(T3) For any divine persons x and y, if x produces y, x and y are equal in perfection.
However, T3 conflicts with Avicenna’s theory of production. Avicenna maintains that whenever a product is produced without any pre-existing materials, it must be different in kind from its producer. Further, many medieval Aristotelians held the even more general claim that whenever a producer and its product are different in kind, the product must be less perfect than its producer.
But supposing all of that is right, then if a divine person were produced without any pre-existing materials (as T2 from the last post says), that person would then be different in kind, and therefore less perfect than its producer.
(1**) For any x and y, if x produces y without any material m, x and y are different in kind.
[From Avicenna.]
(2) The Father cannot produce the Son with any material m.
[From T2.]
(3**) Therefore, if the Father produces the Son, the Father and Son are different in kind.
[From (1**) and (2).]
(4**) For any x and y, if (i) x produces y, and (ii) x and y are different in kind, then y is less perfect than x.
[From any standard medieval Aristotelianism.]
(5) Therefore, if the Father produces the Son, the Son is less perfect than the Father.
[From (2), (3**), and (4**).]
But of course, that amounts to subordinationism, and it contradicts the Christian scholastic claim that
(6) the Father and Son are equal in perfection.
[From T3.]
Thus, scholastic thinkers like Scotus and Ockham cannot hold all these ideas together, on pain of contradiction. Again then, Avicenna’s theory leaves the Christian schoolmen with a problem, for Avicenna’s theory entails that if the Son and Spirit are produced, they are lesser deities. And that is not acceptable to a Christian scholastic Hence what I call the Subordination Problem: how can the Son and Spirit be produced, but not be lesser deities?
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