Scotus on change vs. production (translation)

From the Lectura

‘Generation in creatures includes both change and production. For a [creaturely] generator has imperfect power, so it requires not only another cause in the same genus, but also a cause in another genus, and for this reason, it does not produce the whole composite [from nothing]. Rather, it presupposes [a lump of] matter, and then it produces the form by transforming that matter.

Thus, change and production have different end-points, for the end-point of change is the form introduced in the matter, but the proper end-point of production is the whole composite (hence the Philosopher speaks of the end-point of generation in various ways, for in Physics II [193b12-18] he postulates that the form is the end-point of generation, and in [Metaphysics] VII [1033b16-18] he says that the composite is primarily generated).

From this, it is clear that the nature of production is separable from the nature of change — by removing the imperfection of the agent — without contradiction, for production is that by which a thing acquires being. Now, it is incidental to a thing which is produced [by a creature] — and so which acquires its being through that production — that it is changed [in this process]. This is evident in creation, where the whole is truly produced without any preceding change. Whence, where there is perfect active power, a thing can acquire all of its being without a change.

Therefore, production is separable from change, for there are distinct formal end-points in generation: the proper start- and end-points of change are being deprived of a form and having a form, but the end-point of a production is the whole composite itself. For an agent with perfect power can act, and there will then be a production, but not a change. Whence in creation, because something is produced by a perfect production, there is a production but not a generation’.

[Scotus, Lect. 1.5.2.un., n. 91 (Vat. 16: 444.23-445.18): ‘generatio in creaturis includit mutationem et productionem. Quia generans est imperfectae virtutis, ideo non solum requirit aliam causam eiusdem generis, sed causam alterius generis causae, et ideo non producit totum compositum, sed praesupponit materiam, et tunc producit formam transmutando materiam. Et ideo alios terminos habet formaliter mutatio et productio, nam terminus mutationis est ipsa forma inducta in materia, sed terminus proprius productionis est totum compositum (et secundum hoc, Philosophus variis modis loquitur de termino generationis, nam in II Physicorum [193b12-18] ponit quod forma est terminus generationis, — et in VII [Metaphysicae, 1033b16-18], quod compositum primo generetur): ex quo patet quod ratio productionis separabilis est a ratione mutationis — amota imperfectione agentis — sine contradictione, nam productio est qua res capit esse. Nunc autem accidit rei quae producitur — et quae esse capit per productionem — quod mutetur, sicut patet in creatione, ubi vere producitur totum sine mutatione praecedente; unde ubi est perfecta virtus activa, ibi potest res capere totum esse sine mutatione. Productio igitur separabilis est a mutatione, tum quia habent terminos formaliter distinctos in generatione, nam termini proprie mutationis sunt privatio et forma, sed terminus productionis est ipsum totum compositum, — tum quia agens perfectae virtutis potest agere, et ibi erit tunc productio, sed non mutatio; unde in creatione, quia producitur aliquid a perfecto producente, est productio et non generatio’.]


‘Therefore, by laying aside the imperfections in generation (namely, the presupposition of matter, which is required on account of the agent’s imperfection), generation is transfered to the divine case. For this reason, generation that’s transfered to the divine case only includes production, but not change, and so in no way in divinity is there a subject or matter or quasi-matter, since there is no change nor quasi-change in God’.

[Scotus, Lect. 1.5.2.un., n. 92 (Vat. 16: 445.19-25): ‘Auferendo igitur illud quod est imperfectionis in generatione (scilicet praesuppositio materiae, quae requiritur propter imperfectionem agentis), transfertur generatio ad divina. Et ideo generatio tantum transfertur ad divina prout includit productionem, et non mutationem, — et ideo nullo modo in divinis est subiectum aut materia nec quasi-materia, cum ibi non sit mutatio nec quasi-mutatio’.]



From the Ordinatio

‘There are two things said to be in generation in creatures: change and production. And of these, there formal natures are different, and they are separable from each other without contradiction’.

[Scotus, Ord. 1.5.2.un., n. 94 (Vat. 4: 60.16-18): ‘Generatio in creatura duo dicit, mutationem et productionem, et istorum formales rationes aliae sunt et sine contradictione separabiles ad invicem’.]

‘For production formally belongs to its product, and it is incidental to it that it comes about by changing some part of the composite, as is clear in creation [where the production occurs without presupposing a part such as matter to change]. Change is formally the act which the “changeable” thing comes to have after being deprived of it, but change occurs along with production in creatures because of the imperfection of [creaturely] productive power, for it is not [powerful enough] to give the end-point of production all of its being. Rather, some part of it is presupposed, and then changed to another part of it, and in this way the producer produces a composite. Therefore, change and production can be separated without contradiction, and they really are separated in cases where there is perfect productive power’.

[Scotus, Ord. 1.5.2.un., n. 95 (Vat. 4: 60.19-61.7): ‘Production enim est formaliter ipsius producti, et accidit sibi quod fiat cum mutatione alicuius partis compositi, ut patet in creatione; mutatio formaliter est actus “mutabilis” qui de privatione transit. Concomitatur autem mutatio productionem in creaturis propter imperfectionem potentiae productivae, quae non potest dare totale esse termino productionis, sed aliquid eius praesuppositum transmutatur ad aliam partem ipsius et sic producit compositum. Ergo sine contradictione possunt separari, et realiter separantur comparando ad potentiam productivam perfectem’.]

‘This is apparent in creation, where because of the perfection of the productive power [of the creator], something is first placed in all of its being, and this is the true nature of production, in which the end-point of the production acquires its being through the production. But there is not here [viz., in the case of creation ex nihilo] a change, insofar as change is said to be some substratum that ‘exists now in a way that it did not before’, from Physics VI [234b5-7, 10-13]. For in creation, there is not some substratum’.

[Scotus, Ord. 1.5.2.un., n. 96 (Vat. 4: 61.8-13): ‘Hoc etiam apparet in creatione, ubi propter perfectionem potentiae productivae ponentis primo in esse totum, vere est ratio productionis, in quantum per eam terminus productus accipit esse, — sed non est ibi ratio mutationis, in quantum mutatio dicit aliquid substratum “aliter nunc se habere quam prius”, ex VI Physicorum [234b5-7, 10-13]. In creatione enim non est aliquid substratum’.]

‘To the case at hand. Since no imperfection should be postulated in God, but rather only total perfection, and since change is said to be imperfect in its very nature, for it pertains to potentiality, in virtue of which something is changeable — and accordingly the active power in the changer is also said to be imperfect, for an imperfect changer necessarily requires a concurrent cause in order to produce something (for there [in God] htere is no imperfection, nor any sort of passive power, nor even any imperfect active power, but only the highest perfection) — in no way is generation in God postulated with the character of change or quasi-change. Rather, generation is postulated in God only insofar as it is production, that is, insofar as something acquires being from it. Thus, generation occurs without matter in God — and for this reason, matter nor quasi-matter is attributed to generation in God, but only the end-point, and this is either the total or primary (i.e., the adequate) end-point, namely that which is primarily produced in being, or it is the formal end-point, according to which the primary end-point formally acquires being’.

[Scotus, Ord. 1.5.2.un., n. 97 (Vat. 4: 61.14-62.10): ‘Ad propositum. Cum in divinis nihil ponendum sit imperfectionis, sed totum perfectionis, et mutatio de ratione sui dicit imperfectionem, quia potentialitatem, et hoc in mutabili, — et concomitanter etiam dicit imperfectionem potentiae activae in mutante, quia talis requirit necessario causam concausantem ad hoc ut producat (non autem fit ibi aliqua imperfectio, nec qualis est potentiae passivae, nec etiam aliqua imperfectio potentiae activae, sed summa perfectio), — nullo modo ponetur ibi generatio sub ratione mutationis nec quasi-mutationis, sed tantum generatio ut est productio, in quantum scilicet aliquid per eam capit esse, ponetur in divinis. Et ideo generatio ut est in divinis, est sine materia, — et ideo generationis ut est in divinis non assignabitur materia nec quasi-materia, sed tantum terminus: et hoc vel totalis sicut primus, id est adaequatus — qui scilicet primo producitur in esse — vel terminus formalis, secundum quem terminus primus formalis accipit esse’.]


From the Reportatio

‘The difference between generation, production, and change is clear, for change is an act [that happens to] something which is changeable by itself, so its start- and end-points are “not such” and “such”. Whence, that which now exists in different way than it did before is said to be changeable. But generation is not an act [that happens to] something changeable, but rather is, by itself, the way to [acquire] a form, just as perishing is the way [to become] deprived [of a form]. Thus, the start- and end-points of generation are “existence” and “not existing”, that is, [to have a substantial] form and [to be] deprived [of a substantial form]. Production, however, is the way not to exist or not to exist, nor the way to acquire or be deprived of a form, but rather the way for [something] to be generated or produced. So production has for its end-point not a form but rather the whole composite’.

[Scotus, Rep. 1.5.2.un., n. 75 (Wolter, 279-280): ‘Quod autem sit differentia inter generationem, productionem et mutationem, patet; quia mutatio est actus per se mutabilis et termini sunt non tale et tale. Unde illud dicitur mutabile quod se habet aliter nunc quam prius. Generatio autem non est actus mutabilis, sed est per se via ad formam, sicut corruptio ad privationem, et ita termini eius sunt esse et non esse, id est forma et privatio. Productio autem est via non ad esse vel non esse sive ad formam et privationem, sed ad genitum vel productum, ita quod habet pro per se termino non formam sed compositum’.]

Scotus on 'Filius est de substantia Patris' (translation)

From the Lectura

‘I say that the Son is truly begotten and he is from the substance of the Father. Now, the doctor who holds the aforementioned opinion [viz., Henry] says that the Master [Peter Lombard] concedes that the Son is from the substance of the Father according to a causality of origin. And certainly, if he [Peter] were to say this, he would not say enough, for creatures are also from the substance of the Father according to a causality of origin. Whence, the Master does not only speak of a cause of origin, nor does he only speak of consubstantiality, for in that way it could be said that the Father is from the Son. But the preposition “from” here indicates both origin and consubstantiality, just as one ancient doctor said. Whence, the preposition “from” here indicates consubstantiality along with origin, and in this way the Son is not created by the Father, nor is the Father from the Son’.

[Scotus, Lect. 1.5.2.un., n. 93 (Vat. 16: 446.1-12): ‘dico quod vere Filius generatur et est de substantia Patris. Nam doctor tenens priorem opinonem, dicit quod Magister concedit quod Filius sit de substantia Patris secundum causalitatem originis, — et certe, si hoc diceret, non sufficienter diceret, quia sic creatura est de substantia Patris secundum causalitatem originis. Unde nec dicit solam causam originantem, nec solam consubstantialitatem, quia sic posset dici quod Pater esset de Filio, sed praepositio “de” in proposito notat originationem et consubstantialitatem, sicut unus antiquus doctor dicit; unde notat in proposito consubstantialitatem cum origine, et sic nec est creatura de Patre nec Pater de Filio’. The editors say that the ‘antiquus doctor’ mentioned here is Alexander of Hales, Summa, I, n. 300 (I 433b).]

‘Whence, it should be known that these Latin prepositions “a” and “ab” [which mean “from”] signify the circumstances of an originating cause, like when we talk about “the light from [a] the sun” and “the brightness from [ab] the flame”. But this Latin preposition “ex” [which also means “from”] denotes the circumstances of a material cause, as when we talk about how a “man is [composed] from [ex] a body and a soul”. The Latin preposition “de” [which also means “from”] denotes the circumstances of an efficient cause, but this is not generally the case, for we do not say that a “house is from [de] a builder”. Whence, the preposition “de” does not universally identify the circumstances of an agent cause in the way that “a” or “ab” do. Rather, [in the case at hand] it denotes the circumstances of an agent cause with a consubstantiality of origin. In this way, the Master [Peter Lombard] meant to say that the Son is from [de] the substance of the Father, as it is clear from his exposition of his meaning in this distinction’.

[Scotus, Lect. 1.5.2.un., n. 94 (Vat. 16: 446.13-23): ‘Unde sciendum est quod istae praepositiones “a” et “ab” significant circumstantiam causae originantis, sicut cum dicitur “lumen est a sole” et “splendor ab igne”; haec autem praepositio “ex” denotat circumstantiam causae materialis, sicut “homo est ex corpore et anima”; haec autem praepositio “de” denotat circumstantiam causae efficientis, sed non in generali, quia non dicimus quod “domus est de aedificatore”: unde non dicit circumstantiam causae agentis in universali, sicut “a” vel “ab”, sed denotat circumstantiam causae agentis cum consubstantialitate originis, — et sic intendit Magister quod Filius est de substantia Patris, sicut patet intuenti expositionem suam in ista distinctione’. For the reference to Peter Lombard here, the editors point to his Sent. 1.5, c. 1, n. 64 (I 49); c. 2, n. 66 (I 50).]


From the Ordinatio

‘The word “from” here does not indicate an efficient or originating cause alone, for if it did, creatures would be from the substance of God. Nor does it indicate consubstantiality alone, for then the Father would be from the substance of the Son. Rather, it indicates origination and consubstantiality at the same time. That is, insofar as the term “substance” is combined with the preposition “from”, it indicates consubstantiality, such that the Son has the same substance and quasi-form as the Father, from whom he is originated. And insofar as the term “substance” is combined with “of the Father”, it indicates the [Son’s] originating principle. Thus, the whole statement “the Son is from the substance of the Father” has this sense: the Son is originated from the Father such that he is consubstantial with him’.

[Scotus, Ord. 1.5.2.un., n. 99 (Vat. 4: 62.15-63.4): ‘Ubi per ly “de” non notatur tantum efficientia vel originatio, quia si tantum efficientia, tunc creaturae essent de substantia Dei, — nec notatur per illud “de” tantum consubstantialitas, quia tunc Pater esset de substantia Filii, — sed notatur simul originatio et consubstantialitas: ut scilicet in casuali huius praepositionis “de” notetur consubstantialitas, sic quod Filius habet eandem substantiam et quasi-formam cum Patre, de quo est originaliter, — et per illud quod in genitivo construitur cum isto casuali, notetur principium originans; ita quod totalis intellectus huius sermonis “Filius est de substantia Patris” est iste: Filius est originatus a Patre ut consubstantialis ei’.]

Scotus on how the Son is not created but is still a Son (translation)

From the Lectura

‘I say that the Son is not [produced] from nothing, even though he is not [produced] from the substance of the Father as from matter. The Son is [produced] from the substance of the Father as from a consubstantial-formal principle of the originator and the originated, and this most truly preserves that the Son is not produced from nothing, and it does so more truly than if the Son were generated from quasi-matter. Here’s an example from creatures: if a flame were to generate a flame without presupposing any matter, and assuming that there were no pre-existing matter such that it produces the matter in the other flame and shares its form with it, the produced flame would more truly not be produced from nothing than in the way of being produced that presupposes matter, for the flame is more truly a being by the form than it is by matter. In this way, the Son is not [produced] from nothing, because he is from the substance of the Father as from the formal end-point of production, for the Father shares the whole [divine substance or essence] as the [formal] end-point of [the Son’s production]. Thus, although the Son is not [produced] from matter, nor does [his production] presuppose anything with the character of matter, he is still not produced from nothing’.

[Scotus, Lect. 1.5.2.un., n. 96 (Vat. 16: 447.9-21): ‘dico quod Filius non est de nihilo, licet non sit de substantia Patris quasi de materia, — quia Filius est de substantia Patris sicut de principio consubstantiali-formali originanti et originato, et hoc salvat verissime Filium non esse de nihilo, et verius quam si Filius generaretur quasi ex materia. Exemplum in creaturis: si ignis generaret ignem ita quod non praesupponeret materiam — nec praeexsisteret materia — sed produceret materiam et communicaret formam, verius esset ignis tunc non de nihilo quam modo quando praesupponit materiam, et eo verius quo forma est verius ens quam materia. Sic Filius non est de nihilo, quia est de substantia Patris ut de termino formali, quia Pater communicat totum ut terminus; et ideo Filius, licet non sit ex materia nec praesupponat aliquid in ratione materiae, non tamen est de nihilo’.]

‘This consubstantiality is sufficient [to give the Son] his character of ‘being a Son’ for the nature of fatherhood in creatures does not come from the fact that fathers share matter, but rather because they share [their formal] end-point. Whence, when a cow generates, it proffers semen, and if it then were to produce and proffer from itself a cow, it would truly be a father. Whence, if the cow were able to proffer a cow just as it can proffer semen, on account of that produced end-point it would be called a “father” even if it did nothing else. Whence, even if this kind of an immediate production were delayed, a cow would still be produced from its semen. Therefore, a cow is not a “father” because he shares his matter in a generation, but rather moreso because of the form and the [primary] end-point that he produces. So also in God, the Father is not a Father because he produces the Son from quasi matter, but rather because he shares the whole [divine substance or essence with the Son] as [the formal] end-point of production’.

[Scotus, Lect. 1.5.2.un., n. 97 (Vat. 16: 447.22-448.8): ‘Et sufficit haec consubstantialitas ad rationem “Filii”, quia ratio paternitatis in creaturis non est quia materiam communicat, sed propter terminum communicatum. Unde quando bos generat, decidit semen, — et si tunc produceret et decideret a se bovem, vere pater esset: unde bos si posset, decideret bovem sicut semen, et propter istum terminum productum dicitur esse “pater” et si nihil aliud operaretur; unde si moreretur statim, adhuc ex semine producitur bos. Non igitur est bos “pater” propter communicationem materiae generationis, sed magis propter formam et terminum quem producit. Ita Pater in divinis non erit Pater quia producit Filium quasi ex materia, sed quia communicat totum ut terminus’.]

From the Ordinatio

‘But to understand the affirmative claim that “the Son is from the substance of the Father” in the aforesaid way [namely, such that the Son is originated from the Father and is consubstantial with him], I say that this understanding truly preserves the fact that the Son is not [produced] from nothing, and it even truly preserves that the Son is “from” in the way that’s required for sonship’.

[Scotus, Ord. 1.5.2.un., n. 102 (Vat. 4: 63.18-64.2): ‘Ad intellectum autem istius affirmativae qua dicitur “Filius est de substantia Patris”, secundum intellectum praedictum [viz., totalis intellectus huius sermonis “Filius est de substantia Patris” est iste: quod Filius est originatus a Patre ut consubstantialis ei], dico quod intellectus ille vere salvat quod Filius non sit de nihilo, — vere etiam salvat quod Filius est “de” sicut requiritur ad filiationem’.]

‘I explain the first point [viz., that the Son is not produced from nothing] like this: a “generated creature” is not [produced] from nothing because something in it (such as matter) pre-exists. Therefore, since the form is something in the composite and it is something in it that’s more perfect than its matter, if the form of something were to pre-exist and the matter were newly added to it so that it were informed by the pre-existent form, that very product would not be [produced] from nothing, for something in it pre-existed, and in fact something in it that’s more perfect than the matter which is normally pre-exists. Therefore, if the Son were not said to be [produced] from nothing “because his essence existed in the Father prior in the order of origin”, and if the essence were the quasi-matter in the Son’s generation, then how much more would the Son not be [produced] from nothing if the essence that ‘exists in the Father prior in origin’ were a quasi-form shared with the Son?’

[Scotus, Ord. 1.5.2.un., n. 103 (Vat. 4: 64.3-13): ‘Primum declaro, quia “creatura genita” non est de nihilo, quia aliquid eius praeexsistit, ut materia. Ergo cum forma sit aliquid compositi et aliquid eius perfectius quam materia, si forma alicuius praeexsisteret et materia de novo adveniret et informaretur illa forma iam praeexsistente, ipsum productum non esset de nihilo, quia aliquid eius praeexstitisset, immo aliquid eius perfectius quam materia quae praeexsistit communiter. Ergo si Filius non diceretur esse de nihilo “quia essentia eius secundum ordinem originis praefuit in Patre”, et hoc si illa essentia esset quasi-materia generationis Fili, multo magis nec Filius erit de nihilo si illa essentia “prius origine exsistens in Patre” sit quasi-forma communicata Filio’.]

‘I explain the second point as follows, namely that in this way the term “from” suffices to preserve the nature of sonship, for in animated thing,s where there is paternity and filiation, we see that he who is the generator by his act is formally called the “father”. Or at least the act of proffering semen, and if he were a perfect agent, such that at the moment when he proffered his semen, he could instantly proffer his offspring, he would truly be a father even more perfectly than in the way where the entirety of all the intermediate changes is required. But here, in this act of proffering semen, that which was his substance (or in some way was something that belonged to him) is not matter, but rather is the quasi formal end-point, shared [with] or produced [in the product] by that act, just as there would be an offspring if it were instantly proffered from the Father. Therefore, because something of the substance of the generator is the end-point of his action, by which he is a father, this truly preserves the fact that the product is similar in nature and “comes to exist from his [father’s] substance”, so also this term “de” is truly enough to preserve the nature of being a father and a son, and because what “he proffered as an end-point” is the matter of a further change, this applies to the term “from” as it belongs to a father and a son’.

[Scotus, Ord. 1.5.2.un., n. 104 (Vat. 4: 64.14-65.9): ‘Secundum declaro sic, scilicet quod istud “de” sufficiat ad rationem filiationis, quia in animatis, ubi est paternitas et filiatio, videamus quis sit ille actus per quem generans dicitur formaliter “pater”. Ille utique est actus decidendi semen, et si esset perfectum agens, ita quod nunc, quando decidit semen, posset immediate decidere prolem, vere esset pater, et multo perfectius quam modo sit, ubi requiruntur tot mutationes intermediae; sed nunc, in isto actu decidendi semen, illud quod erat substantia eius, vel aliquo modo aliquid eius, non est materia, sed est quasi terminus formalis, communicatus sive productus per istum actum, sicut esset proles si immediate decideretur a patre; ergo quod aliquid substantiae generantis sit terminus actionis suae, qua est pater, hoc vere salvat productum simile in natura “esse de substantia eius”, sic ut ipsum “de” vere sufficit ad rationem patris et filii, — et quod illud “decisum ut terminus” sit materia sequentium transmutationum, hoc accidit ipsi “de” ut convenit patri et filio’.]

‘Therefore, the eternal Father, not by proffering some part of himself but rather by sharing his whole essence, such that it is the formal end-point of that production, he most truly produces a Son from himself, in the way in which the term “from” pertains to a father and a son. And although the essence would be here as “that from which” as from quasi-matter, the term “from” does not make something have the character of a father, just as neither in creatures if the generator had his semen both for the formal end-point and for the material of his action, he would not be “father” insofar as his semen were the material subject of his action but rather insofar as it were the end-point of that action, just like how if a created father were to instantly proffer a son from himself, he would truly be a father, because that which would be proffered from him would be the end-point of his action, but it would not be matter in any way’.

[Scotus, Ord. 1.5.2.un., n. 105 (Vat. 4: 65.10-20): ‘Ergo Pater aeternus, non decidendo aliquid sui sed totam essentiam sui communicando, et hoc ut formalem terminum illius productionis, verissime producit Filium de se, eo modo quo esse “de” pertinet ad patrem et filium; et licet esset ibi essentia “de qua” sicut de quasi-materia, illud “de” non faceret aliquid ad rationem patris, — sicut nec in creaturis si generans haberet semen suum et pro termino formali et pro materia suae actionis, non esset “pater” in quantum semen suum esset materia subiecta suae actioni sed in quantum esset terminus illius actionis, quemadmodum et si pater creatus immediate decideret a se filium, vere esset pater, quia illud quod esset de ipso, esset terminus actionis, nullo autem modo materia’.]

Scotus on the formal end-point of production (translation)

From the Lectura

‘I say that in creatures, there is something that is produced, and that’s the primary end-point of production — it is the whole composite that is primarily produced or generated, just as the Philosopher proves in Metaphysics VII [1033b16-18]. Similarly, there is something that’s formally in the product which is produced, and this is the formal nature under which the production ends. This is the formal end-point of production, and it is the form of the product. So in one sense, the form truly ends the production . . . . the form truly is an end-point of production, even though the primary and adequate end-point is the composite itself’.

[Scotus, Lect. 1.5.1.un., nn. 27-28 (Vat. 16: 420.8-22): ‘dico quod in creaturis est aliquid quod producitur, quod est primus terminus productionis, — et est totum compositum quod primo producitur et generatur, sicut probatur VII Metaphysicae; similiter, est aliquid formale in producto quod producitur, quod est formalis ratio sub qua terminat productionem, et est formalis terminus productionis, et haec est forma producti. Et quod sic forma uno modo vere terminat productionem . . . . forma vere est terminus productionis, sed tamen terminus primus adaequatus est ipsum compositum’.]


From the Ordinatio

‘I say that a production has the product for its primary end-point, and I call this “primary end-point” here an adequate end-point. In this way, the Philosopher says in Metaphysics VII [1033b16-18] that the whole composite is what is primarily produced or generated, for it is what primarily gets its existence from the production, and this is adequate [for there to be a production]. Nevertheless, the form in the composite is the formal end-point of generation, but this is not an incidental end-point, as is apparent from the Philosopher’s comment in Physics II [193b12-18] where he proves that a form is a nature: “generation is natural because it is the way into nature, but since it is the way into form, etc.” That argument would mean nothing if the form were only an incidental end-point of generation’.

[Scotus, Ord. 1.5.1.un., nn. 27-29 (Vat. 4: 25.13-26.9): ‘dico quod productio habet productum pro termino suo primo, et dico hic “primum terminum” terminum adaequatum; et hoc modo dicit Philosophus VII Metaphysicae quod compositum primo generatur, quia est quod primo habet esse per productionem, hoc est adaequatum. In composito tamen forma est formalis terminus generationis, non autem terminus per accidens, sicut apparet per Philosophum II Physicorum, ubi probat formam esse naturam per hoc quod “generatio est naturalis quia est via in naturam, est autem via in formam, ergo etc.”, — quae ratio nulla esset si forma tantum esset terminus per accidens generationis’.]

Avicenna on the emanation of the universe

Here's a translation I did of Avicenna's Metaphysics (Al-Shifa) book 9, chapter 4. That's the place Avicenna describes the emanation of the universe from God. It's a facing page translation, with the critical Latin text.

Avicenna, Meta. 9.4

Matter

Lots of people know of Aristotle's and Aquinas's theories that matter is the substratum of change, that it is 'pure potentiality', that it cannot exist without form, and so forth. Henry of Ghent, Scotus, and Ockham have a very different view of matter.

Roughly speaking, matter is the basic stuff that all material substances are ultimately composed of. For instance, although animals are composed of organic tissue, tissue is composed of cells, and so forth, at rock bottom there’s a fundamental kind of stuff that all material substances are ultimately made from. This basic stuff is called ‘matter’, and the earth is filled with it.

Matter is not, as we might imagine today, just another name for atoms or quarks or whatever other sort of particle we think is the fundamental building block of material bodies. Matter cannot be broken down into fundamental ‘particles’ or indivisible parts. It’s more like an amorphous kind of stuff that can always be divided into smaller and smaller parts, similar to the way that a line can always be divided into shorter segments.

But matter is ‘amorphous’ in the sense that it does not have any form itself — it is not, that is, itself a composite of matter and form. Rather, matter is a purely receptive sort of material that can be made into different kinds of material substances.

This is not to say that matter is a ‘bare substrate’, as it were, that has no features of its own. On the contrary, matter is real stuff; it has parts (as I’ve already indicated), and it exists in space. Ockham even thinks matter is extended in three dimensions. (Scotus denies that matter is extended, but he still thinks it exists in particular places, perhaps similar to the way that electrons have no dimensions but still exist here or there.)

Further matter has specific features. It is the foundation for relations, and it has the capacity to take on substantial forms. More precisely, there is a discrete power that exists in matter to receive each different kind of substantial form. So there is a power p1 to receive the form of fire, a power p2 to receive the form of water, and so forth for every substantial form that matter can receive. (Matter has no powers to receive accidental forms.)

Nor is matter just ‘pure potentiality’ — i.e., a mere abstraction of the potential in material substances to be transformed into different substances. Henry, Scotus, and Ockham all believe that God could create a lump of matter without any forms, so matter is at least the sort of thing that in principle can exist all by itself.

Aquinas denies all this, I think. He explicitly says that matter cannot exist without form, and even God cannot create matter all by itself, without a form. Matter does not have any features of its own except that it is a 'pure potentiality'. (I don't know if Aquinas thinks matter has parts or exists in places. I wouldn't think so, but I don't know.)

Still, it’s difficult to imagine what a lump of matter is like, even on the views of Henry, Scotus, and Ockham. As I’ve already hinted, the best we can do is imagine an amorphous blob. But even that’s not quite right, and there’s a reason for this. Medieval Aristotelians believe that we can only know things through their forms, so we cannot imagine something that doesn’t have some particular form.

But just because we can’t imagine it does not mean that it’s not there. As our authors see it, matter must exist because we see material substances coming to be and passing away all the time, and given the hypothesis that change requires a recipient, there must be something there that gains and loses the forms that constitute those material substances.

(Besides, say Henry, Scotus, and Ockham, God isn't limited to knowledge by forms, and he has a proper 'idea' of matter -- and that means that matter has a nature; i.e., it has essential properties that define just like every other kind of entity.)

Per se unity 2

Here are some more thoughts on 'per se unity'. I had a post on this earlier.

For Aristotle, change occurs when a subject x acquires a form F. There are, however, two broad types of change: substantial change, and accidental change.

In substantial change, the subject is a lump of matter, and the form is a substantial form. The matter and substantial form together constitute a substance (e.g., Socrates' matter and a substantial form constitute the human person Socrates).

In accidental change, on the other hand, the subject is a substance, and the form is an accidental form (e.g., when Socrates goes to the beach and gets a tan, Socrates is the subject, and his tan color is an accidental form).

According to Aristotle, matter and a substantial form have 'substantial unity' (or 'per se unity', as it's also called), and a substance and its accident has 'accidental unity'. And for Aristotle, the constituents in a substantial unity are tied together much more tightly than those in an accidental unity. For instance, the matter and form in Socrates are tied together more tightly than Socrates and his tan color.

But as far as I can see, it's very difficult to identify the precise way that a substantial unity is tighter than an accidental unity. In both cases, the constituents are related to each other in many of the same ways. Consider the following.

(1) In both cases, the subject can survive the gain and loss of the form. For instance, Socrates can lose his tan, but Socrates' matter can likewise lose his human form.

(2) In both cases, the form can only exist by inhering in a subject. An accident like a tan color can only exist when it inheres in a subject (like Socrates), but Aristotle thinks that applies to substantial forms too: Socrates' human form can only exist when it inheres in a lump of matter.

(The Christian scholastics believe human forms can survive the death of their bodies, but that's a special case. We can easily use a different example to make the same point: even the Christian scholastics believe that Beulah the cow's substantial form can only exist in a lump of matter.)

(3) In both cases, the identity of the composite depends on the identity of its constituents. For Aristotle, Socrates would be destroyed if his matter and form were separated, but 'tan-Socrates' also cannot survive if its constituents are separated: 'tan-Socrates' ceases to exist when Socrates loses his tan.

(4) In both cases, the subject and the form are related in terms of potentiality and actuality. For instance, Socrates' matter has the potential to have a human form, and Socrates' human form actualizes that potential. Likewise, Socrates has the potential to be tan, and his tan color actualizes that potential too.

So for both accidental and substantial unities, the form actualizes a potential in the subject, the form can only exist by inhering in the subject, the subject can survive the loss of the form, and the subject and the form together constitute a unity that cannot survive if the subject and the form are taken apart. In what way, then, are substantial unities 'tighter' than accidental unities? I don't know.

It's tempting to say that while Socrates' tan color is tied to Socrates only 'accidentally' (i.e., 'loosely'), a human substantial form is tied to Socrates essentially (i.e., much more 'tightly'). But this does not help, for it equivocates on the meaning of 'Socrates'.

When we say the tan color is accidental to Socrates, we are taking Socrates as the subject of the tan color. But when we say a human substantial form is essential to Socrates, we are taking Socrates as the composite of a subject (matter) and a form.

Thus, although Socrates is the subject of his tan color, Socrates is not the subject of his substantial form. Rather, Socrates' matter is the subject of his substantial form. So while it's true that Socrates' tan color is accidental to its subject (Socrates), it's also true that Socrates' human form is accidental to its subject (Socrates' matter).

Similarly, although Socrates is the composite of which his substantial form is an essential component, Socrates is not the composite of which his tan color is an essential component. Rather, 'tan-Socrates' is the composite of which the tan color is an essential component. So while it's true that Socrates' human form is an essential component of the composite Socrates, it's also true that Socrate's tan color is an essential component of the composite 'tan-Socrates'.

Thus, we need to be careful when we talk about how constituents are 'essential' or 'accidental' to their subjects and/or composites. In both cases, the forms are accidental to their subjects, but essential to their composites.