Scotus on the 'indetermination' of active and passive powers

Scotus on the different ways that active and passive powers can be indifferent (or 'indeterminate') to the different activities they empower.

Lect., 1.3.3.2-3, n. 415 (Vat. 16: 390.22-391.6): 'dicendum quod indeterminatio duplex est: una est indeterminatio quae convenit causae materiali, et alia est indeterminatio quae convenit causae agenti universali et quodammodo illimitatae. Exemplum primi est de indeterminatione ligni respectu caloris vel alterius formae; exemplum secundi est de indeterminatione solis ad producendum hoc generabile vel illud; unde haec indeterminatio virtutis activae est ad agendum et non ad aliquam formam ab aliquo recipiendam. Quando igitur dicitur quod illud quod est indeterminatum requirit aliquam formam determinantem qua determinetur, verum est de potentia passiva’.

'It should be said to this that indetermination is twofold: one is the indetermination that belongs to material causes, and the other is the indetermination that belongs to a universal agent cause which, in a sense, is unlimited. An example of the first is the indetermination of a log with respect to heat or some other form. An example of the second is the indetermination of the sun with respect to producing this or that generable thing. Whence, the indetermination of active power is for acting, not for receiving some form from something. Thus, when it is said that something indeterminate requires some determining form to determine it, this is [only] true of passive power’.

Lect., 1.3.3.2-3, n. 415 (Vat. 16: 391.6-22): 'Si autem loquimur de indeterminatione causae effectivae, hoc contingit dupliciter: aliquando enim causa efficiens est indeterminata ad producendum aliquem effectum quem tamen immediate producere potest, et aliquando est determinata ad effectum producendum quem tamen sine causa proxima producere non potest. Loquendo autem de causa effectiva primo modo, ad hoc quod determinetur ad agendum sufficit praesentia passi, sicut sol habet virtutem qua immediate potest dissolvere et constringere: ad hoc quod dissolvat sufficit praesentia dissolubilis, ut glaciei, et ad hoc quod constringat sufficit etiam praesentia passi, ut luti; unde causa effectiva non determinatur per hoc quod aliquam formam recipit. Sed ad hoc quod causa effectiva secundo modo determinetur, sufficit praesentia passi cum praesentia causarum particularium concurrentium, sicut est de sole ad producendum animalia perfecta, ut asinum, bovem; requirit enim, ad hoc quod determinetur ad productionem bovis, causam particularem univocam, ut bovem et passum praesens’.

'But if we are talking about the indetermination of an effecting cause, it applies in [one of] two ways, for sometimes the effecting cause is indeterminate with respect to producing some effect that it can produce directly, and sometimes it is determined to produce some effect that it cannot produce without [the help of] a proximate cause. Speaking of an effecting cause in the first way, the presence of the recipient is enough to determine it to activity. For example, the sun has the power to melt or dry [something] directly, so the presence of something meltable (like ice) is sufficient for the sun to melt it, and the presence of some recipient (like mud) is sufficient for the sun to dry it. Whence, the effecting cause is not determined through the fact that it receives some form. But in order for an effective cause to be determined in the second way, the presence of the recipient along with the presence of [any] concurring particular causes is sufficient. An example is the sun’s ability to produce complete animals like donkeys or cows, for in order to produce a cow, the sun must [act along with] a particular univocal cause such as a cow, and a recipient must be present’.

Ibid., n. 416 (Vat. 16: 391.23-392.3): 'Dico igitur quod intellectus est indeterminatus ad eliciendum actum intelligendi, non indeterminatione causae materialis et passi sed indeterminatione causae activae, quae requirit causam aliam particularem, ad hoc quod causet intellectionem, --- et illa est obiectum, vel species in qua obiectum relucet; et ideo determinatur per obiectum et speciem. Sed non determinatur ipsa tamquam intellectum perficiat, ad hoc quod intelligat, sed determinatur sicut causa universalis et quodammodo illimitata, per causam particularem’.

'I say, then, that the intellect is indeterminate with respect to eliciting acts of understanding not by the indetermination of a material or recipient cause, but rather by the indetermination of an active cause which requires some other particular cause to bring about understanding. And that is the object or species in which the object ``shines through’’. For this reason, it is determined by the object and the species. But it is not determined such that it perfects the intellect enough to understand, but it is determined --- as a universal cause which is, in a certain sense, unlimited --- through a particular cause’.

Lect., 1.7.un., n. 26 (Vat. 16: 481.16-22): 'Sed contra hanc opinionem arguo sic: duplex est potentiae indeterminatio, sicut supra dictum est. Una enim est indeterminatio ``potentiae passivae’’, et haec est ad contradictoria, quae ad hoc quod determinetur, oportet quod recipiat (sicut lignum est in potentia ad calefaciendum et privatur calore aliquando, et ideo non vadit in actum nisi recipiat calorem); et haec est potentia passiva, quae est ``materiae’’’.

'But against this opinion [of Henry’s], I argue as follows. The indetermination of a power is twofold, as I said above. One is the indetermination of a ``passive power’’, and this is [indeterminate with respect] to contradictory [states of affairs]. In order for this [indeterminate power] to be determined [to one or the other state of affairs], it must receive [something]. For instance, a log has the potential to be heated, but sometimes it is deprived of heat, so it only becomes actually [hot] when it receives heat. This is the [indeterminacy of the] passive power of ``matter’’’.

Lect., 1.7.un., n. 26 (Vat. 16: 481.22-482.5): 'Alia est ``potentiae activae’’ indeterminatio, quae indeterminatio consequitur illimitationem suae causalitatis et suae virtutis, et haec potentia in naturalibus -- licet non in voluntate --- non est ad contradictoria; et ista potentia indeterminata, ad hoc quod determinetur, non recipit aliquam formam, sed sufficit praesentia passi si requirat passum (sicut sol est indeterminatus ad multos effectus indeterminatione et illimitatione quadam suae virtutis activae; et ideo ad hoc quod determinetur, non requiritur quod aliqua forma sibi imprimatur)’.

'The other [kind of] indetermination is that of ``active power’’, which is an indetermination that follows from the unlimitedness of its causality and power. And this power [that exists] in natural things -- though not in the will -- is not [an indetermination with respect] to contradictory [states of affairs]. In order for such an indeterminate power to be determined, it does not need to receive some form. Rather, it only requires the presence of a recipient (if it requires a recipient [at all]). For instance, the sun is indeterminate with respect to many effects by an indetermination and a certain unlimitedness that belongs to its active power. For this reason, in order for it to be determined [to some effect], it does not need to have some form imprinted in it’.

Lect., 1.7.un., n. 27 (Vat. 16: 482.6-17): 'Ex his arguitur sic: principium indeterminatum ``indeterminatione activa’’, quod est totale principium naturale et non ``voluntarium indifferens ad contradictoria’’, est de se determinatum ad producendum. Ista propositio iam manifesta est in exemplo praedicto [viz., solis], et iterum probatur ratione: quia si talis causa limitaretur ad unum effectum tantum, determinaretur sufficienter ad illum; sed per hoc quod talis causa ponitur illimitata respectu aliorum effectuum, non aufertur determinatio ad istum effectum nec tollitur comparatio eius ad istum effectum, unde nihil eius perfectionis tollitur per comparationem ad istum effectum; igitur potentia naturalis quae est indeterminata illimitatione suae naturae, determinatur ex se’.

'From these points, I argue as follows. The basis [for a power] that is indeterminate by ``the indetermination of active [power]’’ -- which is the total natural basis and not [a power that is] ``indifferent to contradictory things that can be chosen’’ -- is determined to produce [the effect or effects in question] from within itself. Now, this claim is obvious in the aforesaid example [of the sun], but it can further by proved by argument. For if such a cause were limited to one effect only, it would sufficiently be determined to that [one effect from within itself]. But given that, if such a cause were then supposed to be unlimited with respect to other effects, it would not lose that determination to the first effect nor would that take away its relationship to that effect. Whence, nothing of its perfection would be lost through its relationship to this [other] effect. Therefore, a natural power that is indeterminate by the unlimitedness of its nature is determined from within itself’.

Lect., 1.7.un., n. 27 (Vat. 16: 482.17-22): 'Cum igitur essentia divina sit indeterminata non indeterminatione passiva, sed indeterminatione quae est virtutis activae illimitatae, ipsa non requiret aliquam formam ipsam determinantem; si igitur essentia divina sit principium generationis aut spirationis, ipsa non determinatur ad producendum per aliquam proprietatem respectivam’.

'Thus, since the divine essence is indeterminate not by the indetermination of passive [power] but rather by the indetermination of the unlimitedness of its active power, it does not require some form to determine it. If, then, the divine essence were the basis for generation or spiration, it would not be determined to produce through some relative property’.

Ord., 1.7.1, n. 20 (Vat. 4: 114.1-11): 'Indeterminatio, quaedam est ``potentiae passivae’’ et quaedam ``potentiae activae’’ illimitatae ad plures effectus (exemplum: sicut sol est indeterminatus ad producendum multa generabilia, non quod aliquam formam recipiat ut agat, sed quia habet virtutem productivam illimitatam). Quod est indeterminatum ``indeterminatione materiae’’ oportet quod recipiat formam ad hoc quod agat, quia non est in actu sufficiente ad agendum, sed quod est indeterminatum ``indeterminatione potentiae activae’’ est ex se sufficienter determinatum ad producendum quemcumque illorum effectuum: et hoc si passum-dispositum sit approximatum, ubi requiritur passum, vel ex se ipso ubi passum non requiritur’.

'One kind of indetermination belongs to ``passive power’’ and another to ``active power’’ that is unlimited with respect to many effects. For example, the sun is indeterminate with respect to producing many generable things, not because it needs to receive some form in order to act, but rather because it has unlimited productive power. That which is indeterminate by ``the indetermination of matter’’ must receive a form in order to act, because it is not sufficiently actual itself to act. But that which is indeterminate by ``the indetermination of active power’’ is sufficiently determined from within itself to produce any of those effects (and in cases where a recipient is required, this will happen if a disposed recipient comes near enough, but in cases where no recipient is required, this will just happen from within itself)’.

Ord., 1.7.1, n. 20 (Vat. 4: 114.11-115.2): 'probatio: si tale activum esset de se determinatum ad unum effectum, posset de se sufficienter producere illum, --- sed si est indeterminatum ad hoc et ad aliud, ex tali illimitatione non tollitur perfectio causalitatis eius respectu talis effectus, sed tantum additur causalitas respectu alterius; ita ergo potest istud producere, sicut si tantum esset istius, et ita non requiritur aliquod determinans’.

'Proof: if such an active thing were determined within itself to [produce only] one effect, it could produce that effect sufficeintly from within itself. But if it were indeterminate with respect to this effect and another effect, such unlimitedness would not entail that it would lose the perfection of its causality with respect to the [first] effect. Rather, this would only add causality with respect to the other effect. Thus, it could produce this other effect, just as if it were limited to [produce only] this other effect, and it would not need something to determine it’.

Ord., 1.7.1, n. 21 (Vat. 4: 115.3-7): 'Ad propositum. Essentia divina non est principium indeterminatum ``indeterminatione materiae’’: ergo si est indeterminatum indeterminatione alterius quasi principii activi, erit simpliciter determinatum determinatione quae requiritur ad agendum, et ita non requiritur aliquid aliud’.

'As for the case at hand, the divine essence is not the basis for indeterminate [power] by the ``indetermination of matter’’. Therefore, if it is indeterminate by the indetermination of the other [sort], as the basis for active power, so to speak, then it will simply by determinate by the determination which is required for acting, and it will not need anything else’.

Ord., 1.7.1, n. 21 (Vat. 4: 115.7-12): 'Confirmatur, quia talis indeterminatio activi licet sit ad disparata, non tamen est ad contradictoria, sed determinate ad alteram partem contradictionis respectu cuiuslibet illorum disparatorum; nulla autem indeterminatio prohibet ex se determinate agere, nisi quae aliquo modo esset ad contradictoria, ut ad agere et non-agere; ergo etc.’

'This is confirmed in the following way. Although the indetermination of active [power] is [indeterminate with respect] to different kinds [of activities], it is not [indeterminate with respect] to contractory [states of affairs, viz, acting or not-acting]. Rather, it is determinate only to one of the contradictory [states of affairs, i.e., it is determinate to acting rather than to not-acting], and so [it is only indeterminate] with respect to the different kinds of [activities] for which it is [the basis]. However, no indetermination prohibits something within itself from acting except the kind [of indetermination that is indeterminate with respect] to contradictory [states of affairs] such as acting and non-acting. Therefore, etc.’