Scotus on how the divine essence and a personal property 'combine' to make a person (translation)

‘But how is it that the nature of a real relation [viz., a personal property such as sonship] does not have the same formal nature as the divine essence, but nevertheless the two do not constitute a composite together? The reason for this is that the nature of the one is perfectly the same as the nature of the other, for on account of the infinity of the one nature, whatever can be [compresent] with it is perfectly the same with it. Therefore, the perfection of this identity excludes any composition or quasi-composition, and that identity holds because of the infinity [of the divine essence]. Still, that infinity does not destroy the formal natures [of the things contained in it], so this one [viz., sonship] is formally distinct from that one [viz., the divine essence]’.

[Scotus, Ord. 1.5.2.un., n. 117 (Vat. 4: 69.6-13): ‘Qualiter autem stat quod ratio relationis [e.g., filiationis] in re non sit formaliter eadem rationi [divinae] essentiae et tamen in eodem concurrentes non constituunt compositum, — hoc ideo est, quia illa ratio est perfecte eadem illi: propter infinitatem enim unius rationis, quidquid potest esse cum ea, est perfecte idem sibi. Perfectio ergo identitatis excludit omnem compositionem et quasi-compositionem, quae identitas est propter infinitatem, — et tamen infinitas non tollit formales rationes quin haec formaliter non sit illa’.]

‘Now, [to say “deity is in the Father”] is true insofar as [deity or the divine essence] is a nature in the person, for that person has its “being” and “whatness” through that nature (for this belongs to a “whatness” insofar as it is a “whatness”), but this is not because the form informs the person, and this is true even in creatures. But [to say “fatherhood is in the Father”] is true insofar [fatherhood] is an individual form in the individual, but [again] not by informing it’.

[Scotus, Ord. 1.5.2.un., nn. 121-122 (Vat. 4: 71.8-13): ‘Nam prima [viz., “deitas est in Patre”, cf. n. 120] est vera ut natura est in supposito, habente “esse” quiditativum ea (quia hoc convenit quiditati unde quiditas est), sed non propter hoc est forma informans suppositum, etiam in creaturis. Secunda [viz., “paternitas est in Patre”, cf. n. 120] est vera ut forma hypostatica est in hypostasi, – sed nec informat ipsam’.]


‘I concede that the relation [viz., a unique personal property like sonship] contributes to the actuality of the [divine] person, but it does not contribute actuality to the “whatness” [of that person], for the relation distinguishes that person “personally” rather than in terms of its “whatness”. However, the essence contributes actuality to the “whatness” [of the person], and by that “whatness”, it distinguishes [the person from other things with a different “whatness”]’.

[Scotus, Ord. 1.5.2.un., n. 127 (Vat. 4: 72.16-19): ‘Concedo relationem esse actum personalem, non actum quiditativum, – quia personaliter distinguit et non quiditative. Essentia autem est actus quiditativus et quiditative distinguens’.]

‘So although the “whatness” [in a person] is the form of that person just as much as its individual form is (as it also is in creatures), it is not an informing form. For in creatures, the “whatness” is a part [of a person], so to speak, but in a divine person it is [present] as one formal nature, as it were, formally concurring with another to [constitute] one simple thing that has within itself many formal natures’.

[Scotus, Ord. 1.5.2.un., n. 122 (Vat. 4: 71.13-17): ‘Tam enim quiditas quam forma hypostatica, etiam in creaturis, licet sit forma suppositi, non tamen est forma informans, sed ibi quasi pars, hic autem quasi una ratio formalis concurrens cum alia, formaliter, ad idem simplex sed habens in se plures rationes formales’.]