionis, et mutatio de ratione sui dicit imperfectionem, quia potentialitatem, et hoc in mutabili, — et concomitanter etiam dicit imperfectionem potentiae activae in mutante, quia talis requirit necessario causam concausantem ad hoc ut producat (non autem fit ibi aliqua imperfectio, nec qualis est potentiae passivae, nec etiam aliqua imperfectio potentiae activae, sed summa perfectio), — nullo modo ponetur ibi generatio sub ratione mutationis nec quasi-mutationis, sed tantum generatio ut est productio, in quantum scilicet aliquid per eam capit esse, ponetur in divinis. Et ideo generatio ut est in divinis, est sine materia, — et ideo generationis ut est in divinis non assignabitur materia nec quasi-materia, sed tantum terminus: et hoc vel totalis sicut primus, id est adaequatus — qui scilicet primo producitur in esse — vel terminus formalis, secundum quem terminus primus formalis accipit esse’.]


From the Reportatio

‘The difference between generation, production, and change is clear, for change is an act [that happens to] something which is changeable by itself, so its start- and end-points are “not such” and “such”. Whence, that which now exists in different way than it did before is said to be changeable. But generation is not an act [that happens to] something changeable, but rather is, by itself, the way to [acquire] a form, just as perishing is the way [to become] deprived [of a form]. Thus, the start- and end-points of generation are “existence” and “not existing”, that is, [to have a substantial] form and [to be] deprived [of a substantial form]. Production, however, is the way not to exist or not to exist, nor the way to acquire or be deprived of a form, but rather the way for [something] to be generated or produced. So production has for its end-point not a form but rather the whole composite’.

[Scotus, Rep. 1.5.2.un., n. 75 (Wolter, 279-280): ‘Quod autem sit differentia inter generationem, productionem et mutationem, patet; quia mutatio est actus per se mutabilis et termini sunt non tale et tale. Unde illud dicitur mutabile quod se habet aliter nunc quam prius. Generatio autem non est actus mutabilis, sed est per se via ad formam, sicut corruptio ad privationem, et ita termini eius sunt esse et non esse, id est forma et privatio. Productio autem est via non ad esse vel non esse sive ad formam et privationem, sed ad genitum vel productum, ita quod habet pro per se termino non formam sed compositum’.]