Book released in the UK

Just got an email telling me that the book is released in the UK today.

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Divine-Production-Medieval-Trinitarian-Theology/dp/0199646376/

Aquinas on Distinguishing Two Productions

In the last post, I talked about what Aquinas takes to be the basic components of any production. A production is a process whereby some material is fashioned into a product. The three basic components of such a process are these: there's the producer, there's the 'formal term' (the final form the product takes), and there's the 'receptive material' that gets fashioned into the product along the way.

As we saw in the quotation from the last post, Aquinas thinks two productions can only be distinguished by one of these three components. Let me restate that as follows: two productions P1 and P2 are distinct only if they differ with respect to (a) their producers, (b) their formal terms, or (c) their materials.

Consider (b) first: two productions are distinct if they have different formal terms. Let me try to explain this with the following scenario. Suppose that I am a cleaner who works for the sole sculptor within a hundred miles. This sculptor likes to work alone, so I only come in at night to clean. One night, I notice a clay statue on the table, but the next night I notice that the same lump of clay has been re-fashioned into a vase (I know it's the same lump of clay because the sculptor's only got one lump of clay at the moment; the next shipment has yet to come in).

Now, the only thing that's different between the two days is the shape/form of the clay. Apart from that, the clay (the receptive material) is the same, and the sculptor (the producer) is the same (after all, there isn't anyone else within a hundred miles who could've done the sculpting). Still, the fact that there are two different forms (the 'formal terms') provides enough information to tell me that there have been two productions, even if the producer and the material are the same: on the first day, the sculptor fashioned the clay into a statue, and on the second day, she fashioned it into a vase.

Now consider (c): two productions are distinct if they involve different lumps of material. Suppose that the next delivery of clay arrives, and that night I notice a that lump of red clay has been fashioned into a statue. On the next night, I notice that a brown lump of clay has been fashioned into what looks to me to be the exact same statue.

In this case, the producer is the same (it's the same sculptor who made both statues), and the forms are the same (both statues are identical copies), but the material is different: the first statue is made from red clay, and the second is made from brown clay. Still, the fact that there are different lumps of material is enough information to tell me that there have been two productions: on the first day, the sculptor made a statue out of red clay, and on the second day, she made one out of brown clay.

Now consider (a): two productions are distinct if they involve different producers. To get at this idea, we'll have to modify our hypothetical scenario a bit. Suppose that another sculptor moves in, and the two join up to form one esteemed sculpting firm. However, each sculptor likes to work alone, so they come in on alternate days. Suppose also that they're a bit manic, and so each one destroys whatever work the other one has left in the studio.

One night, I notice a statue made out of the last lump of clay (again, there's only one lump of clay left; the next shipment hasn't arrived). The next night, I notice what appears to be the exact same statue made from the exact same clay.

In this case, the material is the same (it's the same lump of clay), and the forms are the same (the statue has the same shape on both nights). But nevertheless, I know that two producers have been involved, and that's enough to tell me that two productions have occurred: on the first day, the first sculptor made a statue, but on the second day, the other sculptor smashed the previous statue into a lump, and then re-fashioned that lump into an identical statue.

Of course, these scenarios are contrived, but hopefully they illustrate how two productions are distinguished by their producers, formal terms, or materials. If two productions differ with respect to even one of these, that's enough to tell that there are two productions.

Now, I've talked as if we're looking for a way to notice a distinction between two productions, and I've been saying that if we notice a distinction between producers, formal terms, or materials, that gives us enough information to tell that there are two productions.

However, it's not clear that Aquinas is suggesting a criterion by which we can notice when two productions are distinct. Instead, he may be suggesting the cause of two productions being distinct. If that's what he means, then he'd be saying something like the following.

Consider (c) first: if a producer uses two lumps of material, that necessarily amounts to two productions (she makes one product out of one lump of material, and she makes another product out of another lump of material). That's not necessarily very plausible though. Surely I can use two lumps of material to make one product.

Now consider (a): if two producers produce, that necessarily amounts to two productions (one producer performs one production, and the other performs another act of production). This is not so plausible either. Surely two producers can cooperate to make one product. And besides, Aquinas believes the Father and Son together produce the Spirit, and does he want to say that the Spirit is produced by two productions? (Maybe he does; some scholastics do think that.)

Finally, consider (b): if a producer produces two formal terms, that necessarily amounts to two productions (she makes one product with a certain form, and she makes another product with a distinct form). That's much more plausible, for no one product could have two formal terms (a lump of clay can't have a statue shape and a vase shape at the same time, for example).

I reckon that from the list of (a), (b), and (c), (b) is the only plausible cause of distinction. (a) and (c) work fine as criteria of distinction, but surely a difference in (a) or (c) doesn't necessarily cause distinct productions.

Aquinas on the components of production

On a number of occasions throughout his various works, Aquinas defends the filioque (namely, the claim that the Holy Spirit is produced by two persons, the Father and the Son). At one point (SCG 4.24, n. 11), he says this:

'If the Holy Spirit were distinct from the Son, then they'd have to be produced by distinct productions or processions. Two productions, however, can only be distinguished by their principles, terms, or subjects.'

Never mind the first sentence. What interests me is the second sentence, for I think there's a nice bit of metaphysics here. I gather that Aquinas thinks the following three components are involved in any production:

(a) a principle,
(b) a formal term, and
(c) some receptive material (which Aquinas calls the 'subject').

Think of production as a process whereby some material gets fashioned into a product, much like how a lump of clay gets fashioned into a statue. Here, (a) the 'principle' is the source of the production, and in this sense it's the starting point of the whole process; (b) the 'formal term' is the final form the product takes, and so in this sense it's the end point of the whole process; and (c) the 'receptive material' is the stuff that gets fashioned into the final product along the way.

Of course, that's a rough way of putting it, so let's discuss each of these components in a little more detail. I'll start with the last item on the list and work my way backwards.

First, then, is the last on the list: the (c) 'receptive material'. We think of 'material' as stuff like wood, clay, or iron, but for Aquinas the meaning is a bit wider. Something deserves the label 'material' only if it has the capacity (in medieval-speak: a 'passive power') to be acted upon in some way. Aquinas calls it the 'subject' because it receives the activity of the producer. So, for example, a lump of clay has the capacity to be shaped into statues, vases, and the like, so clay is 'material' in this sense. But Socrates can be sunburnt, so he is like 'receptive material' for the sun's activity too. For Aquinas, the term 'receptive material' extends to quite to a few objects in the material world.

Further, the receptive material has to be the right kind of stuff, where 'the right kind of stuff' is anything that has the capacity to be fashioned into the particular kind of product in question. Materials have certain kinds of capacities ('passive powers'), but not others, so not all materials can be made into just any old product. Clay makes for great statues, but horrible nails. Organic tissue, on the other hand, makes for great animal bodies, but horrible statues.

Also, the receptive material has to be distinct from whatever product it's fashioned into. The very same lump of clay can become a statue, then a vase, and so it's clearly not the very same thing as the statue or the vase. If it were the same as the statue, it'd be destroyed when the statue is, but that's obviously not the case. I can smash a clay statue, but I'm still left with a lump of clay, even though the statue is no more.

As for (b) the 'formal term', different scholastic authors define this in different ways (Ockham, in particular, provides a distinctive definition in Ord. 1.5.3). But for Aquinas, it's the final form of the product. The 'formal term' is called the end point (terminus) of a production because it's the final form the product takes. When I sculpt a statue, my lump of clay takes on a succession of different shapes, but eventually I get to the one I'm after. The 'formal term' is that final shape that I finally get to, and that's why it's the 'end point' of a production.

(Sometimes a lump of matter doesn't go through a series of intermediate forms. Instead, it's immediately turned into the product in question. Living organisms are generated this way: a lump of organic tissue immediately becomes the organism in question as soon as it gets the organism's form. But even in cases like this, the product's form is the 'end point' of the production.)

As for (a), the term 'principle' has a broad meaning in scholastic writings, and it basically means 'source'. Of course, there are lots of way for one thing to be the 'source' of another, so there are lots of different kinds of principles. So what kind of principle does Aquinas have in mind when he talks about the 'principle' here?

I think there are two candidates here. First, a cause is one kind of principle. (Here I mean an 'efficient cause'. Aquinas also calls the 'formal' and 'material' causes 'principles', but those don't seem to be good candidates for what Aquinas is talking about here, so I'm only looking at the 'efficient cause', i.e., whatever acts to bring about an effect.) If we take 'principle' in this sense, then the 'principle' (efficient cause) of a production is the producer – i.e., the thing that actually does the producing.

But another kind of principle is a power source (or what I call a 'power-pack'). A power-pack, in this context, is some constituent or 'metaphysical part' of a producer that provides it with the power to produce the product in question. The idea here is that certain things have certain power-packs, and those power-packs give them certain powers. Consequently, something can only produce a particular kind of product if it has the right kind of power-pack.

On many an occasion, scholastic authors use the term 'principle' to refer to a 'power-pack' (see especially distinction 7 of the Sentences Commentaries), and so I suppose it's possible that Aquinas has the 'power-pack' in mind here when he talks about the 'principle' of a production.

So which is it? Does 'principle' mean 'producer' or 'power-pack'? I think that Aquinas must mean 'producer' here. I have two reasons for saying this. First, when some later authors present Aquinas's argument (and I'm thinking of Henry of Harclay in his Ord. Quest. 6), they just use the term 'producer' instead of 'principle'. Now, later authors often misconstrue Aquinas if it suits their purposes, but this particular reading is perfectly sensible, so I see no reason to doubt it.

Second, Aquinas's argument simply wouldn't work unless he meant 'producer'. He goes on to argue that we can only distinguish the Son and Spirit by (a) their principles, and from this, Aquinas concludes that the Son and Spirit must have different producers (the Son comes from one producer, and the Spirit comes from two producers). This wouldn't work if Aquinas didn't mean 'producer'. If he meant 'power-pack', he could only conclude that the Son and Spirit come from different 'power-packs', not different 'producers'.

A production, then, is a process whereby a producer (the 'principle') takes a lump of 'receptive material', and fashions into a product by giving it a particular form (the 'formal term'). This provides an abstract account for many different kinds of production: a statue is produced when a lump of clay is given a statue shape; a human being is produced when a lump of organic tissue is given a human form; 'tan Socrates' is produced when Socrates is given a tan color; and so on.

Scotus on the formal term, adequate term, and primary term of generation.

My translation:

Scotus, Ord. 1.5.2.un. nn. 94-97 [Vat. 4: 60-62].

[94] /60/ Generation in creatures occurs in two ways: by change or by production.
These two have formal definitions which can be separated without contradiction.

[95] Production formally pertains to a product, and it so happens that it comes about with a change of one of the parts of the composite, as is clear in creation. But change formally pertains to the act of the 'changeable', which passes from privation (to act).

But in creatures, change occurs with production, and this on account of the imperfection of the productive power which cannot give total being to the product. Thus, something of the product is presupposed, and that's what's changed by another of its parts. In this way, it produces a composite. Therefore, change and mutation can be separated without contradiction, and they can be really separated by looking to a perfect productive power.

[96] This is apparent in creation, where the perfection of the productive power which is first posited in total being entails that there really is the nature of a production, for the term acquires existence by that production. But there is no change here, for a change is said of some substratum 'now existing in a different way than it did before', from Physics VI [Z.3-4 234b5-7, 10-13], and in creation there is no substratum.

[97] To the proposed claim. Nothing imperfect should be posited in God. Only total perfection should be posited in God, and change is by definition said to be imperfect, for it entails potentiality in being changeable. A change is even said to be imperfect with respect to the active power of the changer, since the active power necessarily requires a co-cause to bring about the product (though not that there is here some imperfection. [So this kind of imperfection is not said of God]. Nor do we apply to God the imperfection associated with /62/ a passive power, nor even some imperfection in the active power. Rather, only the highest perfection [is said of God]. Thus, in no way is there posited here a generation with the character of a change nor quasi-change. In the divinity, there is only a generation that is a production, and this only in the sense that something acquires existence by that production. For this reason, divine generation occurs without matter, and thus only a term is assigned to divine generation, but no matter nor quasi-matter. This term is either the total or primary term, i.e., the adequate term – which, namely, primarily is produced – or the formal term, according to which the first term formally acquires its existence.


Scotus, Ord. 1.5.1.un. n. 28 [Vat. 4: 25-27].

[27] /25/ To the definition of 'to communicate', I say that the product of a production is the primary term, and I say that this 'primary term' /26/ is the adequate term. In this way, the Philosopher says in Metaphysics VII [Z.8 1033b16-18] that a composite [of matter and form] is generated primarily, since that is what primarily has existence by the production, so this is the adequate term [of production].

[28] In a composite [of matter and form], the form is the formal term of generation, but not a term per accidens. This is clear from the Philosopher in Physics II [B.1 193b12-18] where he proves that the form is the nature when he says that 'generation is natural because it is the way into a nature, and since it is the way into a form, then etc.'. Such a thing would not be if the form were only a per accidens term of generation. In the same way, the Philosopher wishes to say that the form and the end coincide in the same thing, which is true of the end – not of the generator, but rather of the generated thing. Therefore, the form is the end of a generation.

[29] Thus, the generator is related in one way to the primary term (which is the product or the generated thing), and in another way to the formal term. In creatures both of these relations are real, since there are two really distinct relations to, and both of these are really dependent on, the producer. But in the proposed claim, the producer has one real relation to the product, since it is a real distinction or real origin, /27/ though it does not have a real relation to the formal term in the product, since there is no real distinction [there], and without a real distinction there is no real relation. Therefore, 'to produce' in the divinity is called a real relation, 'but to communicate is called a relation of origin and quasi [a relation] of reason, concomitant to the real relation'.An example of this is the principle 'from which' [quo]. In creatures, it is really related to the product, just as the [principle] 'what' [quod] (for the same genus of cause pertains to art and to the artist, according to Metaphysics V [D.2 1013b20-33]), but the 'from which' does not have a real relation to the product because it is not distinct (according to [what is said in] distinction 7 [n. 13]). Nor the converse true, [namely, that] the formal term [is really related] to the producer.

[30] Therefore, when it is said that these are opposite relations, namely to communicate and to be communicated, I say that they are relations of reason, for they have opposite definitions, although they are necessarily concomitant with some real opposite relations, namely to produce and to be produced. But nevertheless, they are not formally 'these' and 'those' of the same relatives.

Some translations

I'm teaching a class this term on medieval trinitarian theology. The sub-topic on which we're focusing is 'the constitution of a divine person'. Here are a few translations I've done for the class:

Henry of Ghent, Summae Quaestionum Ordinariarum, article 56
John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, book 1, distinction 26
William Ockham, Ordinatio, book 1, distinction 26

Discussion on Material Constitution

There's been a lot of good discussion on Brower and Rea's theory of the trinity and material constitution over at trinities.org.

These are the relevant posts (with their comments):

Constitution Trinitarianism Part 1: Ned and Lumpy
Constitution Trinitarianism Part 2: Craig's Objections
Linkage: Constitution Trinitarianism Around the Web
Constitution Trinitarianism Part 3: The Meaning of "Is"
Constitution Trinitarianism Part 4: Pausing and Revisiting Some Issues
Guest Post: JT Paasch on Constitution Trinitarianism
Constitution Trinitarianism Part 5: Ambiguous God-Talk

Randal Rauser, Is The Trinity a True Contradiction?

Randal Rauser, 'Is The Trinity a True Contradiction?'. Quodlibet Journal 4 (2002).

http://www.quodlibet.net/rauser-trinity.shtml.

Rauser compares the logical problem of the trinity to 'true contradictions', i.e., contradictions which are true. In classical logic, if you admit one contradiction, you have to admit all contradictions, so to avoid this, everybody believed that contradictions were false. In modern paraconsistent logic, you can localize contradictions so that those contradictions don't entail contradictions in the rest of the system. Consequently, some today can admit contradictions which are true.

Rauser then considers David Cunningham's book These Three Are One because Cunningham seems to claim all over that book that contradictory states of affairs are true. In the end, Rauser concludes that it is not helpful to countenance true contradictions in God. The reason is that God is a necessary being, and thus any true contradictions would ultimately be about God's nature, and it makes more sense to say God is, for example, 'good' only rather than that God is 'not-good' and 'good'.