Ockham against Robert Cowton on the substratum view

One of the more obvious problems with Henry's theory is that it seems to entail that the divine essence is imperfect. By all standard medieval accounts, matter is less perfect than form because it has less actuality than form, and here 'actuality' refers to causal oomph (among other things). If Henry wants to say the divine essence is matter, it would seem to follow that the divine essence has less causal oomph, less actuality, or less perfection than it would if it were a form.

This is certainly not a consquence that Henry wants to draw. Robert Cowton, one of Henry's followers, attempted to address this problem by arguing that Henry's model of material production accurately applies to the Son's production, but only if we remove any imperfection from the model. For Robert, divine production is like material production, free from imperfection.

In material production, there is a producer and a product, so let's call these x and y, respectively. Both the producer and the product are composed of matter and form, so let's call the matter M and the form F, and let's use subscripts for x and y to specify the matter or form of x or y: the matter Mx and the form Fx of the producer, and the matter My and the form Fy of the product.

The same goes for divine production. There is a producer and a product, and let's call these x and y, and the producer and the product are each constituted from the divine essence and a personal property, so let's call these E and P, and let's use subscripts for x and y to specify the essence and the personal property of x and y: the essence Ex and the personal property Px for the producer, and essence Ey and the personal property Py for the product.

According to Robert, in material production, there are three imperfections that need to be removed in divine production. First, there is one lump of matter in the producer, and another lump of matter in the product, so the matter of the producer and the matter of the product are not numerically identical. Thus, in material production, we have:

(M1) Mx and My are not numerically identical.

But this is an imperfection, so Robert says we should remove this for the divine case. In divine production, the 'matter' is the divine essence, and it will not be numerically distinct in the producer and the product, so we have:

(D1) Ex and Ey are numerically identical.

In the production of the Son, the divine essence in the Father is numerically identical to the divine essence in the Son. Between the Father and the Son, there is just one divine essence that they share.

Second, the lump of matter that a product is made from is in potential to the form of the product. When a sculptor makes a statue out of a lump of clay, the clay is in a state of potentiality to the form of the statue, thus:

(M2) My is in a state of potentiality to Fy.

But this is also an imperfection, so Robert claims we should remove this from divine production. Thus, in divine production:

(D2) Ey is not in a state of potentiality to Py.

When the Father produces the Son in the divine essence, the divine essence is not in a state of potentiality to being a Son. Presumably, this means that 'before' the divine essence is a Son, it is not in a state of potentiality, It is always in a state of pure actuality.

Third, in material production, when a producer produces a product, this occurs by changing a lump of matter into a product. This means that the matter was first potentially the product, and after the production, it is actually the product. For example, when a sculptor turns a lump of clay into a statue, the clay changes from being potentially a statue to actually being a statue. Thus:

(M3) Before x produces y, My is potential. After x produces y, My is actual.

But this is an imperfection, so Robert says we should remove this imperfection in the divine case:

(D3) Ex and Ey are actual.

In divine production, then, the divine essence does not change from being potentially the Son to being actually the Son. Rather, the divine essence is always actual. D3 follows straightforwardly from D2.

In addition to the three imperfections just discussed, Robert thinks there are three perfections in material production that apply to divine production. First, in material production, the lump of matter in the producer is the same kind of thing as the lump of matter in the producer. Thus:

(M4) Mx is the same kind of thing as My.

This is a perfection, so this also applies to divine production:
(D4) Ex is the same kind of thing as Ey.

Of course, D4 follows directly from D1. If Ex and Ey are numerically the same thing, then there can only be one thing, E, so Ex and Ey will be whatever kind of thing E is.

Second, in material production, matter helps, along with a form, to constitute the product. When a sculptor produces a statue out of a lump of clay, the clay is part of what constitutes the statue. Thus:

(M5) My partially constitutes y.

This is a perfection, so this also applies to divine production:

(D5) Ey partially constitutes y.

Third, Robert claims that in material production, a product is not produced ex nihilo. Rather, a product is produced from some matter. Thus:

(M6) y is not produced ex nihilo.

Again, this is a perfection, so it applies to divine production too:

(D6) y is not produced ex nihilo.

When the Father produces the Son, he does not produce the Son from nothing. Rather, the divine essence already exists, and the divine essence is one of the ingredients in the Son.

(I must admit that I don't see why M6 would be a perfection. Surely Robert would think that an act of creating some y from nothing would be more perfect than producing y from some already existing matter. After all, to produce y from nothing would take more effort, as it were, than producing y from something already existing. Perhaps Robert is stretching for one more reason why material production could apply to the divine case, but whatever his reason, Robert takes this as a perfection of material production.)

As I have already explained, Ockham doesn't think we have any reason to say a model based on matter is any better than a model based on form. But Robert thinks there are reasons why this model of matter maps onto the divine case better than a model of form would. Much of Robert's argumentation for this relies on the fact that most of M1-M6 (and thus D1-D6) seems to require that the 'matter' is prior to the form.

For example, if D1 is true, that is, if Ex is identical to Ey, then when x produces y, E exists in x prior to its existence in y. Likewise, if D5 is true, that is, if Ey partially constitutes y, then Ey will be prior to y. Robert thus infers that whatever role E is going to play in the model, it will be prior to the product because it exists in the producer prior to the production, and because it partially constitutes the product. In material production, matter is prior to the product in just these ways, so matter is a good canditate for this role.

Ockham agrees that the divine essence is prior to the product, but this does not mean that the divine essence is more like matter than form. Presumably, Ockham is thinking of the example where God creates some matter under an already existing form. In such a case, the form is more prior than matter to the product, so mere priority is not enough to say the divine essence is more like matter than form.

Besides, in the divine case, the personal properties are really identical to the divine essence, and for Ockham, this should prevent any attempt to compare the divine essence and the personal properties to matter and form. Matter and form are really distinct entities, so it is simply not appropriate to talk about the divine essence and the personal propreties in hylomorphic terms.

All of this suggests that for Ockham, explaining the production of the Son in terms of material production is, at best, just an analogy. The divine essence is not literally matter, so Henry and his followers can only say this in an extended sense. Of course, one could ask: this is just an analogy, so why can't we use this analogy, or even many analogies, to explain divine production? It seems to me that Ockham finds material production to be a particularly bad analogy. At the end of the day, we have to remove so many features from the model of material production that we are hardly left with much of a model. If we go with material production, then we end up with a fairly thin model, a model with very few features that can't do much explanatory work. What Ockham wants, I think, is a thick model, a model with many features that can do some explanatory work.

Ockham against Henry on the substratum view

Like Scotus, Ockham thinks Henry's model of material production is problematic, and like Scotus, Ockham thinks the main problem lies in the claim that the divine essence is the matter or quasi matter of the divine persons. Ockham's argument is, roughly, that we can take the claim that the divine essence is matter either literally or in an extended sense, and since nobody thinks the divine essence is literally matter, it must be matter in an extendend sense. But if that's the case, we could just as easily say that in an extended sense the divine essence is something else – form, for example.

Let's say that a statement that is literally true is TL, and let's say that a statement that is true in an extended sense is TE. Thus:

(P1) The statement 'x is y' is either TL, or TE.
(P2) Not TL.
(P3) Not TE.
(P4) Therefore, x is not y.

As for P2, it seems obvious that the divine essence cannot literally be matter, but Ockham does not shy away from giving a few reasons for this, if only just to show how absurd it would be to take Henry's claim literally. Two are worth consideration.

First, Ockham says that the term 'matter' is applied precisely to that which is in potency to some really distinct form. According to Ockham:

(T1) Matter is (i) really distinct from form, and (ii) in potency to form.

If, then, this is what 'matter' means, then to say the divine essence is matter is to say:

(T2) The divine essence is (i) really distinct from some form or forms, and (ii) in potency to those forms.

In the divine case, the 'forms' would be the personal properties, so it would follow that the divine essence would be really distinct from the personal properties and in potency to the personal properties.

Of course, Henry thinks the divine essence is in potency to the personal properties, so it might seem that Henry would be quite happy to agree that the divine essence is 'matter' in just this sense. However, Henry also thinks that matter and form are really distinct, even though he thinks the divine essence is really identical to the personal properties. So although Henry may want to say the divine essence is in potency to the personal properties, Ockham's claim is that simply being in potency to a form is not enough to merit the proper label 'matter' (A strolling Socrates is in potency to the act of sitting, but does that make him the 'matter' of an act of sitting?). To be called 'matter' literally, the divine essence and the personal properties would also have to be really distinct.

Second, Ockham thinks that if we divide and sub-divide the world up various categories, some of which are incompatible with each other, we cannot apply something from one category to something of another, incompatible category. But this is exactly the kind of thing that is happening when Henry says the divine essence is matter. If we divide 'being' into the categories of created being and uncreated being such that anything contained in the category of created being cannot be applied to anything contained in the category of uncreated being, and if we then classify 'matter' in the category of created being, it follows that 'matter' cannot apply to anything in the category of uncreated being. Like most Christian scholastics, Henry does think that matter belongs in the category of created being, since the doctrine of creation entails this, and of course he thinks God is the only uncreated being. Consequently, Henry cannot attribute matter to the divine essence literally, for matter belongs to a category that is fundamentally inapplicable to God.

One might object that this argument would apply to every predicate from the created order which we apply to God (e.g., 'wisdom', 'goodness', 'love'). Indeed, by standard medieval accounts, human concepts are acquired by emprical observation of created entities, and so by Ockham's reasoning, it should follow that every concept we wish to apply to God in fact cannot be applied to God, for such concepts belong to the category of created being. It would seem from this that if Ockham is to be consistent, then he cannot apply any creaturely-acquired concepts to God.

However, Ockham does not think that every concept humans acquire belongs to the category of created being. At the very least, Ockham thinks the concept of 'being' applies to both created and uncreated being, and perhaps one could argue that there are other concepts that apply universally (or even transcendentally) to created and uncreated beings. Ockham's problem with Henry's account is not that he is using a concept acquired from creatures to describe God. The problem is that 'matter' belongs exlusively to the category of created being. And it is important to keep in mind that Ockham is talking about literal predication here. The point, then, is that if matter is classed in the category of uncreated being, then it can be applied literally to created beings only, not to uncreated being.

In any case, if it's not P2, then it must be P3. The claim that the divine essence is matter cannot to be taken literally, so it must be taken in an extended sense. However, Ockham thinks that speaking of something in an extendend sense requires some common condition C on which the extension is based.

(T3) If the statement 'x is y' is TE, then (i) x is C, and (ii) y is C.

For example, the claim 'Paul is lightning fast' is based on the condition C of being able to travel at high speeds. Paul is C, and lightning is C, so we can say 'Paul is lightning fast' based on C. (Compare with 'Paul is turtle fast', which still is intelligible based on the condition of speed, and 'Paul is lamp fast', which is not intelligible because there is no condition to draw a likeness.) Thus, if Henry wants to say that the divine essence is matter in an extended sense, then there must be some condition which is common to the divine essence and matter.

Ockham points out that if C is common to not just x and y, but also some other z, then we could just as easily say 'x is z'. That is, if this condition is common not just to the divine essence and matter, but also to other things, then we end up with no reason to say that the divine essence is matter, for we could just as easily say the divine essence is one of the other things which share the same condition.

For example, if there is some condition that applies to the divine essence, to matter, and to a goat, and if this condition is the basis by which one can say the divine essence is matter in an extendend sense, then one could just as easily say the divine essence is a goat. The point is that if we want to maintain in any non arbitrary way that the divine essence is matter in an extended sense, then the condition for that extended sense cannot be common to the divine essence, to matter, and to other things. It must be common only to the divine essence and matter.

But even if there is some condition that is common to the divine essence and matter, Ockham argues that if there another condition, D, that the divine essence shares only with something else, w, then we could also say 'x is w', and then we have no reason to choose y over w. For example, one could argue that there is some condition common only to the divine essence and to form, and that would be sufficient to allow us to say 'the divine essence is form' in an extended sense. And if we can say that in an extended sense, just as we can say 'the divine essence is matter' in an extended sense, why should we choose one over the other?

Ockham applies this argument in various ways to Henry's position. For example, Ockham rightly recognizes that one of the reasons Henry turns to material production is because the divine essence is included in the Son but is not produced in the Son, so Henry wants a model where some part of the product is not produced. In the realm of material beings, matter is just that: a part of the product that is not produced. But, Ockham argues, matter is the most obvious candidate here only because we are considering natural causes, and natural causes always presuppose matter.

But if we consider another cause such as God, then there is no reason to think that matter is the best candidate for the unproduced part of a product. After all, couldn't God create some matter under an already existing substantial form? In that case, the form would be the unproduced part of the product, so why don't we say the divine essence is form? Ockham does not see why Henry should say the divine essence is matter solely on the grounds that he is looking for a model that includes an unproduced part of the product.

Ockham also argues that we could say the divine essence is a hylomorphic composite just as easily as we can say the divine essence is matter. After all, a composite has per se unity, and neither the matter nor the form it is composed from has per se unity. Further, a composite is more perfect than either the matter or the form it is composed from. God is both per se and perfect, so why we not just say the divine essence is a hylomorphic composite instead of matter?

Peter of Tartaretus on Scotus, Ord. 1.5.2.un. nn. 129-138

More of Peter Tartaretus's 15th century exposition of the third difficulty Scotus brings up in the Ordinatio 1.5.2.un. nn. 129-138 (translated here). As is usual with Peter, these explanations make some of Scotus's more elliptical passages a bit clearer for me. Of course, this is a rough translation, and anytime I quickly translate a text, I'm bound to make some glaring, rudimentary errors. But the general ideas are here, for anyone interested.

[From Peter's Lucidissima Commentaria, bk. 1, dist. 5, quest. 2, art. 3, p. 202-203 of the 1583 Venetiis edition.]

The third difficulty is in the manner of the argument. Wherever one identifies the foundation of a relation and the relation which is founded in the foundation, one identifies some potentiality, because a foundation is in potentiality to any relation which actuates the foundation. In the divinity, the divine essence is the foundation of relations of origin, so the divine essence will be potential with respect to such relations. Therefore, Lord Scotus, since you posit real relations and the essence in the divinity, you posit potentiality and actuality.

Scotus responds with a distinction as the first point. The order of generation, and the order of perfection in creatures are opposites, as is clear from Metaphysics 9, because those things which are prior by generation are posterior by perfection, and those things which are prior by perfection, are posterior by generation. This should be understood for things in the same genus, for an accidental form is by generation induced in a composite after the substantial form, but nevertheless it is not prior in perfection, as is clear from Scotus's Quodlibet, question 13.

The second point is that in the order of generation and the order of perfection, that which is simply speaking first, is possessed by these orders uniformly. That is, in the divinity, what is strictly speaking first is possessed uniformly by both orders: namely, that which is first in one order is also first in the other order. In the divinity, what is first in origin is most perfectly first. In creatures the order goes from potentiality to act, and thus from imperfection to perfection. This is why the things that are prior by generation are posterior by perfection. But it is not this way in the divinity ad intra (although ad extra God could order nature otherwise)

The third point is that if in creatures these two orders uniformly coincide in what is first, that is, if they are simultaneous, we do not seek the matter first and the form second. Rather, we seek the form first and afterwards the matter, and this is because it is not presupposed that a natural agent acts by producing a form.

The fourth point is that in the divinity, one should imagine two instants of nature. When we do this, in the first instant there is the divine essence as the most actual being, existing de se and ex se. This is not how created natures exist, since they do not exist de se like this. They have actuality in their singulars. From this it follows that in this first instant of nature, we do not imagine the divine essence as a subject receptive of an act. When we imagine its existence in the second instant of nature, the properties and relations, which have existence from the divine essence itself, and the relations of origin spring forth, not as products, nor as really distinct, nor even as supposita [i.e. singular instances of the divine essence].

The fifth point is that the relations of origin do not spring forth as forms enforming the divine essence. Rather, they spring forth as things which are naturally identified with the divine essence, as will be said later. Something can be a foundation in two ways: as a material foundation, in which case it is receptive, or as a formal foundation, in which case it is perfective. The first sort of foundation is entirely receptive in creatures, and maximally so if the relation is distinct from the foundation. But when something is a formal and perfective foundation, it gives existence to its relations, and it makes those relations be ordered to it and spring forth from it. In this way, the divine essence is the foundation of the relations, because it is that by which the relations of origin are the same, namely that by which the relations are the same God.

Then Scotus moves to the form of the argument. He concedes the major premise for receptive foundations, but he denies this for formal and perfective foundations. In the way he says there is a formal and perfective foundation in the divinity, there is not a receptive and potential foundation there, and in this way the solution to the argument of this whole difficulty is clear.

An example of this can be taken from creatures. It is said that the relations of origin spring forth from the divine essence and are in the divine essence, but not as forms which actuate the divine essence. Rather, it is such that the divine essence gives existence to them. For the purpose of explaining this, we can take some examples from creatures, but since we can't know everything about God from creatures, we'll suppose something per impossibile.

The first example comes from the type of generation which is growth. As the Philosopher clearly sees, this supposes a suppositum. Suppose, per impossibile, that there is someone's hand, and that its matter remains under the form of the hand while it simultaneously acquires some other form, as for example when the hand grows. Here something new is induced in the matter, but the matter remaining under the form of the hand simultaneously acquires some other form. It is clear here that the acquired form does not give existence to that matter, because the matter already has its existence under the pre-existing form, and it remains so. It is similar in the proposition, although there is imperfection in this example because this sort of thing cannot happen unless there is a change, since such matter does not first have such a form, and then later does have such a form. In the proposition, by separating the imperfection of change, the divine essence is understood to already possess from its formal nature actuated being, and it is infinite being, in the first instant of nature. In the second instant of nature, the relations of origin are understood to spring forth from the divine essence, not as enforming relations so as to give existence to the divine essence, since the essence is already understood in the first instant of nature to have actuated existence, and infinite existence. Rather, the divine essence is why the relations of origin have existence. This example does not entirely attend to the proposition, but it does attend to some aspect of the proposition, as was said.

A second example: suppose that the soul enforms the heart, as the principle part [that it enforms], and then afterwards the soul becomes present to other organic parts like the head or the hand such that the soul gives existence to the head or the hand without changing itself. It is clear that the soul receives nothing, even though it did not initially have those parts but later did. Similarly, we say that the divine essence, in the second instant of nature, gives existence to the relations of origin, but not such that the divine nature itself receives existence from them, since in the first instant of nature it is understood to have infinite and actuated existence. This example is more apt than the first.

A third example is again more about matter, but it is more apt than the first. Suppose that the matter of the animated heart, itself remaining under the form of the heart, could communicate itself to diverse forms such as those of the hand, the head, and so on for other organic parts, and suppose that this could be such that the animated heart produced these composites from its communicated matter and these forms. If this happened, they would have the same matter by the communicated production and the communication of that matter such that the matter would be the basis for the existence of many. Similarly, the divine essence would be the basis for the existence of the relations. But this example does not attend much more to the proposition, since although the matter is the same in number and the basis for the existence of many parts, it would receive those forms by undergoing a change.

For this reason, there is a fourth example about form. Suppose that the soul, which is unlimited with respect to its parts, is communicated to the hand, the head, the foot, and so on, such that those parts were not those things unless the soul gave existence to them, and without changing itself. Similarly, the divine essence gives existence to the relations, without changing itself.

One could say that these examples do not attend very well to the proposition, and especially the two examples about matter do not explain the proposition very well, and neither do the two examples about form. But as for the example of the soul, suppose that, per impossibile, the soul is the basis for the existence of the head, the hand, and the foot, but not by enformation. This would be like saying that I am a man by humanity, but not by enformation, since humanity would not [according to this example] enform me. Secondly, suppose that in the examples some part has the nature of a whole, and that it exists per se. Then we would have per se subsistences, or supposita, and then the example would attend to the proposition because the same thing would be the basis for the existence of many without any change to itself. This is because it would not receive existence, nor would it receive something from them, and those parts would have existence, and the soul would not be called imperfect on that grounds that it wouldn't enform them.

Similarly, according to the proposition, the divine essence is the giver of existence, and it is the form by which the relations exist, and this is not by enformation. The divine essence is the form by which such relations have existence, and for this reason the divine essence does not have the nature of matter, nor the nature of a subject. From this, the argument that the divine essence does not have the nature of matter is clear. The divine essence has the nature of form. It is not the foundation, as matter is, but more as form is. Thus, the divine essence has the nature more of form.

This is confirmed by Damascus. The relation does not determine the nature. The hypostasis does not actuate the divine essence. Rather, the divine essence determines the hypostasis, because it constitutes the suppositum, as the Father is Father by paternity (holding that the divine persons are constituted by relations of origin). This explains that the divine essence is not a foundation in potentiality.

It should be known that for one thing to be related to another thing can be understood in two ways. In one way formally, as the Father is formally the Father by paternity, and something is formally similar by similarity. In another way, one thing is related to another thing foundationally, just as Socrates is similar to Plato foundationally by whiteness, by color, or by knowledge. But this is to be similar formally by similarity. If the divine essence were a foundation in potentiality to the divine relations of origin, then the Father would be related to the Son by the divine essence as the foundation, which is false. It is clear that this is false, since we say that the Father is Father to the Son, we do not say the essence is related to [i.e., is the Father to] the Son, as the foundation, because the divine essence is that by which the Father is ad se and not ad alterum. The Father's act of generating is related to the essence foundationally [rather than formally, and in this way] the divine essence can be called the most perfect foundation of the relations.

Scotus, Ord. 1.5.2.un. n. 129-138

Here's Scotus, Ordinatio, 1.5.2.un. n. 129-138 (the third of four difficulties he discusses. The first difficulty was translated here, the second difficulty was translated here, and Peter Tartaretus's commentary on the second difficulty was translated here).


[Third difficulty]

[n. 129] The third difficulty concerns how there could be a relation that does not require the proper basis of a foundation. A foundation seems to be prior to a relation, and quasi perfectible by it, not the converse, since a relation does not seem to be perfected by its foundation, because then it would presuppose its foundation. Therefore, since the divine essence is the foundation of these relations, it seems that it is quasi-matter.

[n. 130] I respond: in creatures, the order of generation and the order of perfection are contraries, as is clear from Metaphysics 9: 'those things which are prior in generation are posterior in perfection'. The reason is that creatures proceed from potency to act, and thus from imperfection to perfection. For this reason, the way of generation goes through the imperfect before the perfect. But by attending, simply speaking, to the first, it is necessary that the same thing be first, simply speaking, both in origin and in perfection (even according to the Philosopher, in the same place), since the whole order of generation is reduced to some first perfect thing [Vat. eds. note: first in the order of perfection], just as to the first of the whole [order of] origin.

[n. 131] Therefore, just as in creatures, if these two orders uniformly concur, we do not ask first about the matter which is the substrate of form. Rather, we ask first about the form which naturally gives actuality to matter, and secondly we ask about the matter which naturally receives being from form (or the suppositum which naturally subsists by that form). So also in the divinity. By beginning from the first instant of nature, the divine essence – as it exists per se and ex se – occurs entirely first. This does not pertain to any created nature, since no created nature has existence naturally prior to existence in a suppositum. But the divine essence, according to Augustine in De Trinitate book 7, is that by which the Father exists and that by which the Son exists, although it is not that by which the Father is the Father and that by which the Son is the Son. Therefore, per se existence pertains to the divine essence, considered most abstractly. In this first instant then, it occurs not as something receptive of some perfection, but rather as infinite perfection, able in the second instant of nature to be communicated to something, though not as a form enforming matter, but rather as a quiddity is communicated to a suppositum, as much as it [the suppositum] has existence by it [the quiddity]. And so the relations 'spring forth' – as a certain theologian [Henry] puts it – from it [the divine essence], and the persons 'spring forth' in it [the divine essence]. Not as certain quasi forms, giving existence to it, but as certain quasi supposita, in which it [the divine essence] receives the existence which is, simply speaking, its own, but in which supposita it gives 'existence' as that by which those supposita formally are, and that by which they are God. And so the relation which is springing forth, if it is a per se subsistent, springs forth not as the form of the essence but such that it is naturally God by that deity formally, although not such that it enforms it but such that it exists as the same thing as it by a most perfect identity. However, in no way, and the same is true of the converse, is the relation related to the essence as that by which the essence is formally determined or contracted, or in some actuated by it, because this is entirely repugnant to the infinity of the divine essence as it first occurs under the aspect of an infinite act.

[n. 132] I concede then that the essence is the foundation of those relations, but not a foundation quasi-potentially receiving them. Rather, as a foundation quasi in the manner of form, in which these forms naturally subsist – not, indeed, by enformation, as a similarity relation is in whiteness, but as subsistence is said to to be in a nature, just as Socrates is said to subsist in humanity because 'Socrates is a man by his humanity'. Therefore, you will not have the basis for potentiality or quasi potentiality in the divine essence from the nature of a foundation. Rather, you will have precisely the basis for form such that the relation which is founded in it [the divine essence] is, simply speaking, God.

[n. 133] An example of this can be taken from creatures by positing here a certain 'per impossibile'. Growth occurs because nourishment reaches a corrupted body, and its [the body's] matter receives the form of meat, and in this way it [the matter] is enformed by the soul. Now suppose that the same matter, remaining naturally [under the form of the body], receives another part of the form [of the same meat] (just as it is posited in rarefaction). Here the matter remains one, and it was enformed before but now is enformed by a new form. Nevertheless, this is formally a real change, because there is a change from privation to form. Suppose, as another example, that the same soul perfects first one part of the body (such as the heart), and afterwards it reaches another part of the organic body, a part which is perfectible by the soul. The soul then perfects that part newly reached, but nevertheless the soul itself is not changed, because there is no privation in it first and form afterwards. For privation is a lacking, and in this it is suitably meant to receive. But the soul, first un-enformed and afterwards enformed, is not meant to receive anything but rather to give [form to the parts of the body].

[n. 134] In both of these examples, there is a real production of some product, though in the first there is a change, and in the second there is not.

[n. 135] The [first] example would seem more apt if we suppose that the same matter of the animated heart could be communicated to different forms, such as the hand and the foot, and this in virtue of the activity of the animated heart so as to produce this composites [namely, the hand and foot composites] from its communicated matter and from these forms. Here there would be a real production of the whole, having the same matter, though this would occur with a change of the matter. But if, to take the other example, we suppose that the soul, on account of unlimited nature with respect to act and form, could be communicated to many parts, and so in virtue of the soul in the heart, it could be communicated to the hand and the foot, produced by the animated heart, then there would be here a real production of many things consubstantial in form, without any change in that form.

[n. 136] In both examples, it is supposed that the products are per se subsistences, not parts of the same thing, since to be a part is an imperfect. But by supposing this, the second example, in both of its versions, namely the example of communication the form to the product, perfectly represents production in God (the first example does not, since it is about the communication of matter). But still, by adding this to the position – namely that the soul in the heart and the hand and the foot is not an enforming form, since componibility includes imperfection, but rather is the whole form by which these subsistences are animated – then it is understood that deity is not communicated quasi-materially, but rather deity is communicated in the manner of form to the subsistent relations (if the persons are supposed to be relative), not as an enforming form but as that by which the relation or relative subsistent is God.

[n. 137] Therefore, the essence does not enform a relation, nor is it the converse. Rather, there is perfect identity here. But the essence possesses the manner of form with respect to relation, just as a nature does with respect to a suppositum, in as much as it is that by which the relation subsists and is God. Conversely, the relation is in no way the act of the essence, because just as (Damascus says) the relation 'determines the hypostasis, not the nature', so also is it the act of the hypostasis, not the nature. Similarly, when a relation enforms a foundation, the suppositum is said to be related in the second manner of per se predication according to that foundation, just as Socrates is similar according to [his] whiteness or by [his] whiteness [Vat. eds. note: cf. Henry, SQO 60.2 in corp. (Bad. 2: 162B)]. However, the Father is not the Father by deity, according to Augustine in De Trinitate book 7, chapter 4, so here there is no such manner of relation to the foundation of the sort that there is in other things, because here the foundation is not actuated by a relation. Rather, it is only the act of the suppositum or [it just is] the suppositum.

[n. 138] I say briefly then that relation and essence are both in a person but neither is a form enforming the other. Rather, they are perfectly the same, although not formally. Nevertheless, since they are not formally the same, a relation in no way perfects the essence, nor is it the formal term received in the essence. The essence is in this way the form of the relation, because it is that by which the relation exists and similarly is God. The essence is the formal term of generation, just as in creatures a nature is the formal term of generation, not an individual act [Vat. eds. note: cf. Henry, SQO 56.4 in corp. (Bad. 2: 116F-G)].

Scotus, Ord. 1.5.2.un. n. 107-125

Here's Scotus, Ordinatio, 1.5.2.un. n. 107-125 (the first of four fascinating difficulties he discusses. The second difficulty can be found in translation here, and Peter Tartaretus' 15th century commentary on the second difficulty can be found here).

[n. 107] There are four difficulties here. First, how is a divine person one when one thing [the essence or the personal property] is not the act of the other potential thing?

[n. 108] To this, I say the following. First, a created quiddity is that by which something is a quidditative entity, and this does not pertain to imperfection, for it pertains to a quiddity from the nature of quiddity.

[n. 109] Nevertheless, an imperfect actuality pertains to a created quiddity – humanity, let's say – because it is divisible by that which contracts it to an individual – say an individual property, whatever that is, let's call it a – and [the quiddity] receives from a some actuality (either unity or individisibility) which it possesses in the individual and does not have in itself. That contracting thing, namely a, is not only in Socrates as 'that by which Socrates is formally Socrates', but is in some formal with respect to a nature, and that nature is in some way potential with respect to a. Whence, and this is the second point, a nature is contracted and determined by some a.

[n. 110] Third, although the humanity in Socrates is some act, and precisely by receiving humanity and by being distinguishing against itself by a, humanity is more perfectly an act than a is, although a is more properly an act and in some way an act of nature in as much as it determines a nature.

[n. 111] That which pertains to imperfection is left behind by applying these three points to the divinity.

[n. 112] First, deity is, from itself, that by which God is God, and also the subsisting 'of that which properly is a' is formally God, since to be 'that by which' in this way does not pertain to imperfection in creatures but rather pertains to the quiditity by which something is a quidditiy.

[n. 113] Second, there is disimilarity here, because deity itself is not determined or contracted by a personal property, nor is it actuated in some way, since that would pertain to the imperfection and potentiality of created natures. Similarly, deity of itself is a 'this', and so just as it has ultimate unity of itself, so also does it have actuality. Therefore, the personal property is a proper of a person, but nevertheless it is not an act of the divine nature which in some way perfects or enforms it.

[n. 114] Third, there is some similarity here, because a relation is the proper act of a person, and the essence is not the proper act of a person (but it is some act). Nevertheless, the essence is formally an infinite act, but the relaton is not of its formal nature an infinite act.

[n. 115] But how can these two acts concur in the constitution of one thing, if neither is the act of the other? For it is necessary that one thing be in another, since if not, each would be a per se subsistent thing, and then they would not be in the same per se subsistent thing. Similarly, the unity of any sort of distinct things only seems to obtain, according to Aristotle, on the basis of act and potentiality.

[n. 116] I respond that the unity of a composite necessarily is from the basis of act and potentiality, just as the Philosopher says in Metaphysics 7.7 and the final chapter of book 8. But a divine person is not a composite, nor is it quasi composite. It is, rather, simple, and it is really simple just as the divine essence is considered in itself, having no real composition nor quasi composition. Nevertheless, the formal nature of the divin essence is not the formal nature of the relation, nor the converse, just as was said above on the trinity in the solution to distinction 2, question 1.

[n. 117] But how is it that the when the nature of the relation in the thing is not formally the same as the nature of the essence but yet they concur in the same thing but do not constitute a composite? The reason is that the nature [of the relation] is perfectly the same as that [of the essence], for on account of the infinity of that one nature [viz., of the essence], whatever can be with it is perfectly the same as it. Therefore, perfect identity excludes any composition or quasi composition, and that identity is on account of infinity – and nevertheless, the infinity does not destroy the formal natures which are not the same as that of the infinite nature.

[n. 118] Therefore, there is no quasi composition [that can be inferred] from these [viz., from the essenec and a property]. For this reason, there can be no inference to a composite from act and potentiality. Rather, there is one most simple thing [that can be inferred] from these, since one nature is perfectly, indeed most perfectly, the same as the other, even though they are not formally the same. But it does not follow that 'they are perfectly the same by an identity of simplicity, therefore they are formally the same', just as was held concerning identity in the aforementioned question [Ord. 1.2.2.1-4 nn. 408, 411, 413-14] and will be held below in distinction 8 [n. 209 and 217]. That same perfect identity excludes any aggregation, because the same thing is not aggregated to itself.

[n. 119] And when it is added that 'one thing must be in another', I concede this in the sense that a relation is in a foundation or a source, but not in the sense that an act is in potentiality. Rather, as they are identically contained in an infinite sea.

[n. 120] In this way, it could be said that all of these are true: 'deity is in the Father, paternity is in the Father', 'the Father is in deity or the divine nature, paternity is in deity', but nevertheless, the word 'in' here does not have the sense of an act being in potentiality.

[n. 121] Now, the first of these is true as a nature is in a suppositum, having quidditative being by it (since it pertains to a quiddity whence it is a quiddity), but this is not on account of a form enforming a suppositum, even in creatures.

[n. 122] The second of these is true as a hypostatic form is in a hypostasis. But not as [a hypostatic form] enforms a hypostasis. For just as much as a quiddity, a hypostatic form, even in creatures, is not an enforming form, even though it is the form of a suppositum. It is here rather a quasi part [Vat. eds. note: e.g., in creatures, socrateity-humanity in Socrates]. However, here [in the divine case] there is, as it were, one formal nature concurring with another, formally, in the same simple thing, but possessing in itself many formal natures.

[n. 123] The third of these is true as a suppositum is in a nature, and it is clear that it is not as an enforming [form]'.

[n. 124] The fourth of these is true in the same way, since the way in which a whole is first in something, the part is per se in the same way, although not first in the same thing. This is clear of being in a place. Therefore, if the Father is first in a nature, as a suppositum of nature, then paternity 'will be per se in the same nature', in the same way of being 'in', although not in the first.

[n. 125] Further, what was said [in n. 119] in my earlier response gives the manner of 'in' – namely the manner in which a relation is in a foundation – which is not reduced to being the form in matter except where the foundation is limited, in as much as it does not have that relation in itself by perfect identity.

The divine essence, quidditative properties, and natural kinds

Scotus thinks the divine essence is a quidditative property. What exactly does that mean? A quidditative property is a 'whatness' property, a property that explains what kind of thing something is. Here I've explained 'quiddity' with the notions of 'what' and 'kind'. Does that clarify anything? Not really. The notion of 'what' and 'kind' stand in need of just as much explanation as the notion of 'quiddity'. So what is it that makes a property quidditative?

Scotus often describes a quidditative property as being common to many. On this account, any property that can only occur in one individual at a time would fail to be a quidditative property, and everything else would be a quidditative property. Accordingly, properties like being human, being white, and even being matter or being a form would be quidditative properties.

Scotus certainly thinks that being human is a quidditative property, so in this sense, a quidditative property is much like a natural kind. But Scotus also thinks that matter and form have an essence, so presumably being matter and being a form also count as quidditative properties. Would the modern writer think these are natural kinds? Probably not. I also suspect that Scotus thinks being white counts as a quidditative property too, although many modern writers don't want to count colors as natural kinds.

All that said, though, what about the property being an individual? This property certainly can occur in many individuals, and in fact it should necessarily occur in every individual. But obviously this kind of property doesn't count as a natural kind. So trying to define quidditative properties in terms of commonality doesn't seem to be any more illuminating than 'quiddity', 'what', or 'kind'. The question stands: what exactly is it that makes a property common?

Scotus sometimes claims that common properties have less than numerical unity. Since they have less than numerical unity, they are not incompatible with entities that have numerical unity. The idea is that something with numerical unity is numerically one. Things that are numerically one are just that: they are one, not many. This might make us think that common properties are those that cannot be common to many. If this is right, then a quidditative property would be anything that's not numerically one.

But if that's what it means to be a quidditative property, it's not clear just how the divine essence could be a quidditative property. If lacking numerical unity is precisely what makes something common or quidditative, then the divine essence would not be quidditative because, for Scotus, it has numerical unity. Conversely, if having numerical unity is what makes something incapable of being common, then the divine essence would have precisely that property, namely numerical unity, which makes something incapable of being common.

So again, if having numerical unity is what is supposed to distinguish individual properties (haecceities) from quidditative properties, then again we don't explain very much. The divine essence has numerical unity, just like individual properties (haecceities), so having numerical unity is not enough to do the explanatory work we need here.

Scotus sometimes says that being an individual means being indivisible. However, for Scotus, the divine essence is individisible, but in the divine case, this is compatible with being shared. Some x could be individisible and still be shared, just so long as it is not divided by those who share it. The divine essence is 'common' in this sense. Although it is indivisible, it is shareable.

Indeed, Scotus thinks that although the divine essence is indivisible, it is also communicable. Again, the notion of 'communicable' or 'shareable' stands in need of just as much explanation as 'kind' or 'common'. What is it to be communicable? It won't help to appeal to less than numerical unity, commonality, and all the other options already mentioned, for all of these need explanation too.

As far as I can tell, Scotus can only say that the divine essence is 'common' in the sense that each divine person shares it. But this sort of commonality doesn't seem to answer any questions. Lots of things are commonly shared by many, but the shared items don't make various things belong to the same kind. A duvet, for example, can be shared by two people, but a duvet doesn't make two people belong to the same kind. Being a shareable property does not, in itself, seem to amount to being a quidditative property. [Or does it? If two people share a bed spread, then they'd both have the common property sharing a bedspread. Would the persons have a common property sharing the divine essence in a similar way? And is that sufficient for the divine essence to function as a quidditative property?]

Scotus is clearly trying to say that quidditative properties are kind-maker properties, for the divine essence is in this context a divine-maker property: any x that possesses the divine essence will be divine in virtue of possessing the divine essence. Of course, this definition does not explain much, since a 'kind' stands in need of explanation, but for now, let's just assume that a quidditative property can be defined as a kind-maker:

(PQ) A quidditative property =df a property K the exemplification of which by some x is a necessary and sufficient condition for x to belong to K-kind.

When something exemplifies a quidditative property, this property makes that thing into the kind of thing it is. For example, the property being human is a quidditative property because any x that exemplifies the property being human is a human (belongs to human-kind) in virtue of possessing the property being human.

For Scotus, the divine essence is a quidditative property because it is a divine-maker: any x that exemplifies the divine essence is divine in virtue of exemplifying the divine essence. As Scotus puts it, the divine essence is that by which each person is divine, just as the property being human is that by which Socrates is human.

One caveat. Many medievals think the divine essence does not belong to a genus, so for someone of this persuasion, it's not exactly correct to say that the divine essence functions as a kind-maker, for there is no divine 'kind' (no divine genus). (However, Ockham thinks the divine essence can belong to a genus, so for him, it could be accurate to say that the divine persons belong to divine-kind.) But nothing philosophically significant seems to turn on this. Whether these cats say the divine essence belongs to a genus or not, it functions for everybody as a kind-maker property: it is the property in virtue of the possession of which the divine persons are divine.