Solving the Creation and Subordination Problems

In the last two posts, I described what I call the 'Creation' and 'Subordination' problems. Here, I want to say something about different ways to solve these Problems. Christian scholastics are dealing with two sets of claims. On the one hand, they have a set from Aristotle and Avicenna (from Aristotle: things can only be produced with materials, from Avicenna: things produced without materials are created and inferior to their producers). On the other hand, they have their own Christian set of claims about divine production (namely, T1, T2, and T3 from the last two posts). As I explained in the last two posts, putting these two sets of claims together results in the Creation and Subordination Problems.

To avoid these two Problems, a scholastic thinker like Scotus or Ockham must reject something from either set of claims. As for the Christian claims (T1-T3), scholastics like Scotus and Ockham feel that T1 and T3 are required by Christian doctrine, for T1 is required by the Nicene Creed, and T3 is required to avoid subordinationism. Consequently, they are not going to reject T1 or T3. However, authors like Scotus or Ockham do not think that T2 is required for orthodoxy in the way that T1 and T3 are. Rather, they see T2 as just a very plausible claim.

In principle then, a scholastic thinker could reject T2, and that could be one way to avoid the Creation and Subordination Problems. For instance, if one were to say that the Son is, in fact, produced from some sort of pre-existing material, then the Son would not be created from nothing, and by consequence, the Son would not necessarily be less perfect than his producer (the Father).

But of course, T2 is extremely plausible, so anyone who wants to reject it would have to explain how a divine person --- who is entirely spiritual and therefore without any material components at all --- could be produced from 'pre-existing materials'. And that is certainly no easy task.

Alternatively, someone Scotus or Ockham could reject one of the claims from Aristotle or Avicenna. That too could be a way to avoid the Creation and Subordination Problems. However, Aristotle’s and Avicenna’s theories are designed to explain production, so if one were to reject a part of these theories, they would have to provide an alternative account, and that too is no easy task.

Divine production and the 'Subordination Problem'

In the Christian tradition, 'subordinationism' is the idea that one divine person is less perfect than another. This is considered a heresy; the divine persons are all supposed to be equal. Thus, one might think that when one divine person produces another, the product must be just as perfect as its producer(s):

(T3) For any divine persons x and y, if x produces y, x and y are equal in perfection.

However, T3 conflicts with Avicenna’s theory of production. Avicenna maintains that whenever a product is produced without any pre-existing materials, it must be different in kind from its producer. Further, many medieval Aristotelians held the even more general claim that whenever a producer and its product are different in kind, the product must be less perfect than its producer.

But supposing all of that is right, then if a divine person were produced without any pre-existing materials (as T2 from the last post says), that person would then be different in kind, and therefore less perfect than its producer.

(1**) For any x and y, if x produces y without any material m, x and y are different in kind.
[From Avicenna.]

(2) The Father cannot produce the Son with any material m.
[From T2.]

(3**) Therefore, if the Father produces the Son, the Father and Son are different in kind.
[From (1**) and (2).]

(4**) For any x and y, if (i) x produces y, and (ii) x and y are different in kind, then y is less perfect than x.
[From any standard medieval Aristotelianism.]

(5) Therefore, if the Father produces the Son, the Son is less perfect than the Father.
[From (2), (3**), and (4**).]

But of course, that amounts to subordinationism, and it contradicts the Christian scholastic claim that

(6) the Father and Son are equal in perfection.
[From T3.]

Thus, scholastic thinkers like Scotus and Ockham cannot hold all these ideas together, on pain of contradiction. Again then, Avicenna’s theory leaves the Christian schoolmen with a problem, for Avicenna’s theory entails that if the Son and Spirit are produced, they are lesser deities. And that is not acceptable to a Christian scholastic Hence what I call the Subordination Problem: how can the Son and Spirit be produced, but not be lesser deities?

Divine production and the 'Creation Problem'

The Nicene Creed states that when the Father begets the Son, the Father does not create the Son out of nothing. For a Christian scholastic like Scotus or Ockham, this suggests that no divine person is created:

(T1) For any divine persons x and y, if x produces y, x does not create y from nothing.

Now, if the Son and Spirit cannot be produced from nothing, then it might be tempting to think that they must be produced from something. But what could that 'something' be? Surely it cannot be any pre-existing materials. After all, the Son and Spirit are spiritual beings, so how could they be 'made' from anything material? It seems very plausible to think that the Son and Spirit cannot be produced from materials at all. Thus:

(T2) For any divine persons x and y, if x produces y, x cannot produce y with any material M.

However, (T1) and (T2) lead to problems. Consider the following.

Aristotle maintains that nothing can be produced unless it is produced from pre-existing materials. According to (T2) though, a divine person (e.g., the Son) cannot be produced from pre-existing materials. Thus, a divine person (like the Son) cannot be produced at all:

(1) For any x and y, if x produces y, x cannot produce y without any material m.
[From Aristotle.]

(2) The Father cannot produce the Son with any material m.
[From T2.]

(3) Therefore, the Father cannot produce the Son.
[From (1) and (2).]

Of course, scholastics like Scotus and Ockham want to affirm that

(4) the Father produces the Son,

but that contradicts(3), so one cannot hold all these claims at the same time, on pain of contradiction.

In order to avoid this, one might be tempted to give up Aristotle’s claim in (1), just as Avicenna did. After all, Avicenna was a good Muslim, so he believed in creation: some things can be produced without pre-existing materials.

However, Avicenna also holds that if a product is produced without any pre-existing materials, then it must be created from nothing. And that would entail that if a divine person is produced without pre-existing materials (as T2 says), then that person would be created from nothing.

(1*) For any x and y, if x produces y without any material m, x creates y from nothing.
[From Avicenna.]

(2) The Father cannot produce the Son with any material m.
[From T2.]

(3*) Therefore, if the Father produces the Son, the Father creates the Son from nothing.
[From (1*) and (2).]

But according to the Nicene Creed, no divine person is created from nothing, so:

(4*) if the Father produces the Son, the Father does not create the Son from nothing.
[From T1.]

But that contradicts (3*), so again we get a contradiction.

On the face of it then, both Aristotle’s and Avicenna’s theories of production present scholastic authors like Scotus and Ockham with a problem. For Aristotle’s and Avicenna’s theories entail that either the Son and Spirit cannot be produced at all, or they must be created from nothing, and neither consequence is acceptable for the Christian schoolmen. Hence, what I call the Creation Problem: how can the Son and Spirit be produced, but not created?

Avicenna on the emanation of the universe

Here's a translation I did of Avicenna's Metaphysics (Al-Shifa) book 9, chapter 4. That's the place Avicenna describes the emanation of the universe from God. It's a facing page translation, with the critical Latin text.

Avicenna, Meta. 9.4

Avicenna on necessity and possibility

Avicenna famously says that God is 'necessary in himself', while all creatures are both 'possible in themselves' and 'necessary from another'.

There are two distinctions here.

1. The first distinction is between something that is 'necessary in itself' and something that is 'possible in itself'. God is 'necessary in himself', while everything else is 'possible in itself'.

It would be a mistake to interpret this as a distinction between necessary and contingent beings, as if that which is 'necessary in itself' exists in every possible world, while that which is 'possible in itself' exists in some but not all worlds.

This would be wrong not only because Avicenna doesn't believe in possible worlds (for Avicenna, there are no possible worlds -- just the one, necessary world), but also because Avicenna thinks everything that is 'possible in itself' is produced necessarily. Since anything that's produced necessarily would exist in every possible world, it would be incoherent to also say that it would exist in some but not all worlds.

(Averroes thinks Avicenna is suggesting just that, so he accuses Avicenna of incoherence. But Averroes' interpretation is incorrect.)

So we should not think that to be 'possible in itself' means to be 'contingent'. Rather, we should take it to mean just what Avicenna says: that which is 'necessary in itself' exists without being produced, while that which is 'possible in itself' exists because it is produced.

And that, I think, is the bottom line. That's all that Avicenna means when he talks about being 'necessary in itself' and 'possible in itself'. There's nothing there about modality.

Now, Avicenna says some other things about being 'necessary' or 'possible in itself', but I don't think they take away from my point. They are as follows.

(a) Something is 'necessary in itself' if its non-existence entails a contradiction. In other words, something that is 'necessary in itself' is the sort of thing that simply must exist. Consequently, it exists on its own, so it need not, and in fact it cannot, be produced. (It just exists on its own, and you can't produce what already exists.)

(b) By contrast, if something is produced, then it cannot be 'necessary in itself'. If it were 'necessary in itself', then it would exist on its own, so it could not be produced. But since it is produced, it must not be 'necessary in itself'.

(c) Further, since it's produced, it must not be 'impossible in itself', for impossible things cannot exist at all.

(d) Its existence, then, must be within the bounds of possibility. So it is 'possible in itself'.

But as I said, I don't see how any of that takes away from the basic point: for Avicenna, to be 'necessary in itself' means to exist without being produced, and to be 'possible in itself' means to exist because its produced. And that's all it means.

Some people talk as if Avicenna thinks there is a realm of 'possibles' standing in front of God, and God chooses what to actualize.

But I don't think that's right either. Avicenna uses the word 'possible' only because that which is produced is neither 'necessary' nor 'impossible' in itself, and the only word left is 'possible'. But unfortunately, the word 'possible' suggests contingency, a realm of 'possibles', etc.

I think a better label would be 'not necessary in itself'. Avicenna's real point is just that a product is produced; it's not the sort of thing that just exists without being produced. As Aquinas nicely puts it in Sent. 1.8.3.2: 'That which acquires its existence from another does not exist necessarily in itself, as Avicenna proves'.

So to say that something is 'necessary in itself' means nothing more than that it exists without being produced, and to say that something is 'possible in itself' means nothing more than that it exists because it is produced. That's it. No modality here.

2. The second distinction, however, does have to do with modality. This is a distinction between something that is produced necessarily and something that is produced contingently (or, in Avicenna's terminology, between what is 'necessary from another' and what is 'possible from another').

For those who believe in possible worlds, we could put the point like this: a product is 'necessary from another' if it's produced in every possible world, but it is 'possible from another' if it's produced in some but not all worlds.

Note that just because something is produced does not entail whether it is produced necessarily or contingently. To put it in terms of possible worlds again, a product might be produced in every world, or it might be produced only in some.

This is why I say that the distinction between being 'necessary' or 'possible in itself' is not a distinction between necessary and contingent beings. It is just a distinction between being produced or unproduced. The distinction between being necessary or contingent comes up here, i.e., in the distinction between being 'necessary' or 'possible from another'.

For reasons I don't want to go into here, I should note that Avicenna's distinction between being 'necessary' or 'possible from another' is only a logical distinction. Avicenna believes that every product is produced necessarily, so there is nothing that is genuinely contingent in Avicenna's universe. So the distinction is just logical.

Nevertheless, the point still stands: to be produced is one thing, and to be produced necessarily or contingently is another. Again, to put it in terms of possible worlds, a product cannot exist in a world all by itself: if it exists in a world, it must exist with its producer. But that says nothing about how many worlds a product exists in. It might exist in none (if it was never produced), it might exist in some if it's produced contingently), or it might exist in all (if it's produced necessarily).

Obviously, the distinction between being 'necessary' and 'possible from another' only applies to products. It cannot apply to something that is 'necessary in itself', for such things are not produced, so there's no option to be produced 'necessarily' or 'contingently'. Only products can be produced 'necessarily' or 'contingently'.

Consequently, anything that exists without being produced has only the one feature: that of being 'necessary in itself', while anything that is produced has two features: that of being 'possible in itself', and that of being 'necessary' or 'possible from another'.