Saturday, May 24, 2008

Henry of Ghent, Summa 39.4 (translation): the Divine Essence as a causal power

Henry of Ghent
Summa Quaestionum Ordinariarum
Article 39, Question 4
Badius I f. 247rA-249rO
Translated by JT Paasch


[WHETHER THE DIVINE ESSENCE IS THE BASIS FOR EVERY DIVINE ACTION]


[ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST]

/247rA/ Circa quartum arguitur quod divina essentia non sit in deo ratio agendi omnem divinam actionem.

Primo sic, quod maxime habet rationem materialis et subiecti receptivi in aliqua natura entis, minime est ratio agendi actionem aliquam quod convenit illi enti. Unde in genere entis naturalis materia, quia est subiectum receptibile omnium formarum naturalium, nullo modo est ratio agendi aliquam actionem naturalem, sed ratio patendi et recipiendi tantum, secundum quod dicit Philosophus II De Generatione. Pati proprium est materiae, agere autem alterius potentiae. In natura autem entis increati divina essentia maxime rationem materiae habet, et quasi subiectum existit receptivum omnium dispositionum formalium in deo: ut sunt rationes attributorum et perfectionum et idearum et omnium proprietatum atque relationum. Ergo etc.

/247rA/ Concerning the fourth question, it is argued that the divine essence is not the basis [ratio] for performing every divine action in God.

First, like this. That which maximally has the character [ratio] of matter and a receptive subject in some nature of an entity is minimally the basis for performing some action which pertains to that entity. Whence, in the genus of natural entities, matter, because it is a subject receptive of every natural form, is in no way the basis for some natural action. Rather, it is only the basis for undergoing and receiving, as the Philosopher says in book 2 of De Generatione. To receive is proper to matter, but to act pertains to another power. In the nature of uncreated being, the divine essence maximally has the character of matter, and [it is] a quasi subject existing in such a way that it is receptive of every dispositional form in God, namely the [divine] attributes, perfections, and ideas, and every property and relation. Therefore, etc.

Secundo sic, actio respondet proportionaliter rationi agendi eam ab agente: ut si calidum calefacit calore, sic ut calor est una simplex qualitas principium existens et ratio actionis calidi, sic calefactio est unica et simplex actio, et secundum quod calor intensus est in gradu caloris, sic proportionaliter calefactio est intensa in gradu calefactionis, quia generaliter a magis et minus in qualitatibus activis, secundum Philosophum, causatur magis et minus in actionibus quarum sunt ratio. Si ergo divina essentia esset ratio omnium divinarum actionum, sicut ipsa simplex est et unica nullam habens omnino diversitatem, unica ergo et simplex esset omnis divina actio nullam omnino habens diversitatem. Consequens falsum est, differunt enim inter se generare, creare, spirare, intelligere, velle, quae sunt divinae actiones. Ergo etc.

Second, like this. An action corresponds proportionally to the basis for performing it in the agent. For example, if a hot thing heats by heat, then heat is one simple quality existing as a principle and basis for the action of heating. Thus, calefaction is a single, simple action, according to which the intensity of heat rests in the degree of heat, for the intensity of calefaction is proportionate to the degree of calefaction. According to the Philosopher, it is generally the case that the more and less of active qualities is caused by the more or less of the actions of which those qualities are bases. Thus, if the divine essence were the basis for every divine action, then since it is a simple and single thing having no diversity at all, every divine action would be single and simple, having no diversity at all. The consequence is false, for generation, creation, spiration, understanding, and willing, which are different actions, are different from each other. Therefore, etc.

Tertio sic, agens secundum aliquam rationem in se non producit per actionem nisi simile sibi in illa ratione: ut si calidum calefacit calore, non producit in calefactio nisi calorem, generando calidum sibi simile in calore. Similiter si homo generat hominem in humanitate sua quod est forma sua, non generat nisi sibi similem in humanitate. Si igitur divina essentia sit ratio ageni omnes divinas actiones, agens non produceret sua actione nisi, sibi simile. Consequens est falsum, quod patet in creationem quod est divina actio, qua non producitur sibi simile in deitate. Ergo etc.

Third, like this. An agent, according to some basis in itself, does not produce by an action unless [the product is] similar to itself with respect to that basis. For example, if a hot thing heats by heat, it does not produce [heat] by calefaction unless it produces heat by generating a hot thing similar to itself with respect to heat. Similarly, if a man generates a man in his humanity, which is his form, he does not generate [a man] unless [the man] is similar to himself with respect to humanity. Therefore, if the divine essence were the basis for all divine actions, the agent would not produce its action unless [it produced] something similar to itself. The consequence is false, for it is clear in the case of creation that divine action does not produce something similar to itself with respect to deity. Therefore, etc.

Quarto sic, cum (ut iam dictum est) actio debet esse proportionalis rationi agendi, sicut ergo se habet actio ad actionem, sic se habet ratio ad rationem. Sed in deo actus sive actio quod est esse, se habet ad actionem quod est generare sive spirare, quod est differens ab illa, quia esse est actio ad se dicta, generatio autem vel spiratio est actio ad aliud dicta. Secundum enim quod dicit Augustinus VII De Trinitate, capito 4, aliud est deo esse, aliud patrem esse. Quod esse est ad se dicitur, pater autem ad filium, et relative gignit. Ergo ratio actionis quod est esse in deo, differens erit ab illa quod est ratio actionis quod est generare aut spirare, ita quod ratio esse sit absoluta et dicta ad se, ratio vero generare aut sirare sit relativa et ad aliud dicta. Cum ergo divina essentia omnino sit absoluta et ad se dicta, et ratio eius quod est esse, quia esse est actus entis a forma quod existit, secundum quod dicitur secundo de anima. Causa ipsius esse omnibus substantia est. Non ergo potest esse ratio eius quod est generare aut spirare, immo illud debet aliquid esse respectivum et ad aliud dictum.

Fourth, like this. Since, as was just said, an action ought to be proportionate to the basis for acting, then just as an action pertains in itself [habet se] to action, so also the basis pertains in itself to being a basis. But in God, the act or action which is 'to be' pertains in itself to the action which is generating or spirating, which is different from it. For 'to be' is said to be an action for itself, but generation or spiration is said to be an action to another. As Augustine says in book 7 of De Trinitate, chapter 4, to be God is one thing, while to be the Father is another. 'To be' is said with respect to itself, but to be a father is said with respect to a son, and a father generates relatively. Therefore, the basis of the action which is 'to be' in God will differ from the basis of the action which is generating or spirating, and so the basis for 'to be' is absolute and is said with respect to itself, but the basis for generating or spirating is relative and is said with respect to another. Since, then, the divine essence is entirely absolute and is said with respect to itself, it is its basis for that which is 'to be', for 'to be' is the act of a being which exists by a form, according to which it is said secondarily of the soul. And the cause of 'to be' in any way is substance. Therefore, it cannot be the basis for generating or spirating, which instead ought to be something relative and said with respect to another.

Quod confirmatur arguendo quinto ad idem sic, illud est ratio agendi propriam actionem in unoquoque, quod est ultimam formale et constitutivum illius: ut si calor est ultimum formale constitutivum calidi in natura calidi, calor ergo est propria ratio in calido agendi actionem calefaciendi. Consimiliter intellectus quia est ultimam formale constitutivum hominis, est ratio agendi propriam actionem hominis, ut determinat Philosophus primo Ethicorum. Sed generare est propria actio patris inquantum pater est, proprietas vero relativa est quasi ultimum et formale in divina essentia qua constituitur persona patris, pater enim paternitate dicitur pater, non autem deitate quod est divina essentia. Ergo etc.

Fifth, this is confirmed by arguing for the same conclusion like this. The basis for proper action in each thing is that which is formally ultimate and constitutive of it. For example, if heat is formally ultimate and constitutive of heat in the nature of heat, then heat is the proper basis in heat for performing the action of heating. Similarly, since the intellect is formally ultimate and constitutive of man, it is the basis for performing the proper action of man, as the Philosopher determines at the beginning of the Ethics. Now, to generate is the proper action of the Father in so far as he is the Father, but the relative property is quasi formally ultimate in the divine essence by which the person of the Father is constituted, for the Father is called Father by paternity, but not by deity (which is the divine essence). Therefore, etc.

In oppositum arguitur primo sic, in deo nihil est reale aut positivum nisi essentia et relatio, ut patet ex supra determinatis. Ratio autem agentis qua procedit actio ab agente, debet esse in ipso aliquid reale positivum, aliter enim actio non esset aliquid reale neque positivum: quia principiatum et causatum non habent verius esse quam principium et sua causa, relatio autem nullius actionis ratio potest esse: quia ratio actionis est per se actionis principium, quod non potest esse relatio, sicut neque terminus, secundum Philosophum V Physicorum et tactum est in praecedenti quaestione. Ergo, etc.

For the opposite position, it is argued first like this. In God, nothing is real or positive except the divine essence and relation, as is clear from what was determined above. However, the basis for acting by which an action proceeds from an agent ought to be something positively real in it. Otherwise, the action would be something neither real nor positive, for that which is principiated and caused does not have being any truer than its principle and cause. However, a relation can be the basis for no action, because the basis for action is the per se principle of an action, and according to the Philosopher in book V of the Physics, and as was touched on in the preceding question, a relation cannot be a principle, just is it cannot be a term. Therefore, etc.

Secundo sic, sicut materia prima est primum omnium principium passivum, sic deus est primum omnium principium activum, decente Philosopho XII Metaphysicorum, quod ea quae sunt in prima materia in potentia: sunt in primo motore in actu. Sed prima materia sua essentia nuda est ratio passiva omnem formam et transmutationem recipiendi. Ergo deus sua essentia nuda est ratio activa omnem divinam actionem in se eliciendi.

Second, like this. Just as prime matter is the first of all passive principles, so also is God the first of all active principles, according to the saying of the Philosopher in book XII of the Metaphysics that things in potency are in prime matter, and things in act are in motion. But the bare essence of prime matter is the passive basis for receiving any form and change. Therefore, the bare essence of God is the active basis for eliciting every divine action in God.


[RESPONSE OF THE AUTHOR]

/247rB/ Dicendum ad hoc: quod secundum supra determinata, in deo super ipsam puram essentiam deitatis nihil additur neque secundum rem neque secendum veridicam intelligendi rationem, nisi ratio respectus, si-/247vB/-ve in attributis substantialibus, sive in rationibus perfectionum aut idearum, sive in ipsis notionibus et proprietatibus personarum. De natura autem respectus secundum quod est respectus, clarum est secundum Philosophum V Physicorum [5.2.10 (225b11-13)], quod nec potest habere per se rationem principii aut termini actionis. Illud autem quod est ratio agendi, quia est id quo agens formaliter agit, necessario est principium per se elicitivum actionis, ut dictum est, quemadmodum anima principium est in animatis, ut determinat Philosophus II De Anima. Quod autem est tale principium in re, necesse est quod sit aliquid positivum reale, ut ostendit penultima ratio iam supra inducta. Quare cum (ut dictum est) praeter respectus in deo nihil est reale positivum nisi pura substantia, quod est deitas sive ipsa divina essentia, in deo igitur ponendum est quod ratio agendi elicitiva divinas actiones, quaecunque sint illae, non sit nisi ipsa pura divina essentia; ita quod licet nulla actio omnino attribuatur essentiae divinae velut principio agenti, sicut determinatum est in praecedenti quaestione: omnis tamen divina actio attribuitur ei ut principio elicitivo, et quo agens principale scilicet suppositum unum vel duo vel tria, simul agunt omnes actiones divinas.

/247rB/ It should be said to this that, according to what was determined above, in God nothing is added – not really nor by the true reason of the understanding – over and above the pure essence of deity except that which has the character [ratio] of a relation, /247vB/ [and this either] in the substantial attributes, the divine perfections or ideas [in rationibus perfectionum aut idearum], or in the notions and properties of the persons. However, according to the Philosopher in book 5 of the Physics, it is clear that the nature of a relation qua relation cannot in itself be the principle or the term of an action. But since it is that by which an agent formally acts, that which is the basis [ratio] for acting necessarily is a principle which in itself is elicitive of an action, as was said, in the way that the soul is the principle of animation as the Philosopher determines in book 2 of De Anima. Because it is such a real principle, it is necessary that it is something really positive, as the penultimate argument listed above shows. Wherefore, since, as was said, apart from relations in God, nothing is really positive except the pure substance, which is deity or the divine essence itself, it therefore should be posited that in God, that which is the basis [ratio] for acting which is elicitive of divine actions, whatever they are, is nothing except the pure divine essence. And although no action at all is attributed to the divine essence as an acting principle, just as was determined in the preceding question, every divine action is attributed to it as an elicitive principle, and as that principally by which the agent – namely, one, two, or three supposita – simultaneously performs every divine action.

/247vC/ Sed quia huismodi actiones divinae differentes sunt inter se, et non est differentia in actionibus nisi ex differentia ex parte principii elicitivi, iuxta quod praecedit secunda ratio supra inducta; divina autem essentia sub ratione qua est essentia, nullam rationem differentiae in se habet, quod autem nullam differentiam ex se omnino potest in se habere, si in se aliquam habeat, oportet quod hoc sit ab aliquo sibi supervenienti. Essentiae autem divinae nihil potest supervenire nisi ratio respectus, essentia ergo ut sit ratio differentium actionum, oportet eam in se differre, saltem secundum rationes diversorum respectuum.

/247vC/ But since divine actions of this sort are different from each other, and since there is no difference in actions except on the part of elicitive principles (which was shown [iuxta] by the second argument listed above), and since the divine essence under the character by which it is the essence has no basis [rationem] for difference within itself, and since it cannot have in itself any intrinsic difference, if it has some difference in itself, then it must get this from something that supervenes [supervenienti] on it. However, nothing can supervene on the divine essence except that which has the character of a relation, so the divine essence, as it is the basis [ratio] for different actions, must differ in itself, at least by reason of diverse relations.

Qui circa ipsam essentiam duo faciunt. Unum, scilicet ut per ipsos essentia respiciat actus, et quasi inclinationem habet ad ipsos eliciendos, cum secundum se absque ratione omnis respectus penitus absolutum quod est, et nullo modo respicit actum elicendum. Nunc autem nullo modo posset esse ratio agendi ipsum nisi aliquo modo ipsum respiceret, et ad ipsum aliquo modo ordinaretur. Aliud vero, ut penes differentiam ipsorum ipsi essentiae determinarentur actus differentes cum secundum se nullum omnino determinat, et ideo nullum determinate eliceret nisi ab aliquo sibi determinaretur.

This, concerning the divine essence, makes for two things. First, by those relations the essence is related to an act and has a quasi inclination for eliciting those acts, since according to itself it is entirely absolute and would in no way be related to eliciting an act without the character [ratione] of a relation, for it would in no way be the basis [ratio] for performing that act unless it were related and ordered to it in some way. Second, the different acts of that very essence are determined by the difference of those relations, for in itself the essence is determined in no way. For this reason, it elicits nothing determinate unless it is determined to it by something.

Actum vero simpliciter respicit per respectum importatum nomine potentiae: secundum quod supra expositum est in quaestionibus de potentia dei. Actus vero diversi eliciendi sibi determinantur per respectus diversos diversorum modorum potentiae. Et sic ad agendum actum aliquem, a persona divina ut a principali agente duplex ratio qua agit eum requiritur: una ut qua ipsum elicit, alia ut qua eliciens actum respicit et determinatur sibi actus. Primo modo dico ut iam dictum est, quod sola divina essentia secundum rationem essentiae est ratio agendi omnes divinas actiones, scilicet in eliciendo ipsas. Secundo vere modo dico quod respectus fundati in divina essentia sunt ratio agendi divinas actiones a deo, scilicet in determinando ipsas ut eliciantur. Ita videlicet quod unica est ratio omnis eliciens, scilicet ipsa divina essentia sub sua ratione absoluta qua essentia est, plures vero sunt rationes determinantes secundum pluralitatem actuum, scilicet ipsi respectus diversi.

Now, an act, simply speaking, is related by the relation which is implied by the name 'power', as it was explained above in the question on the power of God. But diversely elicited acts are determined to themselves by diverse relations of the diverse modes of a power. In this way, for the purpose of performing some act, a divine person as it is a principle agent requires a double basis [ratio] by which it does that act: one as that by which it elicits the act, the other as that by which the eliciting is related to and is itself determined to the act. In the first way, I say as I just said that only the divine essence qua essence is the basis [ratio] for performing every divine action, that is, for eliciting those acts. In the second way, I say that the relations founded on the divine essence are the basis [ratio] for performing every divine action in God, namely in determining those actions as they are elicited. That is, one thing is the basis [ratio] for eliciting every act, namely the very divine essence under the absolute character by which it is the essence, but there are many bases [rationes] determined according to the plurality of acts, namely those diverse relations themselves.

/247vD/ Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum secundum superius determinata, quod ratio propria essentiae dei secundum quod essentia est mere et absolute, est fundamentum omnium aliarum tanquam illarum quod important respectus fundatos in ipsa essentia, quia [q?] non est nisi unica forma realis absoluta existens in divinis suppositis: cui ex seipsam primo et per se non convenit nisi actus quod est esse, quod in ipsa co[...]icatur [coicat'?] suppositis, et omnibus divinis respectibus in ipsa fundatis. Illud autem actum tanquam primum quem respicit et sibi determinat ex ratione sibi propria et absoluta secundum rectam rationem nostram intelligendi, sequuntur omnes alii actus tanquam secundi, quos respicit et qui sibi determinantur, ut dictum est, ex rationibus respectuum potentialium quod in ea fundantur. Cum autem sibi determinati sunt actus, seipsam ut essentia est immediate est ratio eliciendi eos.

/247vD/ To the evidence of this, it should be known that, as was determined farther above, the proper character [ratio] of the essence of God, according to which it is merely and absolutely the essence, is the foundation for every other thing just as [it is the foundation] of those things which imply relations founded in that very essence. There is only a single, real, existing, absolute form in the divine supposita to which there pertains primarily and by itself [per se] only the act which is be-ing, which is [present?] in the supposita, and in every divine relation founded on it. But just as that first act is related and determined by it from its proper and absolute character [ratione] according to our right reason of understanding, so also do all other second acts, which are related and determined to it as was said, follow from the bases [rationibus] of relations of power which are founded in it. And since those acts are determined to it, as it is immediately and in its very self the essence, it is the basis [ratio] for eliciting those acts.

Ut quemadmodum materia nullum ordinem habet ad formam et ad pati in recipiendo aliquid in se nisi per rationem potentiae passivae, in nuda tunc substantia sua formas recipit, sic divina essentia nullum ordinem habet ad actum quod est agere simpliciter, nisi per ratione potentiae activae, pura tunc substantia sua est ratio eliciendi omnium actuum. Ita quod sicut potentia receptiva sive passiva in materia non est aliquid re absoluta aliud ab ipsa essentia materiae, quia si sic, materia ex se esset in potentia ad illud, et si potentia illa esset similiter aliud, esset abire in infinitum, quod est inconveniens. Et ideo necesse est stare in primo, quod potentia receptiva materiae non est aliquid re absoluta aliud ab ipsa essentia materiae, sed solum respectus fundatus in ipsa essentia materiae, quia ex se et secundum suam substantiam subintrat ratione respectus. Propter quod dicit Commentatus in De Substantia Orbis. Natura subiecti recipientis formas, scilicet primae materiae, necesse est esse naturam potentiae, scilicet quod substantia eius est esse in posse. Sed posse quo substantiatur hoc subiectum, differt a natura subiecti quod substantiatur per hoc posse, in hoc quod posse diverse [dr?] respectu formae. Hoc autem subiectum est unum existentium per se quorum substantia est in potentia. Consimiliter potentia activa in ipsa divina essentia fundata non est aliquid re absoluta aliud ab ipsa essentia, et hoc consimili ratione: sed est solum respectus fundatus in ipsa divina essentia: quia [q?] ex se secundum sua essentiam subintrat rationem respectus.

Matter has no order to a form or to being a recipient by receiving something in itself except by reason of a passive power, but it receives forms in its bare substance. So also the divine essence has no order to an act so that it might act, simply speaking, except by reason of an active power, but its pure subtance is the basis [ratio] for eliciting all acts. Likewise, a passive or receptive power in matter is no absolute thing other than the essence of matter itself, for if it were, then the matter itself would have a receptive power for the first receptive power, and if that second receptive power were similarly another absolute thing, then we'd go on ad infinitum, which is inconvertible. For this reason, it is necessary to maintain the first claim, namely that the receptive power of matter is no absolute thing other than the essence of matter itself, and it is only a relation founded in the essence of matter itself, for matter, in itself and according to its substance, enters under the character [ratione] of a relation. This is what the Commentator says in De Substantia Orbis. The nature of a subject receiving forms, that is, the nature of prime matter, necessarily is the nature of potentiality [potentiae], which is to say that its substance is being in possibility [esse in posse]. But (a) the possibility by which this subject substantiates and (b) the nature of a subject which is substantiated by this possibility differ in this: that it is possible with respect to diverse forms. However, this subject is one of the things that exist by themselves, of which the substance is in potentiality. [?] Similarly, an active power founded in the divine essence itself is no absolute thing other than the essence itself, and this for a similar reason: it is only a relation founded in the divine essence itself, because the essence in itself and according to its essence enters under the character [rationem] of a relation.

/247vE/ Et ideo ulterius quemadmodum si materia esset una secundum potentiam, sicut est una secundum substantiam, cum agens sit unum, non esset factum nisi unum. Sic si divina essentia esset una secundum potentiam et respectus potentiales, sicut est una secundum substantiam, cum agens primum, scilicet persona patris, sit una, non esset operatio eius nisi una. Sed quia [qa?], sicut ibi quia [qa?] materia est multa secundum potentias, ideo ex ipsa multa possunt fieri, et multa in nuda substantia eius recipi, sic in proposito quia [qa?] divi-/248rE/-na essentia est multa secundum potentias activas sive respectus potentiales activos. Ideo ipsa secundum rationem purae essentiae suae potest esse plurium actuum elicitiva.

/247vE/ For this reason, beyond how if matter were one according to power, just as it is one according to substance, then since the agent is one, it would only be made [into] one thing. In this way, if the divine essence were one according to power and power relations, just as it is one according to substance, then since the first agent, namely the person of the Father, is one, it would only have one operation. But here, matter is many according to its powers, and for this reason it can in itself become many things and receive many things in its substance. So it is in the proposition: the divine /248rE/ essence is many according to active powers or active power relations. Thus, the essence itself, according to the character [rationem] of its pure essence, can be elicitive of many acts.

Qui in universo sunt in triplici generatione [gne?] quadam [qda?] quod est actus quod est operatio. Quidam autem qui est actio, quidam vero qui est factio. Qui secundum Philosophum I et X Ethicorum differunt in hoc quod operatio dicitur quando [qn?] non est aliquid ab ipso actu proveniens [pveniens?] tanquam finis eius, sed ipse est finis, qualis est actus citharizandi cui non est nisi delectatio annexa in citharizante et in audiente. Actio vero dicitur quando [qn?] aliquid ab ipso actu est proveniens [pveniens?] quod manet in agente, ut ex morali aut intellectuali operatione habitus aliquis [aliqs?] in agente. Factio vero dicit quando aliquid ab ipso tanquam finis eius procedit ab ipso extra agentem: ut domus ex actu carpentationi. Unde [Un?] Philosophus VI Ethicorum dando differentiam artis et prudentiae circa morales virtutes existentis, dicit quod ars est factibilium, prudentia vero agibilium. Et ambo haec sunt circa ea quae sunt ad finem, felicitas autem est operatio quae consistit in fine, ut determinat X Ethicorum.

In the universe there is generation in a certain triple way: some acts are operations, some are actions, and some are makings. According to the Philosopher in Ethics books 1 and 10, these differ as follows. In an operation, nothing further results from the act as its end, but rather the act itself is the end. An example is a musical performance, in which there is nothing except the enjoyment of the musician and the audience. In an action, something which occurs in this act remains in the agent, as for example when a habit [develops] in an agent from moral or intellectual operation. But in making, some end proceeds from the act beyond the agent, e.g., a house resulting from the action of a carpenter. Whence, in book 6 of the Ethics, the Philosopher, when explaining the difference of art and prudence concerning existing morals and virtues, says that art is makeable, but prudence is doable. Both of these are concerned with an end, and happiness is an operation which consists in [itself as its] end, as the Philosopher determines in book 10 of the Ethics.

Ex parte vero dei actus quod est operatio, est actio essentialis intelligendi et volendi, in quo consistit dei beatitudo, ut infra dicetur. Actus vero quod est actio proprie dicitur generatio et spiratio, quia terminantur ad divina supposita. Actus vero qui est factio proprie dicitur creatio, a qua creaturae extra praecedunt in esse. Horum autem trium generum actus in deo quodammodo divina essentia est ratio eliciendi, et respectus in ea, est ratio sibi actum determinandi.

On the part of God, the acts which are operations are the essential acts of understanding and willing, in which consists the beatitude of God, as will be said below. The acts which are properly actions are called generation and spiration, since they are termed to divine supposita. The act which is properly making is called creation, by which creatures come into being. But the divine essence is the basis [ratio] for eliciting these three kinds of acts in God, and the relation for each is the basis for determining [the essence] to that act.

Videndum est discurrendo per singula, ut ex hoc perfecte pateat quodammodo [quo?] in omnibus sola substantia est ratio eliciendi, et diversi respectus in ea sunt rationes diversae sibi diversos actus determinandi. Quod primo patet in actu quod est operatio, ut est intelligere et velle. Actum enim intelligendi elicit in divino intellectu ipsa divina essentia inquantum habet in se respectum importatum per rationem veri, per quam ipsa essentia habet quod sit proprium obiectum motivum [motiuu?] intellectus, non quod respectus ille qui importatur nomine veritatis, sit obiectum intellectus, sed quod ipsa essentia sit eius obiectum ut habet in se rationem huismodi respectus, secundum quod distinctius est expositum supra in quaestionibus de intelligibilitate dei. Actum vero volendi elicit in divina voluntate ipsa divina essentia inquantum habet in se respectum importatum per rationem boni cogniti, per quem ipsa essentia habet quod sit proprium obiectum voluntatis, et movet intelligentem bono apprehenso ad actum volendi ipsum, non quod respectus ille importatus nomine boni sit obiectum voluntatis, sed ipsa essentia pura ut in se habet rationem huismodi respectus.

This should be seen by going through each so that it will be perfectly clear how for each one, the [divine] substance alone is the basis [ratio] for eliciting those acts, and diverse relations in it are the diverse bases [ratio] determining it to diverse acts. The first is clear, [namely God's] operations, i.e., understandig and willing. The divine essence itself elicits an act of understanding in the divine intellect in as much as it has in itself the relation implied by the character [rationem] of truth by which the essence itself has the proper object to move the intellect. It's not that the relation which is implied by the name 'truth' is the object of the intellect; rather, the essence itself is its object so it has in itself the basis [ratio] for this kind of a relation (as it was explained more distinctly above in the question on the intelligibility of God). [Similarly,] the divine essence itself elicits an act of will in the divine will in as much as it has in itself the relation implied by the character [rationem] of the known good by which the essence itself has what is the proper object of the will, and by apprehending the good, it moves the understanding to an act of willing it. It's not that the relation implied by the name 'good' is the object of the will. Rather, the pure essence has in itself the basis for this kind of a relation.

Idem similiter patet in actu qui est agere sive actio proprie dicta. Actum enim generandi filium elicit divina essentia ut habet esse in patre, sub ratione respectus importanti nomine potentiae generandi active, non quod ille respectus eliciat actum generandi, sed ipsum in patre elicit ipsa essentia pura, ut per respectus illum in patre sibi talis actus est determinatur. Et similiter actum spirandi communiter elicit in patre et filio ut habet esse in ipsis sub ratione respectus importati nomine potentiae spirani active.

It is similarly clear in acts that are properly called acting or action. The act of generating the Son is elicited by the divine essence as it has being in the Father under the character [ratione] of the relation implied by the name 'an active power for generating'. It's not that the relation elicits the act of generating, but rather that the pure essence itself elicits the act, for it is determined to such an act by that relation in the Father. Similarly, the act of spirating is commonly elicited in the Father and the Son as [the essence] has being in them under the character [ratione] of the relation implied by the name 'an active power for spirating'.

Idem similiter patet in actu qui est factio. Actum enim creationis elicit communiter in tribus personis divina essentia, ut habet esse in ipsis sub ratione respectus importati nomine voluntatis liberae valentis ad opposita. Ut sic semper ipsa essentia sub ratione essentiae sit eliciens simpliciter, sed ratione alicuius attributi determinantis non elicientis sit eliciens determinate actum determinatum.

Similarly, the same is clear in the act which is making. The act of creation is elicited commonly in three divine persons by the divine essence as it has being in them under the character [ratione] of the relation implied by the name 'free will to wish opposites'. And so its always the divine essence itself, under the character [ratione] of the essence, which is eliciting, simply speaking, though it is determinately eliciting determinate acts under the character [ratione] of some attribute and not [under the character of] determinate elicited acts.

/248rF/ Ut secundum hoc in summa dicamus omni distinctione praetermissa [ptermissa?], quod divina essentia ut essentia est, sit ratio agendi elicitiva omnem divinam actionem quam agunt tres personae divinae vel duae vel unica effective sive principiative, determinative vero secundum rationem alicuius attributi. Ratio autem agendi omnem divinam actionem, sed aliam et aliam secendum aliam et aliam rationem, ut magis habet declarari disputando de divinis actionibus in speciali. Et sic in omni divina actione uno modo est ratio agendi ipsa essentia secundum rationem essentiae: et non secundum rationem attributi. Alio autem modo non nisi ratione alicuius attributi. Communiter autem summendo essentiam et secundum rationem essentiae, et secundum ratione attributi simpliciter et absolute, dicendum quod divina essentia est in deo ratio agendi omnem divinam actionem. Per iam dicta patent obiecta.

/248rF/ And so in summary we say to every previous distinction that the divine essence qua essence is, effectively or principiatively, the elicitive basis [ratio] for every performing every divine act which the three or two or one divine persons do, though determinatively according to the character [rationem] of some attribute. However, the basis [ratio] for performing every divine action, be it this one or that one according to this or that basis, has to be explained more fully by examining particular divine actions. Thus, in one way the essence itself qua essence is the basis for doing every divine action, but in another way way not unless under the character of some attribute. But by commonly assuming the divine essence under the character of the essence, and according to the character of some attribute simply and absolutely, it should be said that the divine essence is the basis in God for performing every divine action. By this, what should be said to the objections is clear.


[SOLUTIONS TO THE OBJECTIONS]

/248rG/ Ad illud ergo quod primo arguitur in oppositum, quod divina essentia maxime habet ratione materialis et receptivi: ergo minime est ratione agendi: Dicendum quod verum est de illo quod est receptivum alterius re asoluta differentis a recipiente: sicut differt forma a materia. Non autem de illo quod est receptivum alterius sola ratione respectiva ab ipso differentis qualiter differunt a divina essentia quaecunque in ipsa fundantur, non dico proprie recipiuntur.

Therefore, to the first objection, namely that the divine essence maximally has the character of matter and receptivity and so minimally is the basis for action, it should be said that this is true of that which is receptive of another absolute thing which differs from the recipient, just as form differs from matter. But it is not true of that which is receptive of other things which only have a relational character and differ from it in the way in which those things are founded in the divine essence differ from it. I do not say that those things are received properly.

/248rH/ Ad secundum, quod si divina essentia est ratio agendi in deo, sicut ipsa est una et simplex, non erit ratio nisi unius actionis simplicis: dicendum quod actionum quaedam sunt diversae re absoluta inter se et ab eo quod est ratio agendi, quaedam vero re relationis aut respectus secundum ratione tantum. Actionum diversarum primo modo nullo modo potest esse ratio una simplex essentia absque determinatione per diversa quod re absoluta differunt, immo si sunt actiones re diversae, et rationes seu principia agendi sunt re diversa. Et secundum hoc dicit Ioannis Damascenus II Sen Suarum capitum XV, quod operatio est naturalis uniuscuiusque substantiae virtus et motus. Unde manifestum est quam [qm?] quorum substantia naturalis est eadem, horum et operatio est eadem, quorum autem naturae sunt differentes, horum et operationes sunt differentes. Impossibile est enim substantiam expertem esse naturali operatione. Vel /248vH/ ad minus determinatur per diversa re, qaemadmodum diversa opera sunt videre et audire ab eadem anima, sed per determinationem diversorum organorum, ut alibi determinavimus in quaestione quadam de potentiis animae. Actiones diversae secundo modo sunt omnes divinae actiones et inter se, et ab ipsa essentia, et ideo in talibus sufficit ipsi essentiae determinati actus per diversos respectus proportionales diversitati actuum. Ut si actus sola ratione differant inter se et ab ipsa essentia, ut intelligere, et velle, diversis respectibus secundum rationem inter se et ab ipsa essentia differentibus, sibi huiusmodi diversi actus determinantur, ut sunt veritas et bonitas, ut patet ex praedictis. Si vero actus inter se differant re relationis: ut generare, spirare, diversis respectibus secundum realem relationem inter se, sibi huiusmodi actus determinantur: ut sunt potentia activa generandi et potentia activa spirandi.

/248rH/ To the second objection, namely that if the divine essence is the basis for acting in God and so will be the basis only for one simple action because the essence itself is one simple thing, it should be said that some actions are absolute things which are diverse from each other and from that which is their basis for acting, while some are relational things or relations [that are diverse] according to reason only. One simple essence cannot be the basis for diverse actions in the first way without a determination by diverse things which are different absolute things. If actions are diverse things, then their bases or principles for acting are diverse things. According to this, John of Damascus says in book 2, chapter 15 of Sen Suarum, that operation is the power and motion of each natural substance. Whence, it is obvious that the substance of a nature is the same for those operations which are the same, but the natures are different for those operations which are different. For it is impossible to experience a substance by a natural operation. Or /248vH/ it is determined less by diverse things, in the way in which diverse operations are seen and heard from the same soul, than by the determination of diverse organs, as we have shown elsewhere in the question on the powers of the soul. But all divine actions are diverse in the second way both from each other and from the essence itself, and for this reason, in such things it is sufficient that an act of the essence itself is determined by diverse relations proportional to the diversity of acts. Thus if acts such as understanding and willing differ from each other and from the divine essence only by reason, then diverse acts of this sort are determined by diverse relations (such as truth and goodness) which differ by reason from each other and from the essence itself, as is clear from what was said before. But if acts such as generating and spirating differ from each other by real relations [re relationis], then acts of that sort are determined by diverse relations (such as the active power for generating and the active power of spirating) [which differ] from each other by a real relation.

/248vI/ Ad tertium, quod si essentia esset ratio omnis divinae actionis, tunc non produceretur a divina actione nisi simile deo in deitate, quod falsum est in actu creationis: dicendum quod semper producitur divina actione simile in divina essentia, vel quo ad veritatem substantiae, ut in productione divinarum personarum, vel quo ad rationem imitationis ad rationes perfectionum et idearum in divina essentia, ut in productione creaturum. Quod [Q?] secundum eundem modum similis producatur simile in omni genere actionis, non oportet, eo quod ipsae actiones diversorum modorum sunt, ut debet exponi tractando de ipsis in speciali.

/248vI/ To the third objection, namely that if the essence were the basis for every divine action then it would not produce [anything] by divine action unless it were similar to God in deity, and that's false in the act of creation, it should be said that something is always produced by a divine action which is similar to the divine essence, either according to the truth of substance, as in the production of the divine persons, or according to an imitation of the divine perfections and ideas in the divine essence, as in the production of creatures. But it is not necessary that something similar is produced in the same similar way in every kind of action, as in those actions which are [performed] in diverse ways, as should be explained by treating those acts in particular.

/248vK/ Ad quartum, quod essentia quia est ratio absoluta actus primi absoluti qui est esse, sic non potest esse ratio actus secundi respectivi qui est generare vel spirare: dicendum quod verum est nisi sub ratione alicuius respectus actui illi secundo proportionalis. Unde in creaturis ratio formae a qua est actus primus qui est esse, sub ratione respectus potentiae activae quam in se recipit, est ratio eliciendi actus secundos absolutos. Ergo multo fortius in proposito potest esse ratio eliciendi actus secundos respectivos. Ratio enim elicitiva (ut dictum est) nullo modo potest esse respectus. Et cum hoc falsum est illud quod assumitur in argumento, quod essentia divina est ratio actus primi in deo quod est esse. Etsi enim in creaturis hoc sit verum, ut ratio essentiae prior sit secundum rationem nostram intelligendi quod sit ratio esse, ut esse dicatur ab essentia. Quia quanto aliquid in creatura habet rationem minus actualis, tanto illud habet magis ex se et natura sua et ab alio quod est magis actuale, esse autem sub maiori actualitate significat quod essentia. In deo tunc [tn?] e contrario tanto ei aliquid magis proprium est et primo convenit, quanto habet rationem magis actualis. Et ideo dictum est supra, quod esse secundum rationem intellectus nostri potius et prius convenit deo quod ratio essentiae, ut in deo essentia potius dicatur ab esse quod e contrario. Secundum quod dicit Augustinus VII De Trinitate, capito 4, et libro V, capito 2, ab eo quod est esse dicta est essentia.

/248vK/ To the fourth objection, namely that the essence is an absolute basis for an absolute first act of 'being' and so it cannot be the basis for a second relative act such as generating or spirating, it should be said that this is true except under the character of some relation to an act which is proportionate to that second act. Whence, in creatures the nature [ratio] of a form – by which something performs the first act of 'being' – is the basis for eliciting absolute second acts by the character of a relation of an active power which it receives in itself. Therefore, how much more can it, [namely the divine essence] in the proposition, be the basis for eliciting relative second acts. The elicitive basis, as was said, can in no way be a relation. Consequently, that which is assumed in the argument is false, namely that the divine essence is the basis for the first act in God which is 'to be'. For even in creatures this is true, as the the character [ratio] of the essence is prior according to the nature of our understanding 'being', for 'being' is said of an essence. As much as something in a creature has the character [ratio] of less actuality, it has that much more from itself and its nature and from another which is more actual. But to be under less actuality signifies an essence. Conversely then, in God, as much as something properly and primarily pertains to it, that much does it have the character of more actuality. For this reason, as was said above, 'being', according to our understanding, preferably and with priority belongs to God in the character of essence, for in God the essence is preferably said from 'being' which is the converse. [?] Accordingly, Augustine says in De Trinitate, book 7, chapter 4, and in book 5, chapter 2, that that which is 'being' is called the essence.

/248vL/ Ad quintum, quod suppositum unusquisque agit per ultimum formale in eo, et illud non est essentia, sed relativa proprietas, quia secundum Augustinum, Deus pater paternitate pater est non deitate: dicendum quod in quolibet supposito singulari est duo considerare, et duplex formale secundum illa. Primum illorum est natura sive res sive essentia in qua subsistit, ut est humanitas fortis in forte, et deitas patris in patre. Secundum vero est modus secundum quem subsistit, scilicet individualiter in creaturis, et incommunicabiliter in divinis, et pertinet ad rationem individuationis formae in creatures, et incommunicationis suppositi in divinis. Modus quo individuatio formae sit in creaturis, tactus est in praecedenti quaestione in parte, et similiter modus incommunicationis suppositi in divinis, sed alibi expressius in quaestione quadam de quolibet. Et quantum ad praesens sufficit: sciendum est quod in creaturis ratio formalis quo sit formae individuatio, negatio est non unica sed duplex, una qua negatur plurificatio naturae intra se, alia qua negatur identitas ad consimiler ei extra se, et qua negatur esse alicuius alterius ab illo cuius est. Socratis enim humanitas est una numero, quia ex se non est nata dividi ullo modo per hanc et illam in diversis, sicut nata est dividi forma speciei, et est ita Socratis quod non est alterius, neque illa quae est alterius, sed alia ab illa. In divinis autem licet in eis non sit proprie formae individuatio, quia non est in deo ratio universalis, quod requiritur ad individuationem proprie dictam, ut expositum est in dicta quaestione de quolibet, est tunc in divinis suppositi incommunicatio cuius ratio formalis non est aliqua negatio qua forma determinatur supposito, aut qua individuabilis aut incommunicabilis redditur, eo quod pluribus suppositis secundum speciem communicabilis est et communicata; et in se ex se singularis est, immo singularitas quaedam (ut habitum est supra) in quali quidem singularitate constat. Forma creata nullo modo per communicationem procedere in aliud suppositum potest propter sua limitationem, sed forma divinitatis propter suam illimitationem ulterius praecedit,ut sic ubi defecit praecessus formae creatae, ibi in eadem singularitate communicatur pluribus suppositis positive, et hoc per differentiam respectuum illorum quos in se habet, sub quibus subsistit diversimode in hoc et in illo.

/248vL/ The fifth objection is that each suppositum acts by that which is formally ultimate in it, and that is the relative property, not the essence, for as Augustine says, God the Father is Father by paternity and not by deity. To this it should be said that for each singular suppositum, there are two things to consider, and accordingly 'formal' has a double sense. The first of these is the nature or thing or essence in which [qua] it subsists, such as the humanity of strength in strength, and the deity of the Father in the Father. But the second is the way in which it subsists, namely individually in creatures and incommunicably in the divinity, and this pertains to the basis for the individuation of form in creatures, and the incommunicability of supposita in the divinity. As for the way in which the individuation of form occurs in creatures, this was partly touched on in the preceding question, and so was the way in which the incommunicability of supposita occurs in the divinity, but it is more expressly addressed elsewhere in a question from the Quodlibet. But for the present, the following is sufficient. It should be known that in creatures, the formal basis by which there is an individuation of form is a double negation, not a single negation. One is that which negates a plurification of natures within itself, the other is that which negates its identity to things outside itself which are similar to itself, and which negates that it is of something other from that of which it is. For the humanity of Socrates is one in number, because from itself it is not naturally apt [non est nata] to be divided in any way by this or that into diverse things in the way that the form of a species is naturally apt to be divided. And it is a feature of Socrates that he is not of another, nor that which is of another, but rather that he is other from that [other thing]. However, in the divinity, there is not a proper individuation of form because in God there is no character of universality, which is required for individuation, properly speaking (as it was explained in the aforesaid question from the Quodlibet). But the formal basis for the incommunicability of divine supposita is not some negation by which a form is determined to a suppositum, or by which individuability or incommunicability is delivered [redditur] to that which is communicable and communicated to many supposita according to species. Rather, [the divine essence], in itself and from itself, is singular, though [this is] a certain singularity (as was had above) which remains as a certain kind of singularity. A created form can in no way proceed to another suppositum by a communication on account of its limitation, but the form of divinity proceeds to another an account of its unlimitedness. And so in this way, where a created form fails to proceed, there in the same singularity [the divine essence] is communicated to many supposita positively, and this by the difference of the relations of those things which it has in itself, under which it subsists diversely in this and in that [suppositum].

/248vM/ Positivum autem absolutum in se non potest recipere divina essentia, quia poneret compositionem in deo. Oportet igitur quod sit positivum respectivum, quod quidem quia pluribus communicari non potest per illud subsistit suppositum in natura divinae essentiae, et hoc ut suppositum singulare. Et talia respectiva sunt tres proprietates relativae personales – paternitas, filiatio, spiratio passiva – qua personas incommicabiles et singulares in deo constituunt: sicut in creaturis negatio constituit suppositum, quod est singulare individuum. Et aspi-/249rM/-ciendo ad tale formale quod ratio constituendi singulare suppositum distinctum a quolibet alio, tali ultimo formali nullum suppositum agit quacumque neque in creaturis neque in deo. Unde nullo dicitur vere quod Sortes generat eo quod est Sortes, in eo quod est individuum sive individuatum suppositum: quam illud (ut dictum est) negatio est, quae nullius est effectiva. Sed quod dicitur agere aliquid aut generare eo quod est formale in ipso, hoc debet intelligi aspiciendo ad formale quod est ratio qua subsistit in natura speciei, quae est sua humanitas, in qua est considerare duo: scilicet quod est humanitas simpliciter, quia tota natura speciei specialissimae est in quolibet suo individuo, et quod est ista in isto individuata. Quod ergo Sortes humanitate sua aliquid agit aut generat, hoc est ratione qua est humanitas simpliciter: et ut existens est in isto. Et ideo homo generat hominem, quod est intellectum [intetu?] naturae simpliciter. Quod autem generat alium a se, hoc non est nisi tam propter materiam in qua generat, ut ponit Philosophus [phus?], qua [q?] quia sua humanitas est ista non communicabilis alteri, ita quod si per impossibile posset generare formam puram sine materia, aliam necessario generaret a se ex nihilo, secundum quod dicit Commentator XII Super Metaphysicorum. Si forma per se generaret, esset generatio ex nihilo. Et sic quod homo sit ab homine, hoc est virtutis et perfectionis, quod autem alius ab alio in forma numerali, hoc est defectus et imperfectionis, et hoc habet generans ex natura individui, non ex negatione individuante, sed ex natura ipsa, ut tali negationi substrata est, illud autem est ex natura speciei. Et ideo de generatione individuorum ab invicem dicit Commentator VIII Super Physicorum, quod modus generationis istorum ab invicem est per accidens, scilicet quia [qa?] homo non dat in generatione hominis nisi illud quod est quasi instrumentum. Sortem, non [n?] generare Ciceronem, est per accidens. Et quemadmodum hic dictum est de creaturis, consimiliter contingit in personis divinis, scilicet quod pater non generat eo quo pater est, hoc est eo quo est incommunicabile suppositum, cum illud respectus est, qui non est ratio agendi, sicut neque negatio individuans in creaturis.

/248vM/ But a positive absolute thing cannot receive the divine essence in itself, because that would posit composition in God. Therefore, it is necessary that it is a positive relation, which, because it cannot be communicated to many, is that by which a suppositum subsists in the nature of the divine essence and is singular. There are three such relative personal properties – paternity, filiation, and passive spiration – by which the incommunicable and singular persons are constituted in God, just as in creatures the negation constitutes the suppositum which is a singular individual. /249rM/ Now, by looking to such a formal basis for constituting a singular suppositum which is distinct from anything else, no suppositum performs any action by such an ultimate formal [principle] – neither in creatures, nor in God. Whence, it is not true that Socrates generates by that in which he is Socrates, in which he is an individual or individuated suppositum, for that (as was said) is a negation, which is effective of nothing. When [Socrates] is said to perform some action or generate by that which is formally in him, this ought to be understood by looking to that which formally is the basis by which he subsists in the nature of a species, which is his humanity. In that there are two things to consider: that which is humanity simply speaking, for the whole nature of the most specific species is in each of its individuals, and that which is individuated into this and that individual. Therefore, Socrates performs some action or generates by his humanity, and this as it has the character of humanity simply speaking, as it exists in him. For this reason, man generates man, which is understood of a nature, simply speaking. But man generates something other than himself only on account of the matter in which he generates [another man], as the Philosopher claims. For a man's humanity is not communicable to another, and so if, per impossibile, he could generate a pure form without matter, he would necessarily generate something other than himself ex nihilo, according to what the Commentator says in book XII of his Commentary on the Metaphysics, namely that if a form were to generate by itself, then the generation would be ex nihilo. And so it is that it is of power and perfection that man is from man, but it is a defect and an imperfection that one form is from another numerically distinct form. The generator has this from his individual nature, that is, from his very nature and not from the individuating negation, for such a negation pertains to the substrate, but that [ability generate another man] is from the nature of the species. For this reason, in book VIII of his Commentary on the Physics, the Commentator says of the generation of one individual from another that the mode of generating one thing from another is per accidens, namely because in the generation of man, a man does not give anything except that which is a quasi instrument. That Socrates does not generate Cicero is per accidens. This pertains to the divine persons similar to the way it does in creatures. The Father does not generate by that by which he is Father, that is, in that by which he is an incommunicable suppositum, since that is a relation, which is not a basis for acting, just as neither is an individuating negation in creatures.

/249rN/ Sed quod dicitur generare eo quod est formale in ipso, hoc debet intelligi aspiciendo ad formale quod est ratio et natura in qua subsistit, in qua non est considerare duo: sicut dictum est de forma creata: scilicet quod est deitas simpliciter, et quod est deitas haec aut huius, quia [qa?] non est nisi haec, et illa eadem quae est huius, per communicationem est alterius. Generare ergo aut aliquid agere patrem deitate non differt quod dicatur hoc agere deitate simpliciter, et ha[e]c vel huius deitate, quia deitate ut deitas est, et ut haec deitas est, non generat deitatem, sed communicando se generat deum, et eundem in deitate sed alium in persona, sed hoc non ratione deitatis, neque huius deitatis qua generat, sed ratione respectus quo determinat actum generandi, qui propter rationem determinandi actionem generato, non potest illi communicari, sed in generato necessario determinat actum passive respectus oppositus. Quemadmodum enim ex parte generantis essentia est ratio eius quod est generare in eliciendo, sed sub ratione respectus determinantis actum ut est efficiendus ab agente, sic ex parte generari essentia est ratio eius quod est generari in recipiendo, sed sub ratione respectus determinatis actum ut est determinandus in genitum, ut habet infra determinari, exponendo quomodo divina essentia est subiectum divinae generationis. Et sic quod deus generat deum simpliciter, hoc est ratione essentiae, quod vero hic generat illum, hoc est ratione unius proprietatis qua determinatur actus ut producatur ab uno, scilicet et alterius quod determinatur ut terminetur in alium. Et sic pater non generat eliciendo actum paternitate, sed deitate, etsi sit pater non deitate sed paternitate. Unde si pater dicatur generare inquantum pater, non inquantum deus (quia tunc filius qui est deus generaret) illud tunc non est verum quod paternitate generet, scilicet quod generet essentia, nisi dispositive ut dictum est. Et amplius in quaestione sequenti dicetur.

/249rN/ But when it is said that [the Father] generates by that which is formally in him, this ought to be understood by looking to the formal principle which is the basis and nature in which it subsists. In that there are two things to consider, just as was said of a created form, namely that there is deity simply speaking, and there is this deity or [the deity] of this [suppositum]. For deity does not exist except as a 'this', and the same 'that' of which it is of 'this', is of another by communication. Therefore, the Father's act of generating does not differ from his other actions with respect to deity, since he is said to act by deity, simply speaking, and by 'this deity' or the deity of 'this'. For by deity as it is deity, and as it is 'this deity', [deity] does not generate deity. Rather, by communicating itself [i.e., deity], [God] generates God, which are the same in deity but other in person. But this is not by reason of deity, nor of this deity by which it generates, but rather by reason of the relation by which it determines the act of generating, which on account of the basis for determining the act in the generated, cannot be communicated to that, but in the generated it necessarily determines the passive act by the opposite relation. For the way in which the essence, on the part of the generator, is the eliciting basis for generating, though under the character of a relation determining the act as it emanates [efficiendus] from the agent, so also the essence, on the part of that which is being generated, is the receiving basis for being generated, though under the character of a relation determining the act as it is determined in the generated, as it has to be determined below by explaining how the divine essence is the subject of divine generation. And in this way, God generates God simply speaking, and this is by reason of the essence. But that this generates that, this is by reason of one property by which the act is determined such that it is produced from one, and the other which is determined such that it is termed to another. Thus, the Father generates by eliciting an act from his deity, not his paternity, even though he is Father by paternity, not deity. Whence, if it is said that the Father generates in as much as he is Father, but not in as much as he is God (since then the Son, who is God, would generate), then it is not true that he generates by paternity, which is to say that he generates the essence, unless it is said dispositively. But that is explained more fully in the following question.

/249rO/ Argumenta autem duo in contrarium etsi bene probant quod essentia est ratio agendi omnes divinas actiones elicitives non tamen excludunt quin determinative requiratur alia ratio, ut dictum est.

/249rO/ The two arguments for the contary prove well that the essence is the elicitive basis for performing all divine actions, though not by excluding the fact that another determinative basis is required, as was said.

6 comments:

Scott Williams said...

You may like to look at G.A. Wilson's critical edition of this text as perhaps the quickest way to sort out some of the latin shorthand. There are several q's which you rendered as 'quod', which should be 'quae'; 'dr' = dicitur (usually).

I may get back to this passage soon enough-- do have a look at SQO 39.8 for a little further clarification regarding divine _productions_.

JT Paasch said...

Yeah, I'd love to look at Gordon's critical edition -- if the Bod had a copy. But of course they never have any copies I need. Anyways, yeah, there's a bunch of typos in there from earlier versions that should be 'quae' and 'dicitur'. And yes, 39.8 is good.

Scott Williams said...

I thought the Bod did have SQO 36-40? I know they are supposed to have it. You should email the librarian and tell him/her to either find it and put it on the shelves in the lower reading room, or to order it asap. The HoG op. om. is a series they are supposed to have on continual order. Did they have Quod. 13 and Quod. 15 on the shelves?

Anonymous said...

R U guys still posting here or is this blog essentially 'dead'?

JT Paasch said...

I'm still posting, just very slowly.

Anonymous said...

Good to hear! I just barely discovered this site...Looking forward to the next post.