In the last post, I talked about what Aquinas takes to be the basic components of any production. A production is a process whereby some material is fashioned into a product. The three basic components of such a process are these: there's the producer, there's the 'formal term' (the final form the product takes), and there's the 'receptive material' that gets fashioned into the product along the way.
As we saw in the quotation from the last post, Aquinas thinks two productions can only be distinguished by one of these three components. Let me restate that as follows: two productions P1 and P2 are distinct only if they differ with respect to (a) their producers, (b) their formal terms, or (c) their materials.
Consider (b) first: two productions are distinct if they have different formal terms. Let me try to explain this with the following scenario. Suppose that I am a cleaner who works for the sole sculptor within a hundred miles. This sculptor likes to work alone, so I only come in at night to clean. One night, I notice a clay statue on the table, but the next night I notice that the same lump of clay has been re-fashioned into a vase (I know it's the same lump of clay because the sculptor's only got one lump of clay at the moment; the next shipment has yet to come in).
Now, the only thing that's different between the two days is the shape/form of the clay. Apart from that, the clay (the receptive material) is the same, and the sculptor (the producer) is the same (after all, there isn't anyone else within a hundred miles who could've done the sculpting). Still, the fact that there are two different forms (the 'formal terms') provides enough information to tell me that there have been two productions, even if the producer and the material are the same: on the first day, the sculptor fashioned the clay into a statue, and on the second day, she fashioned it into a vase.
Now consider (c): two productions are distinct if they involve different lumps of material. Suppose that the next delivery of clay arrives, and that night I notice a that lump of red clay has been fashioned into a statue. On the next night, I notice that a brown lump of clay has been fashioned into what looks to me to be the exact same statue.
In this case, the producer is the same (it's the same sculptor who made both statues), and the forms are the same (both statues are identical copies), but the material is different: the first statue is made from red clay, and the second is made from brown clay. Still, the fact that there are different lumps of material is enough information to tell me that there have been two productions: on the first day, the sculptor made a statue out of red clay, and on the second day, she made one out of brown clay.
Now consider (a): two productions are distinct if they involve different producers. To get at this idea, we'll have to modify our hypothetical scenario a bit. Suppose that another sculptor moves in, and the two join up to form one esteemed sculpting firm. However, each sculptor likes to work alone, so they come in on alternate days. Suppose also that they're a bit manic, and so each one destroys whatever work the other one has left in the studio.
One night, I notice a statue made out of the last lump of clay (again, there's only one lump of clay left; the next shipment hasn't arrived). The next night, I notice what appears to be the exact same statue made from the exact same clay.
In this case, the material is the same (it's the same lump of clay), and the forms are the same (the statue has the same shape on both nights). But nevertheless, I know that two producers have been involved, and that's enough to tell me that two productions have occurred: on the first day, the first sculptor made a statue, but on the second day, the other sculptor smashed the previous statue into a lump, and then re-fashioned that lump into an identical statue.
Of course, these scenarios are contrived, but hopefully they illustrate how two productions are distinguished by their producers, formal terms, or materials. If two productions differ with respect to even one of these, that's enough to tell that there are two productions.
Now, I've talked as if we're looking for a way to notice a distinction between two productions, and I've been saying that if we notice a distinction between producers, formal terms, or materials, that gives us enough information to tell that there are two productions.
However, it's not clear that Aquinas is suggesting a criterion by which we can notice when two productions are distinct. Instead, he may be suggesting the cause of two productions being distinct. If that's what he means, then he'd be saying something like the following.
Consider (c) first: if a producer uses two lumps of material, that necessarily amounts to two productions (she makes one product out of one lump of material, and she makes another product out of another lump of material). That's not necessarily very plausible though. Surely I can use two lumps of material to make one product.
Now consider (a): if two producers produce, that necessarily amounts to two productions (one producer performs one production, and the other performs another act of production). This is not so plausible either. Surely two producers can cooperate to make one product. And besides, Aquinas believes the Father and Son together produce the Spirit, and does he want to say that the Spirit is produced by two productions? (Maybe he does; some scholastics do think that.)
Finally, consider (b): if a producer produces two formal terms, that necessarily amounts to two productions (she makes one product with a certain form, and she makes another product with a distinct form). That's much more plausible, for no one product could have two formal terms (a lump of clay can't have a statue shape and a vase shape at the same time, for example).
I reckon that from the list of (a), (b), and (c), (b) is the only plausible cause of distinction. (a) and (c) work fine as criteria of distinction, but surely a difference in (a) or (c) doesn't necessarily cause distinct productions.
Two more counterexamples to utilitarianism
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It’s an innocent and pleasant pastime to multiply counterexamples to
utilitarianism even if they don’t add much to what others have said. Thus,
if utilit...
2 days ago
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If a kid asks where rain comes from, I think a cute thing to tell him is "God is crying." And if he asks why God is crying, another cute thing to tell him is "Probably because of something you did."
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